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STATE AND REVOLUTION IN EGYPT:

THE PARADOX OF CHANGE AND
POLITICS

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*“It was the best of times,
it was the worst of times,
it was the age of wisdom,
it was the age of foolishness,
it was the epoch of belief,
it was the epoch of incredulity,
it was the season of Light,
it was the season of Darkness,
it was the spring of hope,
it was the winter of despair,
we had everything before us,
we had nothing before us,
we were all going direct to Heaven,
we were all going direct the other way—
in short, the period was so far like the present period . . . ”*

*Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities: A Story of the French Revolution
(London 1859)*

PREFACE: PERSONAL NOTES

My revolutionary days date back to the period between 1968 and 1972. At the time, I was deeply disturbed by the June 1967 war, when Israel squashed our “revolutionary” political system led by the charismatic Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. The war ended catastrophically for the three participating Arab countries: Egypt lost Sinai and Gaza, which together accounted for 61,000 square kilometers—almost three times the total territory of Israel; Jordan lost the West Bank; and Syria lost the Golan Heights. In the aftermath of the war, I became disillusioned with the 1952 revolution and with Nasser himself. I subsequently became active in revolutionary politics with the sole focus of liberating the territories occupied by Israel during the 1967 war and forcing those responsible for the defeat—Nasser and his regime—to be held accountable.

On February 21, 1968, these general sentiments, which were shared by many in my generation, sparked the first demonstrations against the Nasser regime. As I took part in these demonstrations, wrote in WALL magazines, and affiliated myself with different leftist revolutionary groups, from Marxists to Trotskyites, I remained faithful to the goal of liberating the occupied lands. Even when I joined the army in September 1970, I remained involved in political actions that stressed the necessity of revenge for the defeat of 1967 and of the liberation of Sinai.

In January 1972, when mass strikes and demonstrations against the regime broke out, I was on leave from my military unit and studying at Cairo University. As I was still heavily involved in revolutionary politics, I participated by organizing demonstrations and protests during the course of the next year. In February 1973 the police arrested me, and since I was officially still a soldier I was transferred to Military Intelligence, where I was interrogated and forced to live in a solitary cell for three weeks.

By the time I was released and returned to my unit, the countdown to the October 1973 war had already begun. On October 6, 1973, at 8:00 p.m., my unit crossed the Suez Canal, and I was on the Israeli-occupied side of the Canal before dawn of the next day. This crossing

marked the end of my personal revolution and the beginning of my personal future.

Nearly four decades later, an American friend asked me if I was in Tahrir Square during the January 25, 2011, revolution. When I responded that I was not, he was taken by surprise, since every Egyptian he had met had told him that he had essentially lived in Tahrir Square during the entire revolution. Remembering that in the American political memory, those who did not attend Woodstock essentially did not live in the 1960s, I told him that if having been in Tahrir Square was one of the qualifications for being an Egyptian, then it should suffice that I was there between 1968 and 1972.

As a matter of fact, however, I *was* in Tahrir Square, or rather nearby, in the course of the 2011 revolution. To be exact, I was in the al-Ahram building located on Galaa Street, only 500 meters from the square and less than 300 meters from Abdel Monem Riad Square—the extension of Tahrir Square, where revolutionaries who were not able to fit into the Square were located. For most of the revolution I lived in my office on the tenth floor, from which I was able to easily see Tahrir Square. I was essentially positioned in the middle of the revolution, since the street down below and the 6th of October flyover were the main arteries of the city, which fed into the Square and constantly brought forth fresh waves of protesters.

At the time, I was troubled and surprised by the revolution, but in retrospect, I should not have been. As the former director of the al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies for fifteen years (1994–2009) and as the current chairman of the board, I knew that the country was in trouble. When I assumed the directorship at al-Ahram, I found a treasure trove of information that helped me ascertain the pulse of the country. Al-Ahram prints about 85 percent of press publications in Egypt and distributes 90 percent of all print publications— so I had access to information not only about our products but also those of our competitors. Utilizing this information, I, along with my advisor, Mohamed Abdel Salam, devised a way of measuring the degrees of resentment on the part of Egyptian citizens against their government. Since al-Ahram publications were circulated at approximately 3,000 points throughout Egypt, I tracked the distribution levels of three pro-state national newspapers—*al-Ahram*, *al-Akhbar*, and *al-Gomhuria*—

and three opposition newspapers: *al-Masry al-Yum*, *al-Dostur*, and *al-Shrouk*. Utilizing this information, locations where more opposition papers than pro-state papers were disseminated were marked in red, and locations where the national press had a higher circulation in green.

