Office of the President

Task Force on Academic Administrative Structure

March 14, 2023

Dear Staff,

Earlier this month, I informed the faculty that we are convening a Task Force on Academic Administrative Structure, to review the role of the provost and the position’s responsibilities, and to determine an appropriate structure for the academic administration, given some ongoing challenges, especially regarding Brandeis’ current financial model.

We discussed this task force and its charge during a productive faculty meeting on Friday. I wanted to ensure that you were also apprised of the background, and rationale, for forming this group now, and so I've included my initial letter to the faculty below. As you can see, the Chair of the Brandeis University Staff Advisory Council (BUSAC) is also on the task force. The task force will submit its report to me by May 15, and I will update both faculty and staff when they do.

I am looking forward to the findings from this task force, and to the positive changes that will follow. I am confident that a new and improved structure will help us to better position Brandeis for long-term success.

Sincerely,

Ron Liebowitz


Dear Faculty Colleagues,

In 2010, a special committee reviewed the responsibilities of the provost and concluded that Brandeis would be best served by a provost who acts as the chief academic officer and the second-ranking member of the administration. The committee made several recommendations as a part of restructuring senior administration; since 2010, some were implemented, others not.

I am writing today to announce the formation of a task force to once again review the role of the provost and to focus on two specific items related to the position’s responsibilities: (1) clarifying the language in the Handbook when it comes to the authority of the chief academic officer (the provost) on the one hand, and the School deans on the other; and (2) defining an appropriate structure for the academic administration given the ambiguities and consequences of the university’s flawed financial model (explained below). The task force will work on these two issues while Carol, Stew, and I make changes to move ultimate responsibility and decision-making for academic budgets to the provost likely effective July 1, 2023.

There is a larger context for the creation of this task force. As president, I care about nothing more than this university building upon its hard-earned reputation for academic excellence, intellectual rigor, and a truly unique commitment to both consequential research/scholarship and undergraduate education. We have over the past few years discussed how Brandeis is a far more complex institution relative to our peers given our size. This level of complexity creates added strains on our financial resources. Addressing the two issues in the task force’s charge will allow us to focus better on university priorities and allocate precious resources where they are most needed: to recruitment and retention of excellent faculty and staff; to our highest quality academic programs; to our physical infrastructure; and to student life.

This is a remarkable institution with a relatively short, but highly consequential, history that has had a great impact on higher education. I believe its future is exceedingly bright. In order to make progress toward that future, we need to address the issues that this task force will begin to tackle. I look forward to discussing all of this in detail at our faculty meeting next Friday, March 10. 

Rationale for the Task Force Charge

This past year, the university experienced a large, unexpected miscalculation in the projection of revenue from our graduate programs. Such errors are especially challenging when an institution’s margins (its projected revenues less its projected expenses) are as exceedingly slim as ours. This error brought to the surface several weaknesses that must be addressed in our decision-making and budget planning processes. It also emphasized the importance of long-term thinking around realistic enrollment predictions, particularly given the national trend of declining enrollments.

But we cannot address this issue simply or singularly. The projected revenue shortfall, and the late date when it came to the senior leadership’s attention, can be traced directly to our highly decentralized financial model, which is reinforced by the ambiguity in how some decisions are made — primarily between the provost and the deans. We need to review processes and timelines regarding, in particular, information related to admissions and finances of our graduate programs.

The flawed financial model adopted about 20 years ago (described below) is in transition and will be more centralized in future budget cycles. At the same time, the lack of clarity in who makes decisions that carry with them financial consequences, and how these decisions map to the structure of our academic administration, must be addressed if any financial model is to serve the university’s mission, long-term sustainability, and prosperity.

