Leigh Swigart: Welcome to our Roundtable on Justice and Accountability. The format of this session will be different from the one we have been following since the beginning of the conference yesterday morning. The audience has heard a series of people make very interesting remarks about the Responsibility to Protect in a conventional conference-panel style. We thought we would shake up the program now that we are getting toward the end, and have more of an informal conversation about some important questions related to R2P. These questions have been touched upon here and there throughout the other panels without ever being addressed head on. In short, we will be exploring where the ideas of justice and accountability for the acts that normally trigger an international intervention fit into the R2P scheme.

First of all, let me introduce the people who are assembled here to my left. To my immediate left is Hans Corell, who served as UN Under-Secretary General for Legal Affairs and the UN Legal Counsel during a period of time when the International
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were established, as well as the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. All of these institutions were created in response to mass atrocities – war crimes, crimes against humanity, and/or genocide.

Next is Richard Goldstone, who, among the many other hats he has worn, served as the first Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

Finally, we have John Shattuck, currently the President at the Central European University in Budapest, who served as the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor in the Clinton Administration. He was personally instrumental in the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

Since the conference began yesterday morning, speakers have approached the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect from a number of different angles, encompassing both the theory and practice of R2P as well as specific situations where it could very well have been invoked and was not. During these various presentations, the issues of justice and accountability have perhaps been touched upon but never directly addressed.

At this point, I feel there is a question we need to ask ourselves: if we are discussing a doctrine that was designed to be invoked in situations where there are mass atrocities – namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing – then what happens to the perpetrators of these crimes? So far, we have talked about these crimes in a sort of vacuum, as if there are serious crimes out there that have been committed without considering the individuals who could be charged with these crimes and held to account for them. And we also haven’t talked directly about the victims of these crimes, and how they might wish for their suffering to be acknowledged, and at least partially healed, through seeing or participating in some sort of justice mechanism.

What are some of the ways that considerations of justice and accountability have been suggested during this conference? It has been mentioned that there’s very little discussion
of the end game of R2P. If there is an intervention, humanitarian or otherwise, where does it end? What happens in the post-intervention phase? It was also suggested that it would be helpful to mandate that adequate resources be committed for affected populations as a condition of mounting an R2P intervention in the first place; that is, before there’s any kind of intervention, there should be adequate resources set aside so that there can be appropriate follow-up. In the presentation on North Korea, it was contended that it is perhaps impossible for the international community to balance the competing goals of answering the suffering of victims and securing justice and accountability for perpetrators of crimes against humanity. Is this, in fact, the case?

More generally, since the conference began, there has been a lot of talk about what goes into the pre-intervention phases of R2P. For example, we discussed how to negotiate the politics of the Security Council, and whether it is possible to set up an early warning system for crimes that would be covered by R2P.

But again, what happens in any kind of post-intervention phase? The R2P doctrine garnered tremendous support by world leaders in 2005; they were willing to acknowledge that there are crimes of such gravity that the international community cannot just sit back and let them happen. And, of course, institutions of international criminal justice have been established to investigate and prosecute exactly the same crimes that are at the center of R2P, that is, genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The international community thus believes, or at least its rhetoric expresses, that there should be no impunity for these crimes.

What exactly, then, is the relationship of R2P to any kind of mechanism designed to hold accountable the perpetrators of mass crimes, be they state entities, non-state entities, or individuals? Should an intervention by the international community into a situation of mass atrocity be necessarily followed by an international criminal procedure, for example? Should the international community instead assist states so that they are able to hold domestic prosecutions? For states that are parties to a regional human rights court, should the state itself be held accountable for some of these crimes? These are all questions that I hope we can explore during this roundtable.
I’d like to start by throwing out a couple of questions to our panelists and then will ask each to respond for approximately five minutes. I will also give our panelists the opportunity to make any commentary they would like on what has happened over the course of the conference, and to respond to their fellow panelists’ remarks as well. The first question is: “Can an internationally-mandated justice procedure be considered an R2P mechanism in and of itself if it brings about accountability for crimes and the deterrence of future violations?” The second question is: “When an international intervention has not taken place in a situation of mass atrocities and crimes against humanity, can international justice proceedings act as a kind of reparation for – or alternatively, a legitimation of – the failure by the international community to act?” I am going to hand the floor over to Hans Corell first.