I received this information on a daily basis. Until September 2010 the majority of the map was always green. In the period leading up to the parliamentary elections, however, the red spots on the map started to gradually increase. By January 2011, the map had become almost entirely red: The country was raging with anger. Still, I did not predict, or expect, imminent revolution. Rather, at the time I thought that the increased circulation of opposition newspapers was simply a result of shortcomings within the daily *al-Ahram* newspaper. Moreover, I thought that the map simply reflected a state of political mobility in the wake of the parliamentary elections of November of 2010. While I knew that the elections, with their rigging, fraud, violence, and intimidation, were a national catastrophe, I was also aware of the fact that it was not the first time that Egyptian elections had been fabricated. Although I had criticized the elections in several articles, I thought the ordeal would pass in a fashion similar to those accompanying previous elections. This belief blurred my ability to predict the revolution.

Two other developments contributed to my being surprised. First, in February 2010, Mohamed ElBaradei, the former head of the IAEA and a Nobel laureate, returned to Egypt. Upon his return, ElBaradei called for regime change and for a boycott of the elections; subsequently, the entire Egyptian opposition proclaimed him the leader of a broad coalition intended to depose Hosni Mubarak. At this point, I believed that something fundamental was set to happen, to the point that I, along with two of my colleagues, made a strategic assessment that a revolution might be near. In light of my beliefs, I wrote to President Mubarak requesting that he implement major reforms, including appointing two vice presidents and allowing more political space for the civic opposition in the coming Parliament. The President sent an oral message of thanks and appreciation through his spokesperson Ambassador Suleiman Awad, but he neither commented on my suggestions nor promised any reforms.

Soon afterwards, my belief that a revolution was imminent proved wrong. Within a short period of time, the coalition that had formed

around ElBaradei split, and by the end of the summer the major opposition parties had decided to participate in the elections, leaving ElBaradei and his “National Society for Change” isolated. After the rigged elections, when another coalition of opposition parties against the regime started to form, I frankly did not take it seriously: I believed that within a short while, this coalition, too, would break down. In essence, I thought that despite the increasing distribution of opposition newspapers and the consequently growing red marks on my map, there was not enough demand among the people to change the system. Beyond this, I assumed that the readers of opposition newspapers were not necessarily those who impacted political outcomes. At least, that is what I then thought.

There was one additional factor that likely blinded me from predicting the coming storm. In the ten days before the revolution, I met with President Mubarak on three occasions. On all of these occasions, Mubarak did not seem worried about the increasing political turmoil, leading me to play down its significance.

My first interaction with President Mubarak in the days leading up to the revolution came during a presidential trip to three Gulf countries: UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain. Mubarak used to take several journalists, prominent writers, and board chairmen of major newspapers on his plane; at the end of the trip, he would brief them. As the Chairman of the Board of the most prominent newspaper in Egypt, I occupied the front seat facing the presidential seat. During the debriefing, journalists asked questions and received answers for over two hours. Before Mubarak left, I asked him if he was going to do something dramatic before the presidential elections, which at the time were slated to be held in nine months. “Like what, Dr. Said?” asked the President. In response, I proposed two reforms: changing the Cabinet—which, I argued, had lost the momentum or spirit for reform, and was full of internal infighting as well; and creating a national commission to amend articles 76, 77, and 88 of the constitution.¹ (These articles were, in fact, subsequently amended after the revolution, on March 19.) After I spoke, Mubarak was silent for a few seconds and then replied, No, I will wait until I finish with the elections, and then I will look at those two things. During his response, he was calm: He did not say that Egypt did not need constitutional amendments, nor did he object

to the notion of changing the government. Following our interaction, I believed that the President had a different timetable, but that he would in time institute reforms.

On Tuesday, January 18, 2011, one week before the outbreak of the revolution, I met with Mubarak once again. This time, we were at a reception for Dr. Magdy Yacoub, a recipient of the Medal of the Nile, the highest honor in Egypt. The award is usually given to heads of state, but Mubarak also occasionally granted it to Egyptians who had received a Nobel Prize or had otherwise rendered services to humanity. Magdy Yacoub is an Egyptian cardiologist who lives in London, where he was knighted in recognition of his public service, and who established a new hospital and institute for heart diseases in Aswan, Egypt. At the reception, I approached President Mubarak, who, after shaking my hand, did not let go. I waited while several people asked Mubarak questions and made jokes. A number of heads of small opposition parties approached and asked Mubarak to run again for the presidency. The President smiled and then released my hand, and his escort came and left. He was relaxed. He did not seem like a man who felt he was about to be toppled.

