

POWs held captive in North Vietnam's infamous "Hanoi Hilton." Lerner presents a fair appraisal of Commander Bucher's performance before, during, and after the *Pueblo's* short-lived spy mission off North Korea. The author rightly criticizes the Navy for overemphasizing Bucher's failings as a leader when other officers higher up the chain of command were derelict in their duties. At the same time, Lerner suggests that Bucher was a mediocre officer and that "the possibility exists that a more experienced captain would have achieved different [more positive?] results" (p. 46).

The author makes a compelling argument that American civilian and military leaders mistakenly believed that Kim Il Sung's regime would not attack a U.S. naval vessel without being directed to do so by Soviet leaders in Moscow. Lerner goes too far, however, in castigating President Johnson and other officials for viewing the Cold War confrontation in "simplistic shades of black and white" (p. vii), in itself a simplistic revisionist argument. But Lerner is on the mark when he faults these leaders for failing to take heed of North Korea's growing belligerence in late 1967 and early 1968. The North Vietnamese attack on USS *Maddox* in 1964 had already shown that regional Communist countries might act without Soviet direction. U.S. intelligence agencies possessed credible information in early 1968 that an American ship off North Korea's shores might be at risk, but that analysis was not passed on to military commanders. While critical of Johnson's Cold War mentality, Lerner credits the president with avoiding war and gaining the release of *Pueblo's* crew.

Lerner amply supports his contention that the defense establishment in Washington and in the Pacific sent an inadequately prepared ship and crew in harm's way and then failed to support them. *Pueblo's* steering equipment and communications systems were in abysmal condition. Naval commanders in the Pacific, who had operational control of *Pueblo* on her intelligence-gathering mission, failed to have warships and aircraft ready to rush to Bucher's aid in an emergency. Since the ship carried some of the U.S. intelligence establishment's most sensitive equipment and information, their negligence was especially egregious.

The author generally handles the details of naval operations, command relationships, and equipment usage well, but there are several exceptions. He characterizes the .50 caliber machine gun as "antiquated" and not accurate beyond fifty yards (p. 1), an imprecise characterization. Although the weapon was incorporated into the U.S. arsenal in World War II, the American armed forces continue to employ it more than half a century later because of its superior range, accuracy, and hitting power. Lerner observes that Bucher would have sent his sailors on a suicide mission had he ordered them to man the ship's two .50 caliber guns positioned on deck and exposed to enemy fire. Throughout the Vietnam War, however, American sailors fired similar weapons from the exposed decks of

river patrol boats and other craft on the narrow, foliage-bordered waterways of the Mekong Delta. Lerner makes the surprising statement that since the youngest *Pueblo* sailor was "only nineteen years old, and the average age was a mere twenty-eight" (p. 44), the crew was too inexperienced for the mission. At that time, nineteen year olds were the mainstay of the U.S. armed forces, and they routinely demonstrated exceptional professional skill and coolness under fire. Finally, Lerner questions the wisdom of deploying spy ships, submarines, and patrol aircraft on the periphery of the Communist world during the Cold War when that risked the loss of those resources and the lives of American servicemen. Those familiar with the results of such hazardous and sometimes deadly missions, however, understand that the information gained was absolutely vital to America's survival and ultimate victory in that long confrontation.

These points aside, Lerner has prepared a thorough, informative, and well-argued analysis of a key event in modern international history. This book should be the starting point for anyone interested in America's tumultuous Cold War experience in Asia.

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EGAL FELDMAN. *Catholics and Jews in Twentieth-Century America*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2001. Pp. xiii, 323. \$34.95.

The remarkable twentieth-century transformation of Catholic-Jewish relations in the United States deserves far more attention than it has received. During the 1930s, Father Charles Coughlin spewed antisemitic hatred over the nation's airwaves, Catholics assaulted Jews on the streets of Boston and other cities, and a Catholic prelate, John F. X. Murphy, could publish in a respected Catholic journal an article entitled "The Problem of International Judaism." Fifty years later, American Catholic textbooks have largely been purged of anti-Jewish sentiments, Catholics dialogue with Jews in cities across the nation, and both the Holocaust and the State of Israel constitute subjects of serious Catholic reflection.