Hans Corell: Thank you very much. First of all, I would like to point to the Responsibility to Protect and the prevention element here. This is the most important element, and you can’t prevent unless you demonstrate that, if there is a conflict, you will act resolutely and with result. You can compare this to the criminal justice system. If criminals see that nothing is happening when there are crimes, then criminality will just grow. The same applies here – if warlords and dictators see that nothing much happens if others start violating these international laws, then you will be seeing new violations. Everybody is looking at Syria now. I am looking for the next Syria, which could be anywhere in the world, because of the way the Security Council handled the Syrian situation. I will also go straight to how R2P is being enforced, because that is where the problem lies. It is very important to remember that the use of force is regulated by the UN Charter. There are only two situations that allow the use of force: in self-defense, according to Article 51, or if there is an unambiguous resolution by the Security Council.

There have been several references during this conference to the world’s state-centered system and the notion of state sovereignty. When we talk about R2P, we have to look at Article 2.7 of the UN Charter, where it is expressly stated that there must not be interference with the internal affairs of another state, unless by a decision of the Security Council under Chapter VII (threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression). So, we must remember that, in situations where the Security Council could invoke R2P, state sovereignty is no longer an issue and force can legitimately be used.

Also, when I hear the argument about neo-colonialism and Western ideas and so forth in relation to R2P, I am not very impressed. I ask myself, “Who is advancing such an argument?” And then I see that it is the head of government in a particular state. What then about his people, what do they think about the situation? The argument is probably made by a person who understands that, if the rule of law and democracy were established in his country, he would no longer be in power. So he is actually speaking in his own personal interest, not in the interest of his people. More generally, when I look around the world and see a conflict, I ask the question “Why?” And I have the same answer in every situation: “There is no democracy, no rule of law.” That is a recipe for conflict.

Then finally, somebody suggested that if the UN doesn’t work, we should establish a new body. I definitely warn against this. We should remember that the UN was created by a generation that had experienced two World Wars, and we should be very careful to defend the integrity of the UN Charter. I have even sent a letter to the P5 of the Security Council, saying “Don’t you understand that, if you do not act as you should when you have a R2P situation, the UN members might get fed up, saying, ‘Well, this doesn’t work, so let’s create a new organization’? Do you not, you the P5, understand that you will never ever in any new organization be given the legal authority you have today, with a veto power?” They should remember this and carry out their role properly. At the same time, other entities should not proceed to intervene without Security Council authorization. Thank you.

Richard Goldstone: Let me do two things: respond to Leigh’s first question, and then say a few things in response to Hans Corell. The question is whether an internationally mandated justice process, such as would be carried out by the International Criminal Court, can be considered an R2P mechanism. Let’s begin at the beginning. In 1993, the Security Council of the United Nations set up the first-ever truly international criminal tribunal, for the former Yugoslavia. In order to do this legally, it had to make the
connection between peace and justice, in line with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The Security Council unanimously decided that international justice was a form of restoring international peace and security. So the answer from the Security Council about international justice being an R2P mechanism is a resounding “Yes.” Whether the tribunal has lived up to that expectation and, in fact, has acted as a form of peacekeeping, is a much-debated question. I think that the expectations were pitched too high, but they were still met to a certain extent.

Look, for example, at the indictment of Radovan Karadžić in 1995. We issued two indictments against him, the first in July of 1995 before the Dayton Meeting was called, the meeting that brought the war to an end in the former Yugoslavia. Now, Dayton couldn’t have been held if Karadžić had not already been indicted. Remember that the Dayton Meeting took place within two months of the massacre in Srebrenica, a massacre ordered by Karadžić and carried out by his army chief, Mladić. There’s no question that the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including President Izetbegović, would not have attended Dayton and sat in the same room as Karadžić. But because he was indicted, Karadžić could not go – the United States would have arrested him and sent him for trial in The Hague. His not being able to attend the Dayton Meeting meant that it could be held in his absence. Ironically, Milošević acted as his representative at Dayton. And the Dayton Accords, whatever shortcomings they may or may not have had, brought an end to the war, and the guns have remained silent since. As somebody correctly said in the conference yesterday, the situation in the former Yugoslavia is anything but perfect, but it’s better than if tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of people had been slaughtered, and tens of thousands of women had been raped in the continuation of that war. So, on R2P, I think international law can, depending on the circumstances – and one can’t generalize – act as a mechanism to assist bringing an end to atrocities.