On January 23, two days before the revolution, I met with President Mubarak for a third and final time. Mubarak had decided to push forward the celebration of Police Day, which was supposed to be held on January 25 (in commemoration of January 25, 1952, when an Egyptian police force in Ismailia resisted the British occupying forces, and close to 50 were killed). While I only shook Mubarak's hand during the celebrations, I recalled this brief interaction, because I later witnessed on TV Mubarak lying on a bed, on trial, in the very same place. At the time, however, the atmosphere was once again relaxed and jubilant—especially after an announcement was made that the police had successfully arrested the perpetrators of the 2011 New Year's Eve Two Saints Church bombing in Alexandria.

During my meetings with President Mubarak, he and the strategic elite were on all three occasions extremely relaxed, which undoubtedly influenced my perceptions. Beyond that, their demeanor was indicative of the general unexpectedness of the revolution. While conducting interviews for this Essay, I asked Ahmad Kamal al-Bhairi, a member of the Revolutionary Youth Coalition and a leading member in the *al-Adle*

party, both of which represent the youth movements of the revolution, about these groups' expectations for the success of the revolution. He told me that they frankly had no expectations whatsoever. Their plan, according to al-Bhairi, was to hold a demonstration on Police Day in order simply to challenge the regime. They had hoped for ten thousand protesters; if they were extremely lucky, they thought they might turn out twenty thousand. The opposition initially planned to organize a series of demonstrations challenging the regime, which, they hoped, would gradually build up from ten thousand participants to roughly fifty thousand. Within a year or two, they hoped, there would be enough support to topple the regime. Al-Bhairi unequivocally advised that the leaders of the youth movements were completely surprised by the millions of protesters.

As I was standing in front of my large window during the afternoon of January 25, watching large numbers of youth flooding to Tahrir Square, and witnessing some of the protesters throwing rocks at the al-Ahram complex (which is made of glass), I realized that I was faced with a serious problem of protecting the actual building. The complex consists of three connected buildings, which together house around nine thousand employees, including one thousand three hundred and fifty journalists. In addition, al-Ahram possesses print shops in Qalyoub near Cairo, and in 6 of October City it has a large compound for printing and storage in al-Amria, near Alexandria. Since these facilities all have enormous amounts of paper, chemicals, and machines, my first thoughts were about how to protect them from rocks and possible fires. A 360-man security team was sent to the different al-Ahram sites; volunteers also turned out in droves to protect and defend al-Ahram's institutions.

Throughout the revolution, I stayed in my office till two a.m. every night before going home for a few hours of sleep and then coming back early the next morning. Before leaving every night, I used to walk around the building and the print shop. One night, shortly after talking to an employee in the circulation department during one of my rounds, I was informed that he had been shot and transferred to the hospital. Within half an hour he was dead. I later found out that thugs in the al-Galaa Court Complex had shot him. The same thugs later burned the al-Galaa complex on three occasions and also threatened to

destroy the al-Ahram complex. Shortly after this tragic incident, an *al-Ahram* reporter in Tahrir Square was shot and killed by a sniper sitting on the roof of a building that belongs to the American University of Cairo.

Throughout the revolution, *al-Ahram* journalists were divided. On one side were those who wanted to follow a moderate line: They wanted to discuss the problems that led to the revolution while continuing to side with and defend the regime. On the other side were reporters who wanted to clearly align themselves with the revolution. Since assuming the post of CEO of the al-Ahram Center, I had made clear my belief, which I reiterated throughout this period, that the newspaper belonged only to the reader, and that, as journalists, our job was to be loyal to the letter.

My convictions on this matter were to no avail, however, as neither side was willing to completely separate politics from journalism: Rather, journalists lined up according to their political loyalties and ideology—and their age. Within a short period of time, the young and more revolutionary journalists began organizing demonstrations and sit-ins on the premises. When I met with them, I discovered that even though they were not regularly carrying out their jobs, they wanted to implement extensive reforms at al-Ahram, ranging from changing the editorial line to overthrowing the Chairman of the Board. I in turn laid out my own positions. With respect to their first demand, I made clear that the paper's editorial line was the responsibility of the Board and the General Assembly, the two legal bodies of the al-Ahram establishment. As for their second demand, I offered to resign my post as soon as there was an authorized replacement ready to assume my position. Once I made that statement, I was met with intense support backing my continued employment and my proposed reforms.

Surprisingly, during this period the syndicate representing the workers asked me to post a statement supporting President Mubarak. Though I refused to do so, I held on to their request. Later on, the same syndicate issued a statement denouncing President Mubarak and his regime; when they asked me to post it, I showed them their first request asking that I *support* Mubarak. Once I showed them their first statement, they quickly left in shame. At the same time, throughout this period there were voices within various *al-Ahram* departments

(including advertising, printing, and circulation), and at some of the other publications as well, that advocated making no demands until stability was returned.

