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
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Middle East Brief

The Communal Fracturing of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood

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In March 2016, the Jordanian government prevented the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan from holding internal elections for its leadership;¹ the following month, police closed the Brotherhood's headquarters in Amman and its offices in several other cities.² Government officials stated at the time that the Brotherhood in Jordan, originally licensed in the 1940s as a charitable society and a branch of the Brotherhood in Egypt, had become illegal because it was not licensed in accordance with a new political parties law adopted in 2014.

These moves occurred almost exactly one year after a group of Muslim Brotherhood dissidents successfully registered a rival "Society of Muslim Brothers" as a purely Jordanian domestic organization. The government backed the new Society's claim that the seventy-year-old original organization was illegally using the Muslim Brotherhood name.³ These actions were unprecedented for Jordan and seemed to constitute a sharp departure from the historically non-confrontational relationship between the Hashemite monarchy and the Brotherhood, which had always been legal and allowed to operate openly in the Kingdom. Many analysts described this as a "major crackdown" and a sign that, in banning and repressing the Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan was following the lead of, or succumbing to pressure from, its allies: the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.⁴

But these moves by the Jordanian government did not presage a wider suppression of the old Muslim Brotherhood. The government had merely taken advantage of a pre-existing rift among Islamists and used bureaucratic

and regulatory tools to coerce the organization to participate in parliamentary elections scheduled for September 2016 and not boycott a third consecutive national election.⁵ The strategy worked: The now unlicensed Muslim Brotherhood backtracked on its threat to boycott the 2016 election, and its still legal political wing, the Islamic Action Front Party (IAFP), ran candidates on a coalition list.

This Brief argues that this strategy by the Jordanian government exacerbated an intra-Brotherhood rift that is often misunderstood as reflecting a purely ideological divide between hardliner oppositional “hawks” and moderate participatory “doves.” Focusing on ideology, the Brief argues, misses the communal dimension of this divide, between Islamists of Palestinian origin and those of Transjordanian origin. The 2015 defections and split in the Jordanian Brotherhood echo earlier ones in 1997 and 2001, which can be characterized as Transjordanians leaving the Muslim Brotherhood because of its confrontational relationship with the government, its readiness to boycott elections, and its reluctance to fully participate in Jordanian politics on the monarchy’s terms, including giving votes of confidence to appointed governments.

Rival Muslim Brotherhood organizations now exist in Jordan: a licensed new one, dominated by Transjordanians, and the unlicensed original one, increasingly representative only of Palestinian-Jordanian Islamists. These two are in addition to groups and independent Islamists, mostly Transjordanians, who had left the Brotherhood earlier. This communal split within the Muslim Brotherhood, exacerbated by the government’s intervention, could have serious long-term implications for Jordanian society and politics if it leads to the conflation of anti-Muslim Brotherhood and anti-Palestinian sentiments.

A Loyal Opposition

Since its founding in 1945, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has operated legally and openly, including during long periods of martial law and when political parties were prohibited, from 1957 to 1992. The historical relationship between the Jordanian monarchy and the Muslim Brotherhood has often been described as “symbiotic”: The Brotherhood supported the monarchy in the 1971–72 civil war and has never called for its overthrow.⁶ The Brotherhood enthusiastically participated in elections when parliamentary life resumed in 1989 and won twenty-two seats. The IAFP was formed in 1992, soon after parties were permitted, and became the de facto political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Partly because of this history, militant Islamist groups in Jordan have lacked a pool of repressed Islamists from which to recruit, and hence remain relatively unorganized; no equivalent of Egypt’s Islamic Group (al-Gama'a al-Islamiya) exists. The security services closely monitor Jihadi Salafi thinkers and activists and arrest them when they threaten internal stability.⁷ Since the 1990s, the relatively small Jihadi Salafi movement in Jordan has tended to export jihadists to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria instead of targeting the Jordanian state,⁸ an estimated two thousand Jordanians had joined groups fighting in Syria as of 2015.⁹

Jihadi Salafis in Jordan come from throughout the country but, based on available evidence, appear to be disproportionately Transjordanian and not

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drawn from Muslim Brotherhood cadres. Salafis in Jordan have clerics and networks of recruitment separate from (and fiercely critical of) the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, al-Salt and Ma'an are Transjordanian towns in the north and south, respectively, where identifiable jihadi Salafi circles developed at periods of time when the Muslim Brotherhood barely had a presence.