To turn briefly to the question that Hans Corell was addressing, the question of military intervention without the authorization of the Security Council, I want to raise the Kosovo situation. That was a serious contravention of international law, with NATO taking military action in the absence of such authorization. But as we know, an inquiry
ultimately found that the intervention, although strictly “illegal,” was “legitimate” from a moral standpoint. The problem that Hans Corell has pinpointed is that the members of the Security Council have irretrievably weakened their own body. Some Security Council members have almost gone out of their way to weaken the Council by invoking their veto in situations where it shouldn’t be applied. And, importantly as far as the International Criminal Court is concerned, the Security Council has not backed up its own referrals. The Security Council referred Libya to the ICC, and they referred Sudan. But what has the Security Council done after arrest warrants were issued by the International Criminal Court for alleged perpetrators in those countries? Pursuant to their referral, it has done nothing. I am fully supportive of the ICC Prosecutor’s recent decision to inform the Security Council that she has suspended the ICC’s Sudan referral because she can do nothing more. And it is to the discredit and shame of the Security Council that the R2P doctrine appears soft. I believe that if the Security Council goes on in the way it has – of not complying with its obligations – then the world will look to other ways of achieving these ends.

*John Shattuck:* Can international justice be an instrument of R2P? I think that’s your principal question. Let me answer very straightforwardly and say, “Of course it can.” But it’s not a simple question, and I think we see a number of instances in which it’s problematic. Justice is, above all, a human right; that is to say, it’s a right for the victims and a right internationally when it involves genocide and crimes against humanity. The human rights element is straight and pure. But justice as an instrument of ending conflict is a more problematic concept, and it’s had a problematic history, I think. I happen to believe, and in this respect agree with what Richard just said, that justice played a very important role in the critical period leading up to the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. Following Srebrenica, there was really no incentive for the parties on the ground – Milošević, Tuđman, and certainly others – to come together except for the international justice instrument. And so the threat of indictment, particularly in these very early days when the ICTY was just getting started, became quite real because, as Richard just pointed out, there were several important indictments that were issued prior to the Dayton Peace Process. The ICTY gave those of us involved directly in the Dayton Process a
means of confronting those who were committing the crimes against humanity on the ground. I was one of those people who was instrumental, in the sense that I was literally an instrument! In the fall of 1995, I was sent to Bosnia to gather evidence of mass atrocities and interview refugees. Then I would call in information directly to the chief Dayton negotiator, Richard Holbrooke, who would then confront Milošević or Izetbegović with information that he had gotten in real time from me on the ground. He would then threaten either to reinstate or initiate the NATO bombing, which was diplomacy backed by force, if you will. And he would remind them of the reality of the ICTY and the prospect that indictments might be forthcoming. So international justice played a very real, and a real-time, role, I think, in pushing forward the peace process.

On the other hand, you can look at Darfur and Rwanda. In Rwanda, of course, international justice came after no international intervention. This goes back to the question posed by Leigh about whether international justice can be seen as a kind of R2P instrument, a way to make up for the failure to mount an international intervention. I think that’s a serious point, and I was very supportive of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, where Richard was also the Chief Prosecutor. But I don’t think it became an instrument of conflict resolution in the post-genocide period in Rwanda. It was a very limited instrument and it was rather controversial in Rwanda. As for Darfur, I think the whole controversy around the question of whether President Bashir should or should not have been indicted by the International Criminal Court became a kind of political football. I can’t say that it was a means by which R2P was advanced in Darfur. My conclusion is that these are complicated practical questions having to do with justice and its relationship to the negotiation of peace.