Egypt itself was no less divided than was *al-Ahram*. In fact, I myself was divided. After being involved in revolutionary politics, I had worked for the al-Ahram Center and subsequently went to the United States to complete my graduate studies. After returning to Egypt, and to my work at the al-Ahram Center, in September 1982, I moved politically to the Right and adopted reformist positions with respect to politics and economics. I still held these positions until 2003, when Gamal Mubarak, the son of President Mubarak and the head of the Policy Committee of the ruling National Democratic Party, called me. He asked me to join his committee and help implement the reformist ideas that I was writing about on a weekly basis; standing on the sidelines, he argued, would not be of much help, since there was immense resistance to reform. I accepted his offer and thereafter joined a group of experts composed of approximately thirty of the one hundred thirty members of the committee. During the course of the following few years, the committee played a crucial role in instituting many of the reforms that almost changed the country without a revolution. Throughout this period, however, the conservative and bureaucratic sides of the committee and the party fiercely opposed these changes. Meanwhile, although Gamal Mubarak was crucial in conveying reformist ideas to the center of decision making at the presidency, he was also a liability, on account of the prevailing conventional wisdom that he was slated to inherit his father's position as President.

During the revolution, my reformist stance, which I was articulating at committee meetings, in my writings, and on my television shows, was less important than my position vis-à-vis both the regime and the opposition. As the revolution garnered support and political tensions increased, it became impossible to support a mixture of "regime change" and "reform." To this end, I was happy when Husam Badrawy called me on February 5 requesting my advice as to whether he should accept the position of Secretary General of the National Democratic Party (NDP). During our conversation, Badrawy told me that he had an appointment with Hosni Mubarak, the head of the party, in one hour, and by that time he had to reach a decision. I encouraged him

to accept the position on the basis that the President would resign, the rumors of “inheritance” would be quieted, and, since the Cabinet had already resigned and Omar Suleiman had been appointed Vice President, the chances of the reformist wing of the party succeeding would be increased. Badrawy accepted the position, and we remained in constant communication until both of us resigned on February 11, a few hours before Omar Suleiman announced that the President had transferred his powers to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).

Three days earlier, on February 8, I had been called to attend a meeting with Vice President Suleiman in the Oroba Presidential Palace in Heliopolis. As I crossed the city to reach the palace, I encountered a Cairo completely foreign to me, teeming with demonstrations, flags, songs, cheering, shouting, and chanting. While crossing the city, I remembered that since January 25, I had not left my office except to go home very late at night. As I approached the presidential palace, I could see that it was surrounded with barbed wire, tanks, armored vehicles, and plenty of soldiers. Whereas in the past, scheduling at the palace was highly organized, this time the chaos was readily apparent. After waiting for a long time, I finally entered the palace along with other journalists.

The atmosphere inside the palace was completely different from what I had seen in the rest of Cairo. In retrospect, the cool and elegant atmosphere in the presidential palace was intended to give the impression that everything was fine. Despite this façade, I received a glimpse of the real situation when Husam Badrawy gave me a report detailing his talks with the President as he worked on a deal to transfer Mubarak’s powers to the Vice President. Husam explained the situation outside to Mubarak and told him that he was facing a “Ceașescu moment” (referring to the brief military trial and execution of the Romanian dictator and his wife during the Romanian revolution in 1990). The President’s response was simply, “Is it that bad?”

During Omar Suleiman’s press conference on February 8, 2011, fifty journalists asked questions, while Suleiman asked them for advice on how to deal with the grave situation. He noted that the economic situation had gone from bad to worse, and that the political situation was no better. Political forces were divided, and no one really had a

clear idea of how to get out of the jam. The reporters, however, had very little advice to give. Suleiman, who was the head of Egyptian General Intelligence, informed us that his agency kept informed about the demonstrations by monitoring the Internet and Facebook, but General Intelligence had estimated that the events would at most lead to a protest of no more than one hundred thousand participants; millions had not been expected. I was the last to offer my analysis. I said that in my opinion it was crucial that the outcome of the revolution be neither a dictatorship of the Oropa palace nor one of Tahrir Square.

On my way out of the meeting, I ran into Field Marshal Mohamed Husain Tantawy, and we shook hands. I had known Tantawy since he granted me the Shield of Artillery for my performance in the 1973 war. While I wanted to ask him many questions, I knew this was not the time for them. But I did know that since army tanks had rolled into the streets of Cairo and Tahrir Square on January 28, the army had begun to play a fundamental role in the current situation and would likely continue doing so for a long time to come.

When I returned to my office, I was certain that the regime was doomed: In my mind, a political deal would be unable to withstand the revolutionary fervor in the streets. Following Mubarak's departure, it did not take long for the revolutionaries to realize that while Mubarak was gone, his regime remained. Since then, changing the regime has been the focus of the revolution.