How such a wondrous transformation came about is the subject of this much-needed book. Feldman, author of a companion volume entitled *Dual Destinies: The Jewish Encounter with Protestant America* (1990), begins his study with the "theology of contempt," which, in the tradition of the French scholar Jules Isaac, he defines as a "deeply embedded legacy of Catholic principles and teachings of anti-Judaism which had been transported to the United States." He then leads the reader through a series of historical flash points, including the Dreyfus Affair, political Zionism, the Spanish Civil War, and organized Catholic efforts to lure Jews into the embrace of the church. What transformed Catholic-Jewish relations and placed them on a new course, he argues, was *Nostra Aetate* (1965), the Catholic Church's Declaration on

the Jews, part of its Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions approved by the Second Vatican Council. This, he shows, led to "the Age of Dialogue," the "uprooting of contempt," contrition for the church's past role in anti-Jewish persecutions, and heightened sensitivity both to the "black shadow of the Shoah" and, following the 1967 Six-Day War, to "the importance that nationhood held for the Jewish people." The Vatican's recognition of the State of Israel on December 30, 1993, marked, Feldman believes, a "revolution" in Catholic-Jewish relations. Without minimizing areas of continuing disagreement, he concludes that "teaching, dialogue and theological renewal" have produced a "metamorphosis" in Catholic-Jewish relations, helping to shape a new and more conciliatory interreligious theology.

Feldman focuses far more on Catholic attitudes toward Jews than upon the reverse. Nineteenth-century American Jewish anti-Catholicism, urban interactions between Jews and Catholics, and changing Jewish attitudes toward the church hierarchy still await their historian. Feldman also underestimates the role of lay Catholics in stimulating improved Catholic-Jewish relations as early as the interwar years, and the role of church leaders like Richard Cardinal Cushing of Boston, who revolutionized Catholic-Jewish relations in his diocese long before Vatican II. Finally, Feldman takes no account of Gerald Gamm's bountiful insights in *Urban Exodus: Why the Jews Left Boston and the Catholics Stayed* (1999) into the residential, political, and structural factors that helped to shape Catholic-Jewish relations on the local level.

Nevertheless, Feldman offers a generally reliable and eminently readable overview of how Catholic-Jewish relations improved in America over the course of a tumultuous century. At a time when Muslim-Jewish relations stand at a low ebb, his volume provides a welcome reminder that, under the right historical circumstances, even the most seemingly intractable of religious antagonisms can be overcome.

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CAROL M. SWAIN. *The New White Nationalism in America: Its Challenge to Integration*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2002. Pp. xxix, 526. \$30.00.

This is a highly problematic book. Carol M. Swain has an agenda: she wants to convince the public that current government policies are exacerbating racial problems in the United States and that religion, especially Christianity, can play a role in the solution. The argument is straightforward, if curious. Swain argues that racially contentious policies like affirmative action and liberal immigration policies not only are misguided but may bring more whites into the racist movement. This is an increasing possibility today, she contends, because of changes in the political outlook of many whites as well as changes in the racist movement. Racial preferences in university/college admis-

sion and employment and the growing ratio of non-whites to whites in the population fuel resentment among whites already frustrated by such factors as the decline in industrial jobs and high rates of black-on-white crime. At the same time, the white racist movement has become more savvy at recruiting mainstream whites, packaging its message in the language of civil rights, being willing to talk about difficult race issues otherwise unmentionable in liberal circles, and finding the Internet the perfect vehicle to reach a wide audience. To avoid the catastrophe of a mass influx into white racist groups, Swain concludes, we need to address those legitimate issues about race that are being raised by racist groups and embrace the potential of religion to alleviate some of the thorny racial issues facing the country.

In a brief review, it is difficult to address the full range of problems that plague this book. One set of problems concerns Swain's criteria for evidence. To make the case that the racist movement is in the position to recruit large numbers of whites from the political mainstream, Swain needs evidence that racist groups are, or could be, successful in their efforts to reach the mainstream. But much of her evidence is highly suspect. She points to white student unions on campuses without acknowledging that these are very rare and declining. When she cites the Southern Poverty Law Center's statistic that the number of racist groups is increasing, she neglects to note that most scholars conclude that the number of racist group members is steady or declining. She presents *The Turner Diaries* purportedly authored by William Pierce, the (now-deceased) head of the National Alliance, as a "movement-inspiring" book, substantiating its importance by first noting, without citation, that "many ordinary people" have read it and that "the readership is put in the hundreds of thousands"—then muting her claim to "[c]learly, a number of ordinary white Americans have at least heard of [it]" (pp. 40–41). Swain also relies fairly uncritically on statements by racist group leaders, without considering the distortions of their public presentations. When Don Black of Stormfront makes the incredible claim that his website receives as many as 15,000 visits a week, she concludes that it has "incredible popularity" (p. 6).

A second set of issues is analytic, especially Swain's tendency to rely on the self-characterizations of racist groups. When David Duke describes himself now as a "white nationalist" rather than the racist he was in his Nazi and Ku Klux Klan past, or when racist groups identify their success as the result of unchecked multiculturalism and nonwhite immigration, Swain repeats these statements as conclusive. Similarly, she presents a letter to a racist website that purports to be from a high school girl and biographical accounts by racist leaders of their conversion to racism without noting their striking resemblance in form and content to stories by racist activists in a variety of other venues, suggesting that many are contrived for public con-