Since the early 1990s, however, relations between the Brotherhood and the Jordanian government have been uneven and often tense. Electoral systems in Jordan are ephemeral: Between each election, the government tinkers with electoral districts or electoral rules (e.g., votes per voter, seats per district, total number of seats, use of electoral lists, “winner-take-all” voting systems versus proportional representation, reserved seats) or both. These changes are implemented to limit the electoral success of the Muslim Brotherhood and to ensure the election of a parliament that will support the monarchy’s legislative priorities and the Prime Ministers the King appoints. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood strongly opposed a shift, put in place prior to the 1993 elections, to a system in which voters had only one vote in districts with multiple representatives—along with subsequent gerrymandering and redistricting that dramatically overrepresented rural areas; both changes were seen as strengthening “tribal” candidates and weakening Islamist ones.

The Brotherhood and the Jordanian government have disagreed on other issues as well, most notably the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty with Israel, relations with the United States, and cultural issues. In the lead-up to each election, the government announces incremental changes to the electoral system, and the Shura Council of the Muslim Brotherhood then decides if it will participate in or boycott the imminent election.¹⁰ The Brotherhood, through the IAFP, participated in parliamentary elections in 1993, boycotted in 1997, ran a reduced slate of candidates in 2003, participated in 2007, and boycotted in 2010 and 2013. It was in this context that the splits prior to the 2016 election occurred.

A Brotherhood Divided

Academics and journalists typically explain divides within the Muslim Brotherhood as ideological, and closely track the relative standing of factions or “trends.”¹¹ The most prominent divide identified has been that between moderate “doves” and hardliner

“hawks,” with the distinguishing feature between them being how confrontational they want the Brotherhood to be vis-à-vis the government. Journalists carefully watch intra-movement elections and appointments to chart the relative standing of these factions. For example, the relative influence of “hawks” purportedly peaked in 1991, followed by a victory by “doves” in the Brotherhood’s 1994 Shura Council elections. Over time, however, other factions were identified: We were told that “centrists” emerged victorious in internal 1998 elections, only to be usurped by a new “Hamasist” faction in the early 2000s, after which seats on the Brotherhood’s Executive Bureau were split between “centrists” and “Hamasists” in 2008.

In late 2012, a group of Muslim Brotherhood “doves” launched the “Jordanian Building Initiative,” which became known as Zamzam, named after the Zamzam Hotel in Amman, where they met. The Initiative came to emphasize political reforms based on Jordanian citizenship, loyalty to Jordan, working with other parts of Jordanian society, and, most critically, “a desire to maintain a collegial and non-confrontational spirit when interacting with any party, including the Jordanian regime.”¹² This included committing to participate in elections scheduled for 2013, which the leaders of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, emboldened by the election of Muslim Brother Mohamed Morsi as President of Egypt, planned to boycott if a recently approved electoral law was not amended.¹³ The Zamzam organizers were responding in part at the time to speeches and a series of “discussion papers” by King Abdullah that outlined his vision of politics and described electoral participation as a national duty.¹⁴

In an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg of *The Atlantic* in late 2012, King Abdullah referred to the Muslim Brotherhood as a “Masonic cult” run by “wolves in sheep’s clothing,” and recounted meeting with leaders of the Jordanian Brotherhood the previous year, soon after the Arab Uprisings began:¹⁵

They were the first people I saw in the Arab Spring. They were the loudest voice, so I brought them in, and they said, “Our loyalty is to the Hashemites, and we stood with you in the ’40s and ’50s and ’70s,” and I said, “That is the biggest load of crap I have ever heard.” And they were like, “Aaaargh”—they were shocked.

The King recalled, Goldberg reports, that he said to them:

“My father told me that you guys watched the way things were going, and when you saw that my father was winning, you went with him.” I said, “This is complete and utter bullshit, and if we’re going to sit here and bullshit each other, then we might as well have a cup of tea and then say goodbye. If you want to have a serious conversation”—we Arabs like to ass-kiss each other for the first half hour of conversation—“if you want to have a serious conversation, here’s where we start.”