I am, therefore, appointing a task force comprised of faculty who were elected to our major committees, the four division heads from the School of Arts and Sciences, plus an elected staff member from the Brandeis University Staff Advisory Council with experience working in the academic administration, to forward recommendations that will:

  1. Clarify the language in the Handbook when it comes to the responsibilities of the chief academic officer (the provost) on one hand, and our School deans on the other. The current language is ambiguous and, combined with how major decisions are delegated to the School level within our current financial model, the allocation of resources does not always reflect university priorities or allow the administration to address the institution’s most pressing needs.
  2. Recommend an appropriate academic administrative structure for the university. Related to clarifying the role of the provost as chief academic officer is the need to provide the provost with the requisite information to: (1) oversee the allocation of resources across all of our academic programs and (2) adjudicate the inevitable and numerous competing requests for resources. This amounts to recommending a structure that will yield the best “domain information” with which the provost can develop a budget that best supports all of the university’s academic needs and priorities.

I should note that the problem we are trying to solve is in no way related to individuals in their respective administrative positions. The problem, once again, is structural and procedural — how information is gathered and decisions are made, driven by our financial model and interpretations of the Faculty Handbook over the years.

Recommendations that involve changes to the Faculty Handbook will require a vote of the faculty and also affirmation by the Board of Trustees.

Background

Though the task force will not be asked to untangle our financial model and suggest a new one, it is important to understand how that model — a “modified RCM” (Responsibility Center Management) — has led us to where we are today, and how it relates to the two issues the task force will address.

Our “modified RCM” financial model was introduced about twenty years ago. Well-functioning “RCMs” delegate decision-making responsibility to the constituent units of a university, because the “local level” knows the particular needs, strengths, and opportunities of the unit better than the central administration.  The greater autonomy given to the local units is supposed to encourage creativity and innovation, because in RCM models, the constituent units are allowed to keep a portion of their revenue if they produce “surpluses” in a given year, and can invest those surplus funds in new programs and initiatives (so long as they can cover their full costs).

Along with the devolution of authority within the RCM model, however, is the expectation of financial responsibility and accountability. This means that RCM units are expected to cover both the direct and indirect costs of their operations and to take care of any failure to do so from their own resources.  Understanding and calculating direct costs are relatively straightforward. Indirect costs, however, require a “cost allocation” process that distributes the cost of central services and administration among all users. Without these services — e.g., the library, ITS, fundraising, communications, human resources, security, the president’s and provost’s time, etc. — none of the RCM units could operate as they do. The same goes for space: buildings require maintenance and upkeep and RCM units are expected to cover those costs. The Brandeis RCM model, until recently, did not calculate or allocate these costs, and they have not yet been used fully in the university’s annual budgeting process.

The Brandeis RCM has two anomalies that make it inherently unworkable: first is the aforementioned decision not to allocate full costs to the constituent RCM units. These costs are then absorbed elsewhere: someone has to cover them. And second, the largest unit — the School of Arts and Sciences — was excluded from the RCM model, while the Centers, Institutes, and Schools — Rabb, IBS, Heller — plus the Rose Art Museum were all included.

The impact of these two anomalies has been great: instead of paying the fully allocated cost of operations and space (along with all their direct costs), RCM units have been asked to contribute instead a “direct contribution margin (DCM)” to the central budget, which was typically set according to past years’ totals rather than to the actual costs of space use and central services. And since the full costs were not covered by the RCM units, the only non-RCM unit — the School of Arts and Sciences — was left to cover and subsidize the other units in order to balance the university budget.

Being an RCM unit, as mentioned earlier, allows a unit to accumulate reserves in years when revenues exceed costs (in the Brandeis case it has been when revenue exceeds the DCM, which, again, does not include some unallocated costs). However, since A&S was excluded from the RCM model, its surpluses at year’s end were never reserved but used instead to balance the university budget.

Although subsidies are common in universities, the drain on the university’s largest revenue generating unit (A&S), and the one upon whose success or failings most determine the university’s reputation, has been great and felt for a long time. It has become ever more difficult to offer competitive compensation, modernize our infrastructure, or invest in new faculty, staff, and academic programs using the current model. In short, the drain on A&S erodes the core of the university and can no longer be masked by continually spending more from the endowment, skipping major investments in our infrastructure, or compensating faculty and staff at levels below the median of our peer group.

