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Personal Information

Citizenship: Bangladeshi *Gender:* Female *DOB:* May 26, 1979
Languages: Fluent in English and Bengali (native), conversant in Hindi, Urdu and French

Undergraduate Studies

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

S.B. in Brain & Cognitive Sciences, June 2001
S.B. in Economics, June 2001

Doctoral Studies

Brandeis University – International Business School (IBS)

M.S. in International Economics and Finance, May 2008
Ph.D. in International Economics and Finance, expected May 2010
Dissertation Title: “*Essays on the Political Economy of Foreign Aid*”

Committee and References

Professor Can Erbil
Brandeis University, IBS/Dept of Economics
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Professor Catherine Mann
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Professor Kathryn Graddy
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Professor Barry Friedman
Brandeis University, Heller School of Social
Policy and Management
bfriedman@brandeis.edu, 781.736.3783

Teaching and Research Fields

Primary Fields: Political Economy, Economic Development, Applied Microeconomics
Secondary Fields: Applied Econometrics, Behavioral & Experimental Economics

Teaching Experience

Lecturer

Fall 2007, 2008, 2009 Fundamentals of Microeconomics – Managerial Decision-Making
MA/MBA), *Brandeis University IBS*
Summer 2007, 2008, 2009 Microeconomic Theory (undergraduate), *Brandeis University*

Teaching Assistant

Fall 2009 Economics (MA/MBA), *Heller School for Social Policy and Management*,
Professor Barry Friedman

Spring 2009	Economic Theory and Social Policy (PhD), <i>Heller School for Social Policy and Management</i> , Professor Barry Friedman
Spring 2009, 2007	Advanced Microeconomics II (PhD), <i>Brandeis University</i> , Professor Kathryn Graddy, Dominique Lauga (MIT)
Spring 2008	International Trade Policy (MA/MBA), <i>Brandeis University IBS</i> , Professor Peter Petri
Fall 2007	Microeconomic Theory (undergraduate), <i>Brandeis University</i> , Professor Paroma Sanyal
Summer 2007	Introduction to Econometrics (undergraduate), <i>Harvard University</i> , Professor Can Erbil & Daniela Kulusheva
Fall 2006	Advanced Microeconomics I (PhD), <i>Brandeis University</i> , Professor Blake Lebaron
Fall 2006	Game Theory (undergraduate), <i>Brandeis University</i> , Jeremy Dalletteze
Fall 2006	Fundamentals of Microeconomics (MA/MBA), <i>Brandeis University IBS</i> , Jeremy Dalletteze
Fall 2004	Global Economic Environment (MA/MBA), <i>Brandeis University IBS</i> , Professor Stephen Cecchetti

Research Experience

Summer 2005 – Spring 2006	Research Assistant for Professor Chad Bown (<i>World Bank</i> project on antidumping)
Fall 2005	Research Assistant for Professor Stephen Cecchetti - Edited technical material for undergraduate textbook “ <i>Money, Banking and Financial Markets</i> ” by Stephen Cecchetti (McGraw Hill)
Spring 2005	Research Assistant for Professor Nidhya Menon (Development)
Summer 2004	Summer Intern, <i>Asian Development Bank</i> , Manila, Philippines

Relevant Work Experience

Summer 2008	Case Analyst, <i>LECG</i> , Valuation and Damages Practice, New York NY
Spring 2009 - present	Program Officer, <i>US-Bangladesh Advisory Council</i> , Washington DC

Honors and Awards

2001 – present	Sigma Xi Honor Society
2004 – 2008	Brandeis University IBS Fellowship
2003 – 2004	Brandeis University Global Leadership Award
1997 – 2001	MIT/Abdul Latif Jameel Toyota Endowed Scholarship

Conferences

2009 Alexander Hamilton Center Graduate Conference on Political Economy, New York University

Research Papers

“Elections, Electoral Competitiveness and the Foreign Aid Cycle” (*Job Market Paper*)

Using data on elections from the World Bank Database on Political Institutions, this paper looks at the effect of elections on overall bilateral foreign aid commitments from the OECD Development Assistance Committee to developing and emerging countries. I find that controlling for political competitiveness and incumbency, election years are associated with drops in aid commitments. Incumbents facing political competition during non-election years get more aid commitments than those who do not face such competition. Incumbents receive more aid than non-incumbents during elections, but when elections are politically competitive commitments are lower. This is consistent with the model of foreign aid with conditional aid in Alam (2009) where governments want to substitute away from conditional foreign aid

during election years when policy objectives of donor and recipient are not aligned. Moreover, I find that multilateral aid commitments do not exhibit such cycles around election years.

“Do Political Parties Prefer Foreign Aid or Campaign Finance?” (October 2009)

This paper uses a game theoretic model to examine the incentives of a recipient government to accept conditional foreign aid when individuals belonging to different economic groups democratically elect the government. These groups can forge political connections by making monetary contributions to political parties and can thereby potentially counter conditional foreign aid. Similar to Grossman and Helpman (1996) I find that the party with the higher probability of winning receives more contributions and is asked to deviate more from its preferred policy. In addition I find that parties deviate more from their preferred policy under unconditional foreign aid, but that this may no longer be true with conditional foreign aid. Moreover, if conditionality is high enough it may raise incentives for a contributing group to alter election probabilities in order to get that group’s policy implemented.

Research in Progress

“Gender preference in a household bargaining model”

Gender bias in household spending between boys and girls is a widely known phenomenon. I try to explain this fact by using a two period model of household bargaining where parents rely on their children for second period consumption and choose spending levels on children in the first period according to their future earning potential.