I also want to respond to Hans Corell’s earlier intervention, to agree with his general proposition that prevention is the key to the Responsibility to Protect in its full implementation. That means prevention in all of its dimensions, not necessarily just intervention – although prevention is a form of intervention. And international law with respect to the use of force is a critical element for preventing the kinds of crimes against humanity that R2P is intended to cover. Where there’s no rule of law, then you see the
source of the conflict itself. So I will make a practical observation as an American who is deeply committed to my own country but very disturbed about what has happened since the 9/11 attacks in the United States and what has happened worldwide. I’m referring to the security preoccupation that we have had, which has in many ways undermined the international rule of law. It’s certainly done so in the most visible context, with respect to Iraq and our intervention without UN authority in 2003. But it has also happened in other ways, in terms of the counter-terrorist responses that we now take for granted and which are severely impacting various elements of international law. And this is certainly not only in the United States; it is happening in many other places.

So I have a proposition to put out there—and this goes to the Security Council point: I think it is time to mount a campaign for the permanent members of the Security Council to commit themselves to forgo their veto in situations where there are mass atrocities, crimes against humanity, and genocide. I think a serious international movement could develop along those lines, because this is where the primary breakdown of law occurs; it is in the Security Council. So that’s my comment on both of your interventions.

_Hans Corell:_ Thank you, John, for this last point. In fact, this was precisely my idea when I wrote my letter to the members of the Security Council in 2008 where I urged them to fulfill their role properly, and to find a way to limit their veto. In this letter, entitled “Security Council Reform: Rule of Law More Important Than Additional Members,” I suggested that the P5 adopt a legally binding declaration limiting their veto power.¹ And last year I developed my thinking further on the topic.²

To respond directly to the question about international criminal justice as part of R2P, I definitely agree with what has been said by the panelists here. But let’s think out of the box here, because this is how I view the future. The world is becoming more and more a

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global village. Criminal law has to apply to the whole village. Just think for a moment if there were no criminal law applying in the State of Massachusetts. It would immediately become a platform for all kinds of criminal activities. It would not work in the United States of America if one of the states didn’t follow the law. The globe will be dealing with the same situation in the future unless there is criminal justice all around the globe. We can’t have a platform from where criminal elements can act.

Richard Goldstone: I would like to respond to your second question about whether international criminal justice can act as a reparation where there’s been a failure to intervene. I believe it can, and it has. And it can domestically as well as internationally. Now we’re talking about forms of transitional justice. I think that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in my country, South Africa, was a form of justice. It brought acknowledgement to victims of the apartheid regime, to many of those that died. But we were also dealing with the living, and the TRC was indeed a form of reparation for some of them, if not all of them. Every individual reacts differently to forms of truth-telling. Some went away from the TRC angry; some went away with a great feeling of satisfaction.

On a more generalized level, I have no doubt that the Rwanda Tribunal assisted the population of Rwanda and is still assisting them in putting the genocide behind them. In addition they used the gacaca system, and as flawed as it was, it helped empty their prisons, which were terribly overcrowded, perhaps the worst prisons in the world. They couldn’t have used gacaca for the lower perpetrators without the Rwanda Tribunal having convicted the leaders of the genocide. And if one has visited Rwanda in recent years, and in particular the Genocide Museum, you see the work of the Rwanda Tribunal highlighted by the Rwandese themselves. I think if you ask most people in Rwanda today whether they think that the tribunal was a good idea, I have little doubt that a great majority will say “yes.”

Hans Corell: On this point, Richard is absolutely right. Rwanda was a member of the Security Council at the time it voted on the establishment of the ICTR, and it voted “No.” The reason they voted this way was that the tribunal could not use the death penalty. So I
was sent by the Security Council to Rwanda to discuss this issue with government leaders. And I went straight to President Bizimungu and said, “This tribunal cannot apply the death penalty.” We had quite an animated discussion, not unfriendly but animated, where I said, “The people you are looking for have fled Rwanda, and there’s no way they’ll be extradited to Rwanda if you have the death penalty in your own courts. You should cooperate with this tribunal because then they could be brought to justice and maybe be given long sentences in prison. As a former judge, Mr. President, I know that this is a very, very hard punishment.” So there we are. I think that the tribunal was very important for Rwanda.

