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Migration offers one extreme scene of selfhood as it confronts radically different contexts. The migrant leaves one place, language, society, culture, politics and starkly finds him and herself in another. As migrant, the situation entered becomes one at least of exchange, at worst of shock and displacement, but in any case of confronting diversity, where senses of self and of belonging are challenged, to greater of lesser degrees of dislocation, redefinition and transformation.

Anzia Yezierska’s tales of immigration have largely been read in terms of confrontation between the two groups of Old World/New World, with the Old conquered by the New through Americanization and assimilation. As plot in Yezierska, this assimilation narrative centers in daughter heroines seen as biographical reflections of Yezierska herself, in rebellion against parents or other figures of the lower East Side New York ghetto in order to pursue the independence and freedom promised by America. I propose instead to see Yezierska’s work as representing a range of positions in contexts of migration, as figured in a variety of characters, each representing distinctive models of and relationships between selves and groups.

Discussions of migration follow both a chronology and also a topology of methods and ideologies. The chronology moves from immigration to ethnicity to multiculturalism, and more recently, to diasporism, associated with such terms as transnationalism, multinationalism (which implies economic rather than cultural globalization,) hybridity, and migration itself. These recent terms stand in both tension and yet convergence with multiculturalism. Multiculturalism comes in many varieties, but tends to assume bounded groups as units of what is practiced as identity
politics; while diasporism assumes and but also disbands group boundaries. In this it verges into yet another contemporary discourse of selves and groups which see in diversity a post-ethnicity and what can generally be called post-identity.

These chronologies of topic in turn cross a variety of fields or methods: history, sociology, social psychology, psychology; then culture studies, and what will be the main line of approach here, political philosophy. Yet one key term through all these fields is identity. This is the case even in its critique and dissolution in post-identity discourses, but the term has been as problematic as it has been pervasive. As Philip Gleason wrote in 1983, identity is associated with Latin *Idem* meaning sameness: identity implies being self-identical, whose philosophical ties are with the unchanging unity of Platonist Ideas and essences. In this it re-poses the very question it sets out to answer: what constitutes the self in relation to others in a world of time, change, multiplicity? The pressure of this question has become increasingly acute under conditions of mobility, technological speed in transportation and communication, the gradual emergence of gender and sexuality as categories of analysis, and philosophical and theoretical implications of these forms and forces of fluidity. Culture Studies but also contemporary philosophy since Nietzsche rejects the notions of stable self-identical ‘essences’ outside of history, society, culture and politics. But this breaks apart the very terms through which the discourses of identity are conducted: if there is no ‘identity’ for either self or group, then who are we? What is a self? What is a group as frame and association of selves? From what positions do we speak and to whom?

My project here is very much at its beginnings; but I propose to shift the discussion from ‘identity’ to ‘membership.’ Membership is of course not a new term. It recurs through all the discourses of identity and post-identity. It does so however as
secondary, mainly as descriptive reference, rather than as a central and defining center of investigation. My intuition and interest is that by speaking of membership rather than identity the discussion shifts away from selfhood not only as a fixed standard but also as a compulsive self-obsession; one that raises all the problems of self-defined selfhood it wishes to resolve. To speak of a self as a member is already to approach the self as taking part in relation to surrounding others in cultural, linguistic, social, political ways, with whom and through which life is led. Groups in turn are constituted by the members which comprise it as they inter-relate in ongoing interchanges. Membership thus links together terms of identity and identification as used in social psychology.\textsuperscript{2} I however avoid the term ‘roles’ as it has, as Goffman insisted, theatrical implications and points to theories of performance that I think equally evade the question of selfhood they seem to address, notably in Judith Butler but also in Homi Bhaba and Stuart Hall, all theorists of post-identity. My discussion will mainly rely on terms taken from political philosophy, in its liberal and communitarian discussions of selfhood. But I wish to avoid a communitarianism seen as determinism and reification of the group, such as David Riesman for example does in “Individualism Reconsidered;”\textsuperscript{3} while also avoiding autonomies of selfhood implied in classic possessive individualism, as these strip away social embeddedness leaving,\textsuperscript{4} as in classical liberalism, where something close to an essence of selfhood defined outside history and society. This reifies the self rather than the group as a fixed essence. Oddly and ironically, while post-identity discourses rigorously attack claims to essence, they also leave the self in a floating and ambiguous disjunction from social contexts that would situate it.