My focus, however, was on protecting the al-Ahram institution, as I had been doing since the beginning of the crisis. Luckily, on February 5, I held a meeting with the editor in chief of *al-Ahram* and his senior editorial group and told them that, since I was authorized to define the editorial policy of the paper, we would henceforth recognize the events as a "revolution" and not an "upheaval," and the participants would be described as "revolutionaries" and not by any other name. In addition, I informed the editor in chief and his staff that we would create a new section that would be called "Tahrir Square," which would be edited and produced by revolutionary journalists. They agreed, and the section was published the next day. This step was not only intended to deal with the internal divisions at the paper, but was also supposed to enhance the acceptability of our papers in Tahrir Square and in the streets generally.

A few days later, I was rushed to the hospital. According to the doctors, I was suffering from added stress on top of my existing heart problems; they informed me that I needed not only a *catheterization*, but also some rest. Subsequently, I spent a week at my house at Ein al-Sokhna in the Gulf of Suez. During this week, I had time to reflect and to decide on a course of action, as reports were stating that al-Ahram was on the brink of disaster, owing to a lack of the money needed for part-time appointments compounded with the usual acrimonious rivalries at the *al-Ahram* newspaper. By the end of February, I had put together a plan based on sticking to the law and implementing it. I continued to participate in a number of political meetings with SCAF; with the former Prime Minister, Air Marshal Ahmad Shafik; and, later, with the Prime Minister, Esam Sharaf. During our meeting, I requested an address to which I could send my resignation. I had decided to resign as a result of the dissolution of Egyptian national institutions and the developing trend according to which revolutionaries who declared “revolutionary legitimacy” questioned the legitimacy of the leaders of the national press. SCAF finally made the decision that all those heading national institutions were to continue in their posts with the same powers until further notice.

At the time, Prime Minister Sharaf declared that his government was the Cabinet of the revolution. In response to this declaration, I stated that his Cabinet could choose to be either an Egyptian Cabinet for all Egyptians or a Cabinet simultaneously of the revolution and the counter-revolution, since more than half of his team were members of the NDP, and he himself had been a prominent member of the now discredited Policy Committee. I made these comments not only in person but in my weekly articles—and Sharaf never forgave me for them.

Based on the SCAF decision, I conducted a series of meetings with al-Ahram’s Board to devise a plan that would deal with the new situation. Al-Ahram’s losses were staggering, and our newspapers and magazines were not reaching their destinations. Furthermore, advertising had ground to a halt as the economy of the country stagnated and nearly collapsed. We came up with a sixteen-point plan to deal with the situation. On March 23, after creating the plan, I called for a General Assembly meeting, which included elected representatives of the

workers, administrators, and reporters. At the meeting, the plan was approved unanimously after five hours of debate. I was relieved, and some calm and a sense of direction prevailed at al-Ahram.

A week later, on March 30, 2011, at 1:00 p.m., I was conducting a meeting with the heads of departments of *al-Ahram's* advertising sector when I received a call from my associate, Mohamed Abdel Salam, informing me that the Prime Minister had passed a resolution that approved changing the leaders of the national press. Abdel Salam told me that Labib al-Sibai, a member of *al-Ahram's* Board, was slated to replace me. Meanwhile, I was to go back to my position as president of the al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, and continue to be a political writer and analyst for the *al-Ahram* newspaper.

For me, this point marked the end of the second Egyptian revolution. For writers, analysts, and academics, however, revolutions never end: Like wars, they have a magnitude that cannot be ignored. This monograph is a testament to that reality.

INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL NOTES

Change has come to the Middle East in the most unexpected of ways. The region that was regarded by many as the most ossified region in the world has been experiencing massive democratic movements since early 2011. The “Arab Exception,” a concept codified by Western scholars that argued that the Arab world was immune from the waves of democratization that have transformed other regions, has been proved wrong. Even the idea that Arab rulers and a good part of the Arab elite have themselves promoted—that Arabs were a “particular” people with a distinct culture that should not be corrupted by Western ideas or tainted by others seeking to mold their history—has been rendered inoperative.

For years, indeed for decades, aged Arab leaders had retained power. Suddenly, however, Tunisia witnessed the fall of its leader, Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali, who was forced to leave on January 14, 2011. On February 11, the President of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, left Cairo for internal exile at the Sharm el-Sheikh resort area; within a short period of time, he was returned to Cairo to stand trial. (The trial began on August 3.) Meanwhile, revolutions and calls for fundamental change have been gaining momentum in Algeria, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, and finally, Libya, where Muammar Gaddafi fell from his people’s favor. The echoes of democracy have now spread to Kuwait, Oman, and Sudan, and the winds of change continue to hover over the entire region.