_John Shattuck_: I want to inject a broader question of international law here, to be answered by anyone on the panel. It relates to the very important question of what happens when the international community fails, through the mechanisms of the UN Security Council, to intervene in a situation of genocide or crimes against humanity. Is there any recourse that the victims of these crimes might have against the international community? My question starts with another: what is the relevancy of the Genocide Convention in this domain? The Genocide Convention has been cited as imposing an obligation on the part of all states that have signed and ratified it to take appropriate action – whether it’s concerted action or, indeed, one can read the Convention to mean even individual state action – to respond to crimes that are rising to the level of genocide. It may be that the Security Council fails, as it has in a number of instances cited during this conference, to implement any kind of response due to a veto. Or, it may be that the Security Council does nothing, as in the case in Rwanda – it wasn’t that some member states issued a specific veto over action there; rather, there was simply no political will for the Security Council to go forward.

What is the obligation on the part of the member states who have signed the Genocide Convention and ratified it, vis-à-vis those who are on the receiving end of the genocide? I don’t have myself a good answer to this, but I can say that this is a question that has preoccupied at least twenty years of legal advisors inside of the U.S. State Department. When I was in the State Department and was an observer of the Rwandan genocide, I
actually raised the question in a public press conference in Geneva, and said, “I have just come back from Rwanda and there can be no question that genocide is being committed there.” I was then immediately called to account by the legal advisor’s office, which said, "You can’t do this because that’s a finding of fact, and you’re not able to provide judicial facts that warrant the actions that would be undertaken by the Genocide Convention.” I took heart from this, in a certain perverse way, because it indicated to me that the Genocide Convention actually had some bite, and it was preoccupying international lawyers on situations similar to the one I had seen. So my question really is, in essence, to Hans, about what the obligation might be.

*Hans Corell:* Well, this is a very important and interesting question. And what you just said reminds me that we were not allowed to use the word “genocide” in the discussions related to Rwanda in the Security Council in March or April and May of 1994. But then in June, things changed, when the Security Council adopted resolution 925 (1994) in which the word “genocide” is used, and that also authorized the French troops that were sent to Rwanda.

But if you are looking at it from a single state’s point of view, the situation is different. I was on a commission in Sweden that was charged with finding out whether we had Nazi criminals in our country, and we found out that there were a handful of them, many of them very old. But there were one or two we thought we might be able to prosecute. But then we found out that there were statutes of limitation that applied to these crimes, so they couldn’t be prosecuted. It was then that I discovered that there is a great difference between civil law states like my own, and common law states. The common law states were very much more focused on the territory where the crime was committed, while in our situation we would have had jurisdiction over these people. But we could not extradite someone from my country to one where he would be threatened by the death penalty. And I have experienced this kind of case, where we have brought people to justice in Sweden because we couldn’t extradite them. So if a person is suspected of having committed genocide somewhere in the world, what we found, at least in my country, is that we would be obliged to investigate this case and prosecute. We’ve
actually had cases against Rwandans in Sweden, not many but still some. This is what I can say from the UN perspective and from a national perspective.

Leigh Swigart: Let me just throw out a final question to the panel. It has to do with powerful states and their role in some of the obstacles that we see at the UN. At a recent meeting of the Brandeis Institute for International Judges, held in Malta, there was a judge from a small Caribbean nation who made a provocative remark. He said, “We sit here in our little island states, and we look at the U.S. doing targeted killings through drone warfare, with civilian collateral damage, and we think, ‘We would never get away with that. Why can the United States get away with that?’” Hans, you were talking to me yesterday about your desire to see some prosecutions come out of the recently released U.S. Senate torture report. This raises the question of what is the incentive for powerful states to actually do what they’re supposed to do, to play by the rules that they have been very instrumental in setting up? I’m just wondering whether there is anything that can be done, even by citizens, to try to have our own governments actually play the international law “game” as it ought to be played.

Richard Goldstone: Well, it’s an important question, and again one can’t generalize about powerful states. But it seems to me the United States is in an untenable situation, because it claims to be a democracy, it claims to support human rights, and it claims to be the world’s leading human rights protagonist. If that is so, it has a duty to comply with the rule of law, and to comply with justice domestically, so as to set an example. And it’s certainly, in my book, a great disappointment that the Obama Administration is doing nothing. This wouldn’t have been the view of Candidate Obama, but it is of President Obama, so I think there’s a huge gap. When this sort of thing happens in China and Russia, you don’t expect them to do anything because they don’t claim to be great human rights protagonists. But you can’t have it both ways, or you shouldn’t be able to have it both ways, and the United States, in fact, does in a number of respects like to have it both ways.