To speak of membership here is not to speak of one only. Especially in modern Western societies, but perhaps to some extent everywhere the internet
reaches, selves do not belong to one membership only. To restrict selves to only one membership in today’s world requires isolation from social media; enforced through various means of intimidation and coercion, from threats of violence to murder. This is my definition of fundamentalism as well as totalitarianism: the attempt to restrict members from participating in any but its single membership group. Yet: those who do not live under conditions of such enforced restriction face a different consternation: how to be members in more than one group without dissolving both self and group into the sheer mobility, fluidity, hybridity of entry and exit, of time and change. Can a self be a member of more than one group, yet retain its commitments and contours? I propose to call this possibility of plural yet committed and organized (although not static) participation in more than one group complex memberships. The selfhood of complex members turns towards others in their memberships, in commitment and responsibility; rather than towards themselves in the self-reference implied in “identity,” with the tenuous ties to others implied in post-identities -- twin forms of isolate selfhood -- such as emerges in Mary Waters’ Ethnic Options, David Hollinger’s Post-Ethnic America; and which Steven Cohen and Arnold Eisen’s analyze in The Sovereign Self.

In outlining complex membership I draw on a vast and rich body of discussion from a variety of fields. I mention in particular Peter Berger’s analysis of primary and secondary socialization in the social construction of reality which implies, but doesn’t theorize, plural group memberships; Sylvia Fishman’s distinction between compartmentalized and coalescing cultures; and Michael Walzer’s writings, particularly his essays in Passion and Politics on “Involuntary Associations.”

Unlike historians and sociologists, my material of analysis in exploring issues of membership will not be documents or surveys or interviews, but literature – which
has often been used in documentary ways but less often through literary analysis. Yezierska herself has been a source for historical study of immigrant life, which she does indeed provide. But her work also represents different positions of and about diversity in America under conditions of migration. Her own discourses derive mainly in discussions of immigration that were contemporary to her, with its invitation and threat of assimilation or Americanization. This perspective was shared both by the immigrants themselves and those who dealt with them. But Yezierska’s work can be viewed from later approaches to group diversity and the selfhoods they presume – ethnicity, multiculturalism, diasporism, and post-ethnicity, as each of these presume models and ideologies of selfhood.

Ethnicity came after immigration closed down in the 1920s, a new term, as Jonathan Sarna and others point out, to avoid using the increasingly fascist connotations of race but also as a first shift away from Americanization models. These took two contrasting directions: towards closing off migration and towards greater American diversity. America had always provided a number of options in how it conceived migration. The dominant option offered a kind of inclusive singularity: conformity to the original Anglo-Saxon Protestantism – rather easy to do if you were German and Swedish. A second mode was exclusive singularity. There was only one sort of American, the Anglo-Saxon Protestant one, and no one could join. This nativist strain has repeatedly arisen when faced with new and large migration – first of Irish Catholics, then of Eastern European non-Protestant nationals, also of Chinese and Japanese, and now of Hispanics and Muslims. A third mode, the twentieth century melting pot but which had earlier appeared as the New American in Crevecoeur’s famous phrase, imagines an idealized amalgamation of the attributes of
all who arrive. This New American, however, often looked very much like the Old Northern European ones, in what is more or less another form of inclusive singularity.

Response to the mass immigration gave rise to another model, not singular but plural: the cultural pluralism with which discourses of ethnicity are associated. In the form proposed by Horace Kallen, "cultural pluralism" tilts emphasis towards the diversity of continued group distinctness, but harmonized with each other – “a multiplicity in a unity, an orchestration of mankind.” Just how to define and maintain this orchestration of difference is left vague in Kallen as John Dewey’s response to him. Dewey comes out strongly against the ideology of Americanization, but with an ambiguity as to how much harmony and how much diversity are to be balanced. He graciously dismisses as “some pet tradition” the “Englandism [or] New-Englandism, Puritan [or] Cavalier,” who would claim the right “to impose upon all . . . measuring the scope of Americanism by some single element.” To do so is to be “false to the spirit of America,” in which any and each component, whether “Teuton or Slav, can . . . but furnish one note in a vast symphony.” Howsoever, pluralist ethnicity assumes or argues for the value of group diversity but as sharing a common American commitment to civic and democratic norms. This is the classic pluralism model: diversity of culture but a common shared civic life. Such pluralism has been most comfortable for Jewish Americans, sanctioning them as both Jewish and American in what Jonathan Sarna calls the “Cult of Synthesis,” as if the two cultural systems really stand for the same structures and values. Just how and whether this synthesis continues to allow for Jewish distinctness within American culture is a driving concern of Jewish sociology and social psychology.
Ethnicity, however, gave way to Multiculturalism between the 1980s and 1990s. This is much less comfortable for Jewish Americans, and in some of its forms marks a shift from pluralism’s emphasis on liberal political culture and organization. Multiculturalism can in fact be a form of pluralism, as in Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka; but even there emphasis shifts from individual members to groups as units claiming greater autonomy and recognition apart from the mainstream culture, society, and norms. Its distinction from cultural pluralism is in seeing the body politic as an assembly of these distinct groups, with each culture recognized, and insisting that this multiplicity of cultures be equally represented with the majority society.\(^\text{11}\)