The King continued by outlining areas of common interest, he told Goldberg, and told the Brotherhood leaders, “I think you’re part of the Jordanian system, and I think you should be part of the process.” “I think we all leave this meeting,” he said he told them, “feeling really good, but—I’ll be honest with you—there’s 10 percent distrust from me, and 10 percent distrust from you, I’m sure. But we have good vibes here.”

King Abdullah says that after the meeting, Brotherhood leaders met with the Supreme Guide in Cairo and decided not to participate in the national-dialogue committee in Jordan. According to multiple sources, Jordanian intelligence claimed to have intercepted messages from Brotherhood leaders in Egypt encouraging the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood to boycott the 2013 elections; in the end, despite pressure from the King and the Zamzam Initiative to participate, the Brotherhood went ahead with the boycott, marking the first time they had boycotted consecutive parliamentary elections. This further antagonized the Jordanian government, leading to its decision two years later to license a new “Jordanian” Muslim Brotherhood led by “doves,” which was committed to participate in elections and in government-sponsored reform endeavors.

In February 2015, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Shura Council expelled ten members from the organization, including a former leader, Abdul Majeed Thneibat, for violating the group’s bylaws. These members had been collecting signatures and meeting with government authorities in an effort to get a new license in the name of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood was first licensed “as a society” in 1945 as a branch of the Brotherhood in Egypt. This legal status was modified to that of a charitable society in 1953, but without its having to sever relations with the Egyptian organization. The dissident Brothers, including Thneibat and several members of the Zamzam Initiative, claimed that the old Muslim Brotherhood organization was no longer a legal entity because it had not been

re-licensed under a new political parties law passed the previous year. They sought to rectify that status, but also to completely disconnect the Jordanian Muslim Brothers from any Egyptian leadership or pan-Islamic organization.

It is unclear to what extent the Jordanian government instigated the dissidents’ actions—but at the very least, in an effort to weaken the Muslim Brotherhood or to coerce it to participate in elections or both, it supported the dissidents through regulatory and legal means. In March 2015, the Jordanian government approved their application to make the Society of Muslim Brothers a licensed Jordanian domestic charity with new leaders.¹⁶ The old Muslim Brotherhood’s Shura Council rejected the government’s decision and denounced it as interference in the internal affairs of the organization. They accused the dissidents and the new Society of being pawns of Jordanian intelligence and part of a post-Arab Spring effort by the government to weaken and co-opt the Islamic Movement.¹⁷

As of March 2015, Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood has been formally split. The new, officially licensed Brotherhood is defined strictly as a Jordanian group. The older, officially unlicensed and therefore illegal Brotherhood remains much larger, and nominally loyal to the regional movement based in Egypt. Although some Zamzam members helped form the new Society and joined it, many did not—and Zamzam ultimately created a new party called the National Congress Party (Hizb al-Mu’tamar al-Watani).

Internal Divisions in the Muslim Brotherhood

The central argument of this Brief is that what is almost always described as an ideological divide within the Muslim Brotherhood misses its communal dimension, and it is this dimension of the split that could have serious long-term implications for Jordan. Ostensibly “ideological” or religious divides between “doves” and “hawks” and “centrists” within the Muslim Brotherhood are really about political considerations—namely, how accommodationist the Brotherhood should be vis-à-vis the Jordanian government—and this disagreement largely falls along a line separating Transjordanian from Palestinian-Jordanian Islamists. “Transjordanians” are Jordanian citizens who trace their origins to groups living east of the Jordan River before 1948. “Palestinian-Jordanians” refers to Jordanian citizens who trace their origins to towns or villages on the West Bank of the Jordan River; most came east to Jordan in 1948 or 1967

or are descended from people who did, or else came to Jordan from the Gulf in 1990–91. Palestinian-Jordanians are estimated to constitute approximately 60–70 percent of Jordan’s population and are also citizens.¹⁸

Transjordanians have long been given preference over Palestinian-Jordanians with respect to public sector jobs, contracts, and benefits such as health care and subsidized goods, and this was particularly so in the years after the 1970–71 civil war. Official Jordanian government employment statistics indicate that public sector employment constituted 90 percent or more of the employment in most Transjordanian-majority governates throughout the 1990s but less than 50 percent in most Palestinian-Jordanian areas. Many Transjordanians, particularly those in the south and in rural Jordan, came to see public sector jobs and favoritism as an entitled “right.” Members of Parliament can often mediate access to such jobs and benefits,¹⁹ so it is not surprising that surveys show that Transjordanians place a greater priority than Palestinian-Jordanians on voting for candidates who have wide influence with government institutions. Such influence is commonly referred to as *wasta*.²⁰

