

tions. Many believe that this event constituted a turning point, convincing broad segments of the Jewish population that their only hope lay in emigration.

With 120,000 Jews coming to Israel to 1950–1951, many of them with a higher education, why has it taken so long for a comprehensive study of their recent history to appear? A significant number of the leaders who had espoused the “Iraqi orientation” chose to remain in Iraq after the mass emigration, faithful to the belief that it would one day turn into a society in which Jews and Arabs would live side-by-side as equals. Eventually, most of these leaders emigrated in the 1960s and 1970s. Several of them have written memoirs, which serve as key documents for Kazzaz (along with many other sources, both foreign and local). It is clear that for these Iraq-oriented Jews, the final separation from their country brought about not only the obvious suffering of becoming refugees, but also a major spiritual trauma. This may be one reason why it has taken so long for their story to be told.

What we are not given in Kazzaz’s book is a sense of what Jews with average education, and average income (or lower) thought and felt about being Iraqi in the period under discussion. These reactions must have been complex, undoubtedly difficult to document, and should surely form the subject of another study. In any event, the Jews of Iraq provide us with an intricate case of modern Jewish identity, which Kazzaz shows is deserving of detailed attention.

HARVEY E. GOLDBERG  
The Hebrew University

Thomas A. Kolsky, *Jews Against Zionism: The American Council for Judaism, 1942–1948*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990. xi + 269 pp.

The American Council for Judaism (ACJ), founded in 1942 to oppose “a Jewish state, a Jewish flag or a Jewish army,” claims the dubious distinction of being the only Jewish organization in the United States created to fight against Zionism. In this well-researched volume, Thomas Kolsky recounts the story of the ACJ from its prehistory in anti-Zionist circles of the American Reform movement and the American Jewish Committee to the founding of the state of Israel in 1949, when many in the ACJ sought to liquidate the organization and it lost the bulk of its supporters.

Kolsky has examined a great many newly available primary sources in the course of his research, and he is better informed about the inner workings of the ACJ than any previous scholar. He demonstrates that the ACJ underwent something of a metamorphosis as early as 1943, when Lessing Rosenwald and Elmer Berger transformed it from being a rabbinic-dominated religious organization aimed at reviving Reform Judaism into a lay-dominated political organization aimed at combating Zionism—a move that deprived the ACJ of more than thirty percent of its rabbinic supporters. He also argues, persuasively, that confirmation of the mass murder of Jews in Europe had a decisive impact on the ACJ’s fortunes, depriving it of many potential sympathizers and undercutting its optimistic, assimilationist ideology. Finally, he blames lack of funds and ideological weaknesses for the ACJ’s failure,

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implying that it might have succeeded better had its budget been larger and its leaders more astute.

The deeper significance of the Zionist/anti-Zionist clash eludes Kolsky. He fails to penetrate fully the symbolic meaning of the clamorous debate that he recounts, not realizing that, at its core, it reflected an unbridgeable chasm between two opposite visions of American Jewish life. He also fails to perform more than a rudimentary social analysis of pro-and anti-Zionist forces—an analysis that might have helped us better to understand why some Jews of German descent converted to Zionism while others did not. Finally, he fails to address the psychological dimensions of ACJ membership, although the motivations of some leaders cry out for explanation and the issue as a whole is known to have split some American Jewish families down the middle.

The analysis that Kolsky does provide is tainted by his obvious sympathy for the ACJ's cause. He laments that an anti-Zionist organization was not formed earlier when "it might have been more successful." He criticizes the "abusive" tactics of American Zionists and claims that many of the ACJ's worst fears about the consequences of a Jewish state ultimately came true. In the final analysis, he concludes, "the ominous predictions of the American Council for Judaism are still haunting the Zionist venture."

JONATHAN D. SARNA  
Brandeis University

Mark Levene, *War, Jews and the New Europe: The Diplomacy of Lucien Wolf, 1914–1919*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. 346 pp.

In discussing Lucien Wolf's diplomatic career, Mark Levene means to challenge the "Whig interpretation" of Anglo-Jewish history during the First World War, from which Wolf has hitherto emerged as the most conspicuous victim. Journalist, historian, champion of Jewish civil and minority rights, and diplomat—the person who may be said to have directed Anglo-Jewish foreign policy for more than two decades—Wolf is nonetheless known mainly as one of the most persistent opponents of Zionism and of the Balfour Declaration, the zenith of British-Jewish cooperation. Having been on the losing side, Wolf was relegated to the margins of historical research, while his ideas and policies were presented as irrelevant. In the past decade, however, historians have been showing a growing interest in Wolf, perhaps because of two contradictory but complementary factors: the maturity and deideologization of Anglo-Jewish history; and the changing attitudes in Western Jewry toward Israel, Zionism and Russian Jewry, problems of the kind with which Wolf himself dealt. Under these circumstances, Wolf's version of Jewish nationalism seems to have acquired a new relevance.

Using a rich corpus of primary and secondary sources, Levene presents the most comprehensive, authoritative study of Wolf's career published to date. It deals with his activities during the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference, when he