The political sphere is not one of common terms or norms but is itself open to renegotiation to reflect the diverse groups that make it up.

That such negotiation in fact relies on the democratic politics it critiques is only one of a number of fissures in this form of multiculturalism. The rights to diversity to which it appeals relies on the liberal democratic norms it questions. A second self-contradiction is that multiculturalism treats the group as a single reified whole, while at the same time insisting on the social construction of both group and individual. This would dissolve the very group boundaries which multiculturalism as identity politics defends.\(^\text{12}\) These are the grounds in any case on which diasporism critiques multiculturalism.\(^\text{13}\) Diasporism, with other discourses of transnationalism, challenges boundaries, instead asserting a mobile state of 'border crossing' [Bhaba], hybridity, and the ‘in-between’ in continually fluid shifting processes and representations. It therefore questions the kinds of identity politics that multiculturalism pursues when this assumes unitary if diverse group action. Diasporism however shares with multiculturalism an approach to groups as constructed through power differentials. The dominant figure here is Foucault.
Foucault analyzes society as systems of power, power that disciplines, informs, conforms subjects. In a core and powerful pun, Foucault reverses the notion of subject from an autonomous interiority, as Descartes established it, to subjection through social institutions that shape and determine the self. The only avenue of escape from this disciplinary conformity is through resistance, a resistance made possible through "gaps" between institutional disciplines in the overall power structure. The analysis of groups is thus reduced to power differentials, that is the power of dominant groups over groups that are dominated. In multiculturalism such groups are no longer specifically "ethnic" but rather “minoritized” groups measured not by size or origin or territory, but as sharing oppression and domination due to gender, sexuality, race, migration, rather than ethnicity as such. This is the basis of intersectionality, which oddly overrides diversity joining groups together, creating a uniform category of oppression as against a uniformity of oppressors regardless of historical differences and internal distinctions.

Diasporism, like multiculturalism, defines relationships in terms of power structures, of oppression and resistance; and does cross over with multiculturalism’s group politics if this is seen as “strategic” and not “essentialist.” At the same time, the hybridity and fluidity of boundaries of diasporism also recalls post-ethnic discussions. In these, however, the emphasis is less on power differentials and more on continued liberal assumptions of individual sovereignty and free choices – as David Hollinger declares: “The postethnic social order encourages individuals to devote as much or as little of their energies as they wish to their community of descent,” focusing on “self-definition” in an “internal, highly personal consciousness;” and this makes post-ethnicity in Hollinger’s terms “a classically liberal disposition.” P.23

The focus on “self-definition” Hollinger describes
accords with findings by Steve Cohen and Arnold Eisen in *The Sovereign Self*.15

The Sovereign Self is a liberal one. Yet liberal selfhood is something other forms of post-identity such as diasporism attacks. The liberal self is regarded as falsely metaphysical and asocial, ignoring social construction through institutions of power. What diasporism and post-identity (and also multiculturalism, depending on its politics) have in common are models of the self as hybrid, fluid mobility, constructed as "discursive and representational practices" in flux through altering social forces.16