International justice is another issue. Without the United States, there wouldn’t have been an International Criminal Court established in 2002, and there wouldn’t have been the
Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals. It was the United States primarily that pushed for those courts, and from my own experience, I know that those tribunals wouldn’t have succeeded to the extent they did without the active support of the United States, politically, and economically in particular. The high profile defendants who ended up in The Hague wouldn’t have gotten there without the United States’ economic push, particularly against Serbia and against Croatia. But the United States’ attitude is an ambivalent one again in this area. Its attitude, and I don’t think I’m being unfair, is that international justice is a great idea, and we’re even prepared to pay for it, but don’t include us. It’s a great idea for the other 192 members of the United Nations, but leave us out. China and Russia are in a much easier position; they just don’t like international justice, period. There’s no ambivalence; one knows exactly what their attitude is and one tends not to expect more.

John Shattuck: Well there are two lines of analysis that one needs to apply in this case. And one is what I would call the “domestic political analysis” and the other is the “national self-interest analysis.” I think both lines of analysis, when properly pursued, point to the severe damage that the United States does to itself by failing to follow the rule of law. On the domestic political analysis, one can fault leaders but also one needs to fault the population at large. I referred briefly earlier to the situation since 9/11, where there has been a domestic, political, and security mania that has gripped the United States. It first manifested itself in the remarkable legislation that was enacted right after 9/11, called the “Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Terrorists,” which was passed unanimously by the United States Senate – a whole group of liberal human rights-oriented senators even voted for it, and there was only one vote cast against it in the House of Representatives. So, virtually the whole American body politic rose up and gave the authority for the President of the United States to do something that had never been done before, which is to pursue not just enemies who are nations or even groups of non-state actors, but individuals who can be designated by the sole discretion of the President of the United States as enemies who were responsible for the attacks on 9/11. And that law remains on the books and continues to be the underlying representation of the American domestic political support for the post-9/11 security apparatus.
There are many other parts of this. Of course, we know there were the various elements related to the use of torture, there was the relatively permanent detention of about 127 individuals in Guantanamo, and I don’t need to go on, everyone knows the examples. But this situation was produced not just by leaders, although there were leaders who were certainly doing this, and fanning the flames of the security response to 9/11, and they included the Vice President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense and others. But it penetrated down into the domestic/political sphere in such a way that I think it early on poisoned the American democracy and the response of democracy, which should have been more measured. This would have been the more appropriate response of a large powerful country to this kind of horrific attack. This was a massive crime against humanity. But the domestic political scene led to the kind of response that has undermined international law. And the correction of this situation depends on political leaders and those running for office, who need to start putting the international rule of law back on the agenda.

The second line of analysis is the national self-interest analysis, which has to do with the international actions of the United States. Clearly, the U.S. has a great, purely national-security interest in being able to assemble coalitions of countries and being able to assure that Americans who are operating overseas are going to be treated in the same way under international law that we should be treating others. Unfortunately, that hasn’t proven to be the case. Some of the security restrictions came out in the debate that took place in the Bush Administration over the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques,” where Secretary of State Colin Powell pointed out to those who were pushing for this kind of very broad interrogation response that this was going to endanger American soldiers overseas. If the Geneva Conventions weren’t applied fairly by the United States, then how could the United States expect to have them applied to our own citizens? So national self-interest clearly pushes for an adherence to the international rule of law, leaving aside even the larger question of the ideal of international rule of law that we’re talking about here at this conference. So I think both lines of analysis should be pushing the American body politic much more toward a return to the international rule of law. Whether that will happen is another question.
Leigh Swigart: Let’s give a hand to our panelists for sharing their wisdom, thoughts and experience with us. This roundtable has been an opportunity to reflect on some aspects of R2P, and of international law more generally, that had not been addressed up to this point in the conference. Many thanks.