Deputies affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood typically have less influence with government institutions than other deputies, for several reasons. The Brotherhood is ideologically opposed to favoritism, discourages its MPs from facilitating access to undeserved government services, and highly values its reputation for relative “cleanliness.” Most importantly, the Brotherhood’s constant criticisms of the peace treaty with Israel, of relations with the U.S., of the electoral system and limitations on legislative power, and of emergency laws often put its deputies in conflict with government ministers, thereby limiting their clout.

Aside from a short period during the 1990–91 Gulf War, the Muslim Brotherhood’s bloc of deputies has not joined, or supported via parliamentary votes of confidence, any post-1989 Jordanian government; and since 1994, its withholding of support has been directly linked to the Israel-Jordan peace treaty and Jordan’s normalization of relations with Israel.²¹ Owing to its size and ability to mobilize, the Brotherhood coordinates many opposition efforts.²²

The key difference between “doves” and “hawks” in the Muslim Brotherhood is the importance they place on avoiding confrontation with the Jordanian regime. What does being in “opposition” mean? Should that opposition be continual and absolute? Should the Brotherhood always decline to support governments via parliamentary

votes of confidence, or should it be realistic about the Israel-Jordan peace treaty and view such votes in pragmatic terms? Electoral boycotts and poor relations with the regime affect members from Transjordanian-majority areas more than those from Palestinian-majority areas because of Transjordanians’ greater reliance on government jobs and services. And it is difficult for Muslim Brothers to serve that community if they are not in Parliament or are constantly on bad terms with ministers.

Echoes of Previous Splits

The 2015 rift in the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has been called “unprecedented” and “the biggest crisis in its 70 years of existence.”²³ In reality, the split echoes earlier splinters in the organization, and the schism is one that has existed since at least 1993. The members of both the Zamzam Initiative and the group that registered the new Society were almost exclusively Transjordanian “doves,” such as Abdul Majeed Thneibat and Irhail al-Ghraibeh. Their reform initiative centered around redefining “opposition” to encompass being more accommodating to the government and committing to participate in elections. It was also expressed in national terms, in being committed to the Jordanian state and to government initiatives.

Most prominent defectors from the Muslim Brotherhood over the past twenty-five years have been Transjordanians. These defectors remain Islamists and continue to share the ultimate goals and ideology of the Brotherhood. At least nine of the thirty-three Muslim Brothers who served as deputies in 1989 or 1993 or both subsequently left or were expelled from the Brotherhood for opposing nomination decisions, the 1997 electoral boycott, or the Brotherhood’s stance on votes of confidence. Seven of these nine were Transjordanians, among them several prominent leaders who had held executive positions in the organization.²⁴

The first Muslim Brotherhood decision to boycott a parliamentary election, in 1997, triggered a reaction among Transjordanian members similar to what subsequently occurred in 2012. Although Transjordanian Brothers agreed with the justifications for the 1997 boycott,²⁵ many opposed the decision because they knew that surrendering parliamentary representation would limit their influence with government institutions and weaken the Brotherhood in Transjordanian areas.²⁶

Several prominent Transjordanian Islamists quit the Brotherhood over this issue or were expelled when they defied the boycott and competed in 1997 as independents. Such defections reinforced the communal divide because they made it difficult for the Islamic Action Front Party (IAFP) to subsequently rebuild support in Transjordanian areas in which it once had been successful, as its future candidates would have to compete against newly-independent Islamists as well as other candidates. In interviews, Muslim Brotherhood leaders noted the increasing difficulty of finding “suitable, well-known candidates” in Transjordanian-majority districts: Transjordanians with Islamist tendencies would rather run as independents than carry the burden of association with the Brotherhood.