This Crown Essay examines the Egyptian revolution, and particularly how the “Prelude to Change”—that is, the 2005 parliamentary elections—set the stage for the current revolutionary ferment in the country. After examining the (multiple) causes, basic dimensions, and (mis)management of the present revolution, this essay will speculate about possible future directions the revolution might take. As revolutionary change in Egypt is still ongoing, it is important to analyze this fluid situation in order to account for the course that events have taken, and identify the directions that appear to have policy implications. The major argument in this essay is that the struggle between the civil and military bureaucrats, the theocrats, and the democrats illustrates the paradox of Egyptian politics with respect to

change and development—even as the dynamic interactions between these three paradigms have generated a multiplicity of “sideshows” in the saga that is the Egyptian search for progress.

Prelude to Change: The 2005 Elections

Egypt’s future is pregnant with serious possibilities. In the near future, changing the Egyptian constitution to expand democratization is the first priority. Bureaucrats and theocrats, however, will have the main says in such a process. Important laws like the election and antiterrorist laws will have no less an influence on the future of the Egyptian polity. One reality remains, however: Egypt and the rest of the Middle East are not the same anymore. For Egypt, it is clear that the developments surrounding the 2005 elections—even though substantive change did not occur in the country in that year—served as a prelude to the fundamental changes that took place in 2011.²

The 2005 elections were unique in a number of ways. First, despite their many similarities to past elections, the 2005 elections were marked by departures with respect to both the presidential and parliamentary elections. The presidential elections, to begin with, were competitive. Moreover, despite the numerous irregularities that favored the incumbent President, Hosni Mubarak, none of these irregularities decided the results of the election. Nor did these irregularities represent public policy. To put it simply, Egyptian citizens who opposed the President were able to record their positions. Furthermore, candidates who advocated certain stances found plenty of means through which to express their policies in both the public and private spheres.

The 2005 parliamentary elections were much worse, in that they were marked by a much higher number of irregularities, including bribery; by violence, including instances of security forces preventing citizens from voting (particularly in the third round of elections); and by biased national media. Nonetheless, these elections were a departure in numerous respects from past parliamentary elections. They were the first elections conducted under judicial supervision, and with monitoring by civil society organizations; the first with transparent ballot boxes that could not be tampered with; and the first in which irremovable ink was used, guaranteeing that there was not systematic repetition of voting. New traditions were thereby established, along

with a minimum set of standards that if violated in the future would carry a great political cost to the regime. As we will see later, this in fact occurred in the 2010 elections.

The 2005 elections also departed from past elections in that they reflected a continuing trend of increasing competitiveness in Egyptian politics. Five thousand one hundred seventy-seven candidates competed for the 444 parliamentary seats (for a competitive ratio of 11.66), compared with 3,957 candidates that ran for the same number of seats in the 2000 elections (a competitive ratio of 8.91).

Table 1. Electoral Competition in Egyptian Parliamentary Elections, 1976–2000

Parliament	Total number of seats	Number of candidates	Competitive ratio (as a measure of electoral competition)
1976	350	1,660	4.74
1979	382	1,858	4.86
1984	448	3,879	8.66
1987	444	3,592	8.09
1990	444	2,676	6.03
1995	444	3,890	8.76
2000	444	3,957	8.91
2005	444	5,177	11.66

Sources: *Arab Strategic Report* (Cairo: al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2001), p. 416; “Analysis of Results of the Parliamentary Elections,” *al-Marsad* (The Observatory), (Cairo: The International Center for Strategic & Future Studies) December 12, 2005, p. 2.

Indeed, the 2005 Parliament contained one of the highest levels of opposition in Egyptian history. The opposition won 15.1 percent of the seats in the first parliamentary elections, held in 1924, a proportion that increased to 18.1 in 1936 but decreased to 12.1 in 1942. The 1950 elections were the only exception in the pre-1952 regime, with the opposition holding 29.2 percent of seats in Parliament. The 1987

Parliament had the highest level of opposition in the post-1952 regime, at 22.2 percent. In 2005, the elections yielded 121 opposition seats, which translated to 27.3 percent of the total elected seats.³

At the same time, and reflecting these trends, the hegemonic National Democratic Party in turn lost some of its dominance in the 2005 elections. Only 145 of the 444 candidates nominated by the NDP, or 32.7 percent, won: Those candidates won over 2.7 million votes, or 8.5 percent, of registered voters, accounting for 32.3 percent of the electorate. This constituted another sharp decline for the party, which in 2000 had won the votes of 38.7 percent of the electorate, in itself a dismal performance in comparison with previous elections. After the NDP in 2005 reaccepted defectors who had run as independents, its number of seats increased to 311, or 75.7 percent; though this was still far below the 388 seats (94.4 percent of total seats) that the party won in 2000 after reaccepting its defector candidates.⁴