And so how does this relate to the Task Force Charge?

Our financial model determines in many ways how decisions are made that have major implications. The decentralization of budget-setting characterized by the RCM model grants authority to our Schools and their deans, yet the provost is the chief academic officer, responsible for carrying out the academic mission of the university. Despite the 2010 committee’s efforts to clarify and strengthen the provost position, our Handbook remains somewhat ambiguous in describing the relationship between the provost and deans. The Handbook notes that the deans “[report] to the Provost (p. 7,8),” “[act] in close cooperation with the Provost (p. 7,8),” and “[act] under the authority of the Provost (p. 7,8),” yet it also notes specific decision-making responsibilities accorded to the deans that carry with them significant financial consequences (e.g., oversight of contracts, salaries, reviews, and promotions of OTS and adjunct faculty, p. 20, 21) outside the provost’s authority.

The administrative structure needs to be reviewed by the task force to ensure that the provost, as chief academic officer, receives the most useful “domain knowledge” when considering resource allocations and adjudicating among the many competing requests for resources. This is the most pressing for the School of Arts and Sciences which cannot continue to subsidize many other units of the university. A&S accounts for all of the 3,600 registered undergraduate students, >80% of all Ph.D. students, >85% of tenured and tenure-track faculty, >75% of institutional fundraising, and >80% of university revenues. Some A&S academic divisions are larger than RCM units. Therefore, any structure that we put in place must ensure that the needs of those A&S divisions are fully represented by those with a deep understanding of divisional needs during the budget process.

In sum

The current division of responsibilities between the provost and deans, and the administrative structure that plays a significant role in resource allocation and decision making, is flawed. The two items are intertwined with one another and with our modified RCM financial model. They interact in ways that have led to inefficiencies in resource allocation, to the priorities of individual units outside of A&S taking precedence over university priorities, and to a structural financial imbalance, formed over many decades, that becomes harder to address with each passing year. The current model also makes it impossible for the provost to set clear academic priorities for the university and to make the resource decisions needed to support them.

Addressing the ambiguities in decision-making authority (per the Handbook), and amending the academic administrative structure to yield the best information with which to make budgetary and other decisions, is most critical to a sustainable institution.

I have asked the task force to submit a report to me by May 15 that includes specific proposed next steps to strengthen the operational authority of the provost in the service of a stronger university. You can see the list of task force members, plus a larger group to be updated along the way, listed below.

I am confident that with the collaboration and sound thinking of our faculty we can arrive at a structure and clear set of responsibilities that reinforce the unique character of Brandeis and positions the university for long-term success.

Sincerely,

Ron Liebowitz

Task Force Invitees

C0-Chairs Harleen Singh & Charles Golden
From the Senate Council Jody Hoffer Gittell
David Katz
Division Heads Bulbul Chakraborty
Jonathan Decter
Charles Golden
Aida Yuen Wong
From Faculty on CSP Stephen Cecchetti
Sacha Nelson
From Trustee Reps Isaac Krauss
Harleen Singh
BUSAC Representative Christie Barone
Senate Rep At-Large (Governance) Jeffrey Lenowitz
President’s Cabinet Rep Lee Bitsóí
Larger Group to be Updated Along the Way
Co-chairs Harleen Singh and Charles Golden
From the Senate Council Jody Hoffer Gittell
David Katz
Nina Kammerer
Muna Guvenc Ospina Leon
Division Heads Bulbul Chakraborty
Jonathan Decter
Charles Golden
Aida Yuen Wong
From Faculty on CSP Stephen Ceccheti
Susan Lichtman
Sacha Nelson
Carole Carlson
George Hall
Fernando Rosenberg
Rebecca Torrey
From Faculty on CSP Kate Moran
Isaac Krauss
Paul Miller
BUSAC Representative Christie Barone
Senate Rep At-Large Jeffrey Lenowitz
Senate At-Large (IBS) Davide Pettenuzzo
President’s Cabinet Representative Lee Bitsóí