A group of Islamist “doves,” unhappy with the Muslim Brotherhood, created an alternative Islamic Center Party (ICP) in July 2001. The core of the ICP is overwhelmingly Transjordanian, and its leaders are mostly from one town, al-Salt; several are from the same family.²⁷ Marwan Faouri, ICP spokesperson and Deputy Head of the party’s political office when I interviewed him, said that the main differences between the ICP and the IAFP are that the ICP is a Jordanian Party focused on Jordanian issues: independent of the Muslim Brothers, committed to moderate Islam, and committed to participation in elections. He disagreed that the ICP is a party primarily for Transjordanian Islamists, claiming that its membership is 60 percent Transjordanian, which he contended is “just like Jordan.”²⁸ The rift that created the ICP is identical to the one that led to the establishment of Zamzam and the new Society.

National Implications of the Split

As of now, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has split into at least four different groups:

1) The old or parent Muslim Brotherhood is officially unlicensed and vulnerable to restrictions at any moment. Yet, it remains popular, particularly in Palestinian-Jordanian majority areas, and has ten members of its affiliated and legal IAFP in Parliament.

2) The new Society of Muslim Brothers is legal and led by Abdul Majeed Thneibat, a former head of the parent organization. Its leaders are overwhelmingly Transjordanian, but it contested only one district in the 2016 election and failed to win a seat. The breadth and depth of its popular support are unclear.

3) The Islamic Center Party remains a legal party with a Transjordanian following in al-Salt and towns close to Amman. It was the largest party in Parliament in 2013, when the IAFP boycotted the election, but won only three seats in 2016.

4) The Zamzam Initiative, which claims that only 20 percent of its membership is composed of former Muslim Brothers, is also almost exclusively Transjordanian. While Zamzam has no official standing, its affiliated National Congress Party won three seats in the last election.

The Jordanian government’s recent exploitation of this rift in the Muslim Brotherhood risks repolitizing the divide between Jordanians of Palestinian origin and those of Transjordanian origin. That divide has arguably become less salient as memories of the 1970–71 civil war fade and the neoliberal economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s changed the political economy of the country, but it is often just below the surface of social and political tensions in the Kingdom.²⁹ Since the early 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood has come to increasingly rely on votes from Palestinian-Jordanians as Transjordanian Islamists defect from the organization and run as independents. The delicensing of the old Movement, which continues to be supported primarily by Palestinian-Jordanians, and the licensing of two new Muslim Brother splinter groups (in addition to one pre-existing one), supported primarily by Transjordanians, exacerbates and institutionalizes this trend.

The old Muslim Brotherhood has morphed over the past twenty-five years into a de facto party for Palestinian-Jordanian Islamists, not Transjordanian ones. Palestinian-Jordanians have always played a large part in the Brotherhood—especially since 1971, after the Jordanian government allowed the organization to take on social and economic roles formerly fulfilled by the defeated Palestinian Liberation Organization in refugee camps.³⁰ But this transformation of the Brotherhood is really a result of the rapid decline in support for the organization among Transjordanians since 1993.

Some Transjordanian defectors portray the recent splits as amounting to a takeover of the leadership of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood by Hamas.³¹ When Hamas was allowed to operate in the Kingdom it did share space with the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, but this relationship changed drastically after November 1999, when the Jordanian government banned Hamas, closed its offices, and sent four of its leaders (all Palestinian-Jordanians) to Qatar.³² The two organizations became independent and

organizationally distinct in the 2000s, and leadership ties were officially severed in 2008. The recent appointment of Palestinian-Jordanians to the leadership of both the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAFP should not be understood as a “Hamas takeover,” however. Rather, such charges reflect the de facto communal transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood and Transjordanian Islamists’ willingness to imply that the Palestinian-Jordanian-dominated Brotherhood is disloyal to Jordan.

The institutionalization of this communal divide among Islamists limits the ability of the Jordanian government to emulate the Moroccan regime’s strategy of integrating Islamists into the domestic political arena.³³ Although the new Society, the ICP, and the Zamzam group will gladly play a participatory role similar to the one that the Justice and Development Party plays in Morocco, this would result in the government incorporating Transjordanian Islamists and leaving out Palestinian-Jordanian ones, which would run counter to the government’s efforts to create a more inclusive, unified Jordanian national identity, as was the goal of the “Jordan First” and “We Are All Jordan” campaigns in the 2000s.