The decline of the NDP in the 2005 elections was matched only by the secular-liberal parties, which together won only 9 seats (Wafd garnered 6, Tagamou 2, and Ghad 1); by comparison, the secular-liberal parties had won 14 seats in the 2000 elections. This loss of five seats was offset, however, by the two seats won by the still not legalized Karama party and the single seat won by the yet-to-be-established National Front for Change Party, whose candidates ran as independents. It is important to note, however, that some evidence shows that 24 independents in the Parliament had liberal-secular leanings.⁵ Meanwhile, a fundamental change had taken place in the leanings of some members of Parliament within the ranks of the NDP and other parties. This change was evident during the elections for the two deputies to the Speaker of Parliament, in which a few NDP members voted for opposition candidates.


The decline of the National Democratic Party was also coupled with the rise of the Muslim Brothers, who were officially banned, and were harassed and consistently constrained when it came to Egyptian politics. In the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Brothers received over 1.9 million votes, representing 6 percent of registered voters and 23 percent of the electorate: They won 88 seats, or 19.8 percent of elected seats, a dramatic gain from the 17 seats (3.8 percent) they had received in 2000. This increase marked a continuation of the Muslim Brothers'

steady rise in Egyptian politics. In the 1984 elections, the Brothers had won only 8 seats; in the 1987 elections, that had increased to 36.⁶ As the Muslim Brothers gained in stature and became an established presence in the Egyptian and pan-Arab media, they were informally legalized.

Despite the numerous deficiencies in the Egyptian election legislation, the 2005 elections gave the independent Egyptian judiciary a greater role in arbitrating Egyptian politics—and since then, the judiciary has proven to be a stout preserver of civil and political rights in Egypt. The Supreme Constitutional Court has acted mostly in defiance of the executive in an attempt to restore and reinstate those rights—and, along with the judiciary generally, has been one of the main forces for political change and reform. Throughout the Mubarak period, the courts acquired additional independence and secured an expansion of constitutional rights and procedures. To this end, the courts overturned a ban on the new Wafd party, threw out the Electoral Law of 1984, and declared the 1995 Parliament, which was elected according to the previous law, unconstitutional. Still, the courts lacked complete independence, as the regime sometimes simply ignored the Supreme Constitutional Court's rulings—for example, one that overturned the distribution of certain seats in Parliament at the expense of the ruling party.⁷

The role of the judiciary was further enhanced through the amendment of several articles of Law 73/1956, followed by the amendment (by a Supreme Court Decision) of Law 13/2000, which permitted exclusive judicial supervision of all polling stations and vote counting.⁸ Since then the judiciary has continued to assume an increased role, as seen in the number of rulings issued by the Supreme Constitutional Court during the years 1981–2000. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1. Number of Rulings of the Supreme Constitutional Court, 1981–2000



Aside from supervising the 2005 elections, the judiciary also exerted increased political and moral pressure on the government to observe the rules of elections generally. Judges constituted the majority of the high commissions for both presidential and parliamentary elections. Moreover, the Judges Club, an association of Egyptian judges, threatened on several occasions to withdraw supervision of the elections unless the government stopped its systematic interference. Although the judges never acted on their threats, they were nonetheless instrumental in minimizing the level of interference, at least until the third round of the parliamentary elections.

The 2005 elections had a long-term impact on defining standards by which Egyptians judged the regime in power—and it introduced the notion that institutional change could serve as an alternative to political upheaval or revolution. As it turned out, however, when change proved too slow in coming, there was no alternative but to revolt.

The 2005 elections also brought about the return of domestic politics to Egypt. Until 2005, there was a consensus among scholars of the Egyptian political system that foreign policy issues dominated Egyptian political discourse: Domestic issues were sidelined while the issues of Palestine and Israel, Iraq, and relations with the United States and Europe and other international subjects dominated public dialogue. The 2005 elections changed this phenomenon: Foreign

policy issues have taken a backseat in candidates' campaigns to internal political, legal, and, most importantly, economic issues. Since 2005, unemployment and constitutional reform have been at the top of the Egyptian political agenda.

Another long-term impact of the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections was the end of incremental change in Egyptian politics. In the twenty-five years prior to 2005, the Egyptian political system experienced small changes through modest doses of reform. Egypt changed from a one-party system to a multiparty system. Egyptian civil society expanded considerably. The media expanded and became freer and more independent. Yet, despite these changes, the distribution of political power in Egypt deviated from democratic traditions. There were imbalances between the powers of the President and the rest of the system, between the executive and the legislative branches, and between the center of power in Cairo and the rest of the country. The 2005 presidential elections created a consensus that the existing political system was no longer able to serve the needs of the country. All of the candidates supported some form of constitutional reform—and in the years following 2005, constitutional reform became a main theme of Egyptian politics, especially once the revolution erupted.

The 2005 elections also changed the basic concept of the Egyptian state. In a country that had been colonized for over three thousand years, freedom from foreign domination was a fundamental state doctrine. The existence and success of authoritarianism in Egypt was primarily a result of its ability to keep the country autonomous and independent. Once the political discourse returned to domestic subjects, however, and internal issues become the primary subject of politics, economic reform became the primary concern of the political elite, and development replaced national security as the fundamental concept underlying the state. In fact, security itself was redefined in socioeconomic and political terms. And as a new, younger generation of politicians carried out reforms, the country inched toward democratic transformation.

Although there were only eight new ministers in the thirty-minister Ahmad Nazif Cabinet, the new additions were a dedicated group of reformists. This group, which included the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Trade and Industry, the

Minister of Investment, and the Minister of Tourism, enabled the removal of several conservative ministers and was extremely successful in introducing reforms. Reformers were placed in important fields, including internal trade, social security, transportation, public works and reconstruction, and local development. Following the Cabinet's formation in July 2004, this group delivered Egypt from the economic recession, stabilized the Egyptian financial market, strengthened the Egyptian pound, increased exports, and facilitated the rise in Egyptian reserves to \$22 billion, a sum nearly equivalent to the annual value of the country's imports. The reformist group also tripled foreign investment and brought about major economic reforms in taxation, customs, and privatization. In 2005 alone, the Egyptian growth rate reached a remarkable 5.2 percent.

Yet another long-term impact of the 2005 elections was the subsequent emergence of three competing paradigms to guide Egypt's future. Each paradigm offered a different view about the directions, goals, functions, and methods of the political community in Egypt. The first was the bureaucratic paradigm: The state and the NDP were its main advocates. In numerical terms, the bureaucracy represented both the largest political party and the largest interest group in the country. The bureaucrats' primary goal has been the protection of the political community. As nationalists, they see themselves as the guardians of the state from both internal and external threats; they accordingly view change and reform as means of consolidating the state's power to protect and defend, as well as to care for the poor.

The second was the theocratic paradigm. The Muslim Brothers espoused this paradigm: To them, the goal of the polity is salvation, the protection of the faith, and the implementation of God's word—the Sharia. The third, the newest of the three paradigms, is the democratic paradigm. Pre-1950s liberals, the globalized intelligentsia, the business community, the expanding middle class, the media, and Egypt's growing modern civil society all subscribe to this paradigm. It calls for an increased sphere of choice within which citizens can participate in and plan Egypt's future. According to this paradigm, the polity is an entity composed of individual citizens, and its goal is to facilitate individuals' pursuit of happiness and equality.

All three paradigms have remained operative in Egyptian politics during the revolution and in its aftermath.

THE REVOLUTION: A CHRONOLOGY

Though many believed that, for cultural and structural reasons, they would never revolt, Egyptians finally did.⁹ And they did so with a full-fledged revolution. In a country of 80 million citizens, 18 million participated in the revolution. The revolution also took place in all of Egypt's twenty-seven provinces. Beginning on January 25, 2011, and continuing for eighteen days, Egyptians demanded that the regime that had controlled the country since July 23, 1952, be terminated. And in contrast to previous revolutions—in particular, the Free Officers Revolution, an army-instigated revolution that began on that date, which later garnered the support of the masses—this revolution was a mass movement, which only later received military assistance to help bring about a peaceful political transition. (For a detailed chronology of the revolution, see Appendix 1)

Throughout the revolution, Egyptians displayed a willingness to pay a heavy price for political change. Between January 25 and February 16, 2011, 846 Egyptian participants were killed and 6,467 were wounded.¹⁰ The economic cost was also considerable. Egypt's real GDP in the third quarter of the 2010–11 fiscal year (January–March 2011) underwent a sharp contraction, registering a 4.2 percent decline compared with the 5.4 percent increase registered in the third quarter of 2009–10. Meanwhile, investment and net exports of goods and services declined by a respective 26 percent and 3.6 percent in comparison with the third quarter of the previous year. According to IMF estimates, the average growth rate for the whole year 2010–11 was expected to be 1 percent.¹¹ In many ways, the revolution has been an economic disaster for Egypt. The losses in industry, construction and real estate, communications, tourism, exports, and Suez Canal revenues, as well as in the stock market, were considerable. Inflation accompanied this economic decline, along with the depreciation of the Egyptian pound in relation to the dollar; its value, as well as Egypt