II. Anzia Yezierska has been largely approached, both in her work and her life through the immigrant paradigm contemporary to her. Her writing is seen to be largely autobiographical, which is fair enough, featuring daughter-heroines who largely enact a scene of migration pursuing Americanization. I instead would like to focus on the wide range of characters and character positions Yezierska's stories represent. Yezierska's writing if often described as realist, yielding portraits of immigrant life which provide documentary material to historians. Yet at the same time the figures in her stories are strangely parabolic. They represent different positions in ways that verge on fable or parable. Realism and fable conjoin in figures that as parable are frozen into tableaus, but when juxtaposed with each other complicate these assignments. The parents are old world, the goyim – social workers, teachers, lovers -- are cold and distantly rationalistic, the daughters are emotional and fiery and hungry and rebellious. Actually, however, many social workers were German Jews from an earlier, much smaller immigration. That they are historically among the forces "Americanization" already shows to my mind the equivocation of "Americanization" as a term. Not only are there various sorts of Americans, but America itself is in Yezierska’s period undergoing intense transformations through
increasing industrial technologies and their many, many social effects. America itself is in acute transition. This is the case not only for economic organization, urban expansion, and social mobility upward and downward, but for gender structures and roles. Many of the moves towards female independence that Yezierska's daughters attempt that are called "Americanizations" are in fact just emerging in America itself. American gender roles largely shared the norms of domesticity, marriage, economic dependence and control that the Jewish immigrant women also experienced. Both the daughters and many American women are in the same gender boat, with some but not all trying to row their way into new waters. Other types Yezierska portrays are not ethnic so much as economic. The “Americans” in “America and I” are Jews who have moved into a middle- or upper-middle class stratum to the point they “were ashamed to remember their mother tongue” (21). The portraits of the ghetto, including dirt – an almost obsessive concern in social work in the ghetto, instruction in public schools, and reports such as Riis’s How the Other Half Lives” – reflect not ethnic character but overcrowding and lack of city services against which many futilely struggled.17 Yezierska’s urban scenes are likewise as much produced by immigrants as encountered by them as "America." The immigrant influx of workers created many of the conditions and industrial development, not to mention unions, of American economic life. America is in this period and, as many have claimed, from the outset defined by immigration. If as Oscar Handlin writes, Americans are immigrants, how do immigrants Americanize?18

But that is only to say that the characterizations Yezierska offers are not clearly or consistently assigned through, nor do they only represent national categories, immigrant or ethnic or "American." What they offer are less ethnic or American types than models of selfhood and notions of community that are associated
with each. In Yezierska’s case, these models can be connected to those developed by John Dewey, not as the romance figure of her fiction based on her own love affair with him, where he appears as rationalistic Gentile idealized lovers; but as a social theorist. Yezierska attended Dewey’s seminar on “Ethics and Education” in 1917, and then participated as translator in his Polish Immigrant project. She read his work and directly cites it in for example “To the Stars” and “All I could Never Be,” her fictionalized account of the Immigrant project placed in Chicago rather than Philadelphia.

As romance figure John Dewey represents a cold gentile detachment which starkly contrasts with but is vitally attracted to ethnic women, figured as chaotically emotional. Even this distribution of attributes in not just ethnic but also gendered; although assignments are never fixed. Both genders, and both ethnicities, at times exhibit qualities of cold or rational calculation; or warm and supportive care and mentoring. In any case, as an image of assimilation through love and marriage, the Dewey romances tend to be failures. The gap between the ethnic and the Yankee is too great, where Anglo-Saxon is itself represented as a kind of ethnic group – something that becomes pronounced in the conclusion of All I Could Never Be when Fanya goes to live in a New England town whose people are “parsimonious, provident, pinching and saving for a rainy day” (252). “Americanization” in this case means Yankee ethnicity. In any case, as has been increasingly recognized in discussions of Yezierska, she, unlike Antin, does not idealize abandonment of her cultural past for an “American” one. What she instead investigates is different models of being a self in America, of being an American.

This is where Dewey’s influence is more fully felt. Dewey when Yezierska knew him was working through models for interrelation of self and group, exposing
paradoxes of American selfhood and urging forms of democratic life. On the one hand: Dewey is extremely critical of pure American individualism – the “rugged” individualism which he calls “ragged.” [Tocqueville] He fears and protests the reduction of the self to possessive individualism as measured by money. “We are living in a money culture” he writes in Individualism Old and New; “its cult and rites dominate. The money medium of exchange and the cluster of activities associated with its acquisition drastically condition the other activities of the people.” In the Public and its problems he asks: “Is democracy a mere phase of transition from feudal rule to rule by wealth based on management?” (48) Or again, in “The Future of Liberalism” he sees laissez faire when taken as “the very order of nature itself” as resulting in the “degradation of the idea of individuality” in “socially unrestrained liberty in business enterprise” (227). This rejection of possessive individualism Yezierska wholeheartedly embraces. If the American dream is material success, she denounces and renounces it and its associated mode of Americanization, both in her writing and also, rather heroically, in her life.21 Possessive individualism of pure self-interest is likewise not assigned by ethnicity or gender. Jews and non-Jews, men and women, each embody the self-interest into which individualism can degenerate. Yezierska is deeply pained by the inequality of resources that results – I think this reflects her socialist ghetto environment but also Dewey’s democratic vision. In “Dreams and Dollars” she flees the advantageous marriage to money her sister offers, going back to the ghetto and to the love of a poet. In story after story, she bemoans an image of humanity in which “All are wearing out their bodies, brains for the possessions of things – money power position – their dreams forgotten” (Mostly About Myself).
To Yezierska, as to Dewey, what American individualism truly offers is not material reduction but creative freedom. Yet here further paradoxes emerge. The first paradox of American individualism is that its mode of self-interested self-assertion finally reduces and empties the self, enslaving it to material success rather than freeing it. A second paradox is that individualism itself is a cultural paradigm: that is, it is not itself a product or instance of self-determined self-defined autonomy but a cultural form. As Michael Walzer observes in his essay on “Involuntary Associations,” the norm of self-determining individuals requires a community that would educate, teach, and train its members to be individuals—that is, would have to take on the attributes of an involuntary association into which you are born and into whose culture the self is inducted. Dewey is deeply committed to the notion of social selfhood. He however attempts to overcome bifurcation into an asocial individual autonomy as against collective determination of the individual. Dewey instead reaches for a middle ground, what he calls in *The Public and its Problems* “not individualism vs collectivism but social distributions across both.”

I believe this form of engaged selfhood becomes the central mode Yezierska explores through variations in character and plots: especially as figured in the young women who attempt, as story after story puts it, “to make myself a person.” But what exactly does the word “person” intend here? In stories where personhood is taken to mean repudiating and abandoning ties to the ghetto, family and group customs; these characters are represented not as heroines to be taken as ideals, but as losing what are often deeply lyrical and poignant images of traditional life. In “Children of Loneliness,” for example, the father’s anger and despair at his daughter’s rejection suddenly evaporates into the “sobbing voice” of his prayer as “he felt the man of flesh drop away in the outflow of God around him.”
poignancy of this description separates the narrator’s voice from the daughter’s
violent tearing “free” (157) from her parents and her own attachments. At issue it
seems to me is not ‘assimilation’ from Old to New but a self that is positively engaged
with others as against an isolated individualism – although paradoxically such
individualism is itself an American social mode. The story’s final image of such free
individualism is a blank and sterile room with “four empty walls” (162), ironically
fulfilling the strictures given by social workers to immigrant children for uncluttered
space. Like Wittgenstein’s artichoke, what you are left with after you peel away all
the leaves is not essence but nothingness.

The daughter here as typically in Yezierska nonetheless finds her strength
when she sees herself as “one of the millions of immigrant children,” 163. Alongside
the recurrent phrase to “make yourself for a person” is another repeated phrase, “My
Own People.” Dramatically, Yezierska herself repudiated Hollywood fame and
fortune to return to the ghetto without which she had no creative voice. She is neither
ghetto nor Americanized, but rather struggles with which combinations will come to
define herself as American and America itself.

I think complex memberships may be a way to rethink oppositions between
community engagement and creative selfhood, of how individuals pursue their
courses in relation to social others. Dewey’s discussions of cultural pluralism are
immediately relevant to her, where he describes America as “complex and compound.
. . inter-racial and international in its make-up. . . composed of a multitude of
peoples speaking different tongues, inheriting diverse traditions, cherishing varying
ideals of life.” This “international” form as America’s nationalism he saw as what
distinguished America from the warring homogeneous nations of Europe: our
nationalism [is] distinct from that of other peoples,” he writes; “our unity cannot be
homogeneous – but created by drawing out and composing into a harmonious whole the best, the most characteristic which each contributing race and people have to offer" (National Education Address). He intriguingly remarks in *The Public and its Problems* that “each individual is a member of more than one group, [and] this means different groups interact flexibly in connection with other groups.” 122.

This is a mode of cultural pluralism with which Walter Benn Michaels associates Yezierska and criticizes in his essay “Race to Culture.” Pluralism continues to claim “a specifically cultural identity, an identity that can be embraced or rejected,” something he associates with multiculturalism as well. <sup>25</sup> Benn Michael points to more radical theories of representation; not as melodramas of “dying or surviving” but, citing James Clifford, of "complex historical processes of appropriation, compromise, subversion, masking, invention, and revival" (Predicament p. 338). Yezierska herself strikingly proposes issues of representation in her reflections on the Hollywood circulation and production of her image as Cinderella of the Tenements from which she fled. The Hollywood film of her Hungry Hearts and the 2010 “Sweatshop Cinderella” documentary of Yezerka by Suzanne Wasserman all come into play. There are as well Yezierska’s detailed representations of dress. As I pursue this material, I want to read Yezierska in terms of contemporary discourses, testing her against different forms of post-identity towards ways that both acknowledge plurality within and around the self and yet also realigns and confirms contours of selfhood. Dewey, like William James, was pretty radical in rejecting metaphysical categories. For him, in both individuality and nationhood “nothing is fixed, given ready-made” yet is “achieved not in isolation but with aid of conditions, cultural, physical, economic, legal, political, as well as science and art,” *The Future of Liberalism* p. 27). These are views Yezierska echoes. For her, the self admits various
sorts of participation in various sorts of membership groups, but tries to navigate among them within a framework that without being static would maintain connections as well as differences among parts of the self and the others without which no selfhood can arise.

FOOTNOTES (INCOMPLETE)

2 Peter Berger Social Construction; Simon Herman
3 David Riesman Individualism Reconsidered
4 Macpherson possessive; Sandel
5 Berger: primary and Secondary identification implies plural groups and their prioritization but mainly as social-psychology of individual formation.
6 Sylvia Fishman Jewish Life and American Culture SUNY 2000 coalescence compartmentalization
7 Kallen Democracy vs. the melting pot

9 Dewey Natl Edc/ speech. Cf Bourne
10 Glazer what is multiculturalism; Gleason
11 Sarna Cult of Synthesis Sarna The cult of synthesis in Am Jsh Cltr Jsh Social Studies 5: 1,2 autumn 1998-Winter 1999 52-79 Sarna Cult of Synthesis It may also be, as he theorizes, that "the identification of Judaism with America rendered the abandonment of Judaism ... unnecessary" since
"by being a better Jew, one became a better American as well, and to be a better American was what the children of the immigrants most wanted"‘30 also shaping a pluralist Amr Note Decades ago Marshall Sklare noted that liberal American Jews "locate the source of their ethic in Judaism," although the "motive power for their making such an identification comes from the general culture.” 2
12 Parekh Multiculturalism Rethought
13 Parekh Rethinking Multiculturalism tries to present a very fluid multiculturalism; but this argument needs to more fully explain how groups are and are not bounded.
14 Fn from Lowe quote from Tinh too check from mltrcltrlism rethought
15 David Hollinger Am Jw Hist Communalist and Dispersionist 22-23 in Eisen/Cohen and Diner
16 Cf Hasia Diner elasticity of definitions of Jewishness and norms for Jewish practice: all Amrs as ’Jews by choice’ Whether they affiliate or not continue to invest their Jewishness with meaning”
17 Tololyan Rethinking Diaspora 5 p.15. cf Stuart Hall Cultural Identity and Diaspora
18 Fn Riis; my own background immigrant stories insist on great efforts towards cleanliness, especially on Friday to prepare for the Sabbath.
19 Oscar Handlin The Uprooted p. 3 Immigration is American history.
20 Essay on affect
21 Reference articles that acknl this vs older readings of her in the assimilation model.
22 Wrong readings of Yezierska as embracing materialism... ??
23 Walzer involuntary associations
24 Melvin L Rogers the Undiscovered Dewey Columbia Press NY 2009
25 sees Darwin as locating exp into a web of social rel/s that is plural in its offerings. To condition an aestheticized vision of the self wh/ cold erode connec/ to others. Also to hold at bay a strong communitarianism the left unchecked equaly threatens to make us unresponsive to the claims of others.
Both private aestheticism and strong communitarianism blocks give and take of anti-authoritarian legacy of modernity.


25 Walter Benn Michaels Race to Culture (672-673).