And there is another, darker danger. Curtis Ryan and others have written about the “resurgence of identity conflict” in Jordan and have taken note of an increasingly vocal Transjordanian nationalist community, including among military veterans. In a so-called “veterans’ uprising” of recent years, calls for the disenfranchisement of Palestinian citizens of Jordan have spread from the fringes of Transjordanian nationalism to more prominent and central groups.³⁴

These rifts make it increasingly easy for the old, illegal Brotherhood to be characterized as having a non-Jordanian and unpatriotic agenda. We could see a confluence of rising anti-Muslim Brother and anti-Palestinian sentiment among Transjordanian nationalists, leaving the government stuck between right-wing Transjordanian groups and a “Palestinian” Muslim Brotherhood.

Conclusion

Since the Arab Spring, Jordan has moved closer in regional affairs to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, three governments hostile to the Muslim Brotherhood at home and abroad. For this reason, it is tempting to view the government’s actions in recent years as marking the beginning of a crackdown on the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. But as I have argued elsewhere, there has not been a fundamental change in how the Brotherhood and the Jordanian government view and interact with one another.³⁵ The Brotherhood had not participated in parliamentary elections since 2007, and a third consecutive boycott in 2016 would have altered the narrative regarding the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s commitment to elections and to pluralism. Instead of letting it go down that path, however, the government exploited a pre-existing fissure in the Muslim Brotherhood to coerce the organization to participate in the 2016 elections. But this strategy widened and institutionalized a communal divide that, over time, could spread to other parts of the Kingdom.

Endnotes

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- 2 “Jordan Closes Muslim Brotherhood Headquarters in Amman,” *Al Arabiya*, April 14, 2016.
- 3 Soon after the new Society was licensed in March 2015, the government prevented the old Muslim Brotherhood from holding a rally to commemorate its seventieth anniversary. “Declaration Forbidding Muslim Brotherhood Celebration after al-Majali Meets With Them,” *khaberni*, April 29, 2015 [in Arabic].
- 4 See, for example, Osama Al Sharif, “Will Jordan Ban the Muslim Brotherhood?” *Al-Monitor*, April 6, 2016.
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- 6 See, for example, Marion Boulby, *The Muslim Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan 1945–1993* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1999).
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- 8 The last major terrorist attack in Jordan—the coordinated bombing of three hotels in Amman in November 2005—was carried out by Iraqis affiliated with al-Qaeda in Iraq, led at the time by the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. On Jihadi Salafism in Jordan, see Mohammad Abu Rumman and Hassan Abu Hanieh, *The Jihadi Salafist Movement in Jordan after Zarqawi: Identity, Leadership Crisis and Obscured Vision* (Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2009), and Joas Wagemakers, “Jihadi-Salafism in Jordan and the Syrian Conflict: Divisions Overcome Unity,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* (2017).
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- 12 Nael Masalha and Shadi Hamid, “More Than Just the Muslim Brotherhood: The Problem of Hamas and Jordan’s Islamic Movement,” *Brookings*, February 6, 2017. See also Tareq Al-Naimat, “Zamzam and the Jordanian Brotherhood,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, February 4, 2014.
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- 14 The first of these discussion papers, “Our Journey to Forge Our Path Towards Democracy,” was released on December 29, 2012.
- 15 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Modern King in the Arab Spring,” *The Atlantic*, April 2013.
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- 17 Several scholars have argued that the Jordanian government divides Islamists along ideological lines. See Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001), and Ellen Lust-Okar, *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- 18 This usage of “Transjordanian” and “Palestinian-Jordanian” is consistent with numerous studies of Jordanian identity, including Laurie A. Brand, “Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24 (Summer 1995), 46–61; Adnan Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians, and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999); Joseph Andoni Massad, *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); and Stefanie Nanes, “Hashemitism, Jordanian National Identity and The Abu Odeh Episode,” *Arab Studies Journal* 18 (Fall 2009).
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- 22 On coordinated opposition activity in Jordan, see Janine A. Clark, “The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 38 (November 2006), 539–60.
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- 25 The Movement offered public justifications for the boycott in “Why Does the Muslim Brotherhood Boycott the Parliamentary Elections in 1997? A Statement to the People” [Arabic pamphlet], Amman: Muslim Brotherhood Headquarters, dated July 13, 1997.

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- 29 [Curtis Ryan, “We Are All Jordan’ . . . But Who Is We?” Middle East Research and Information Project](#), July 13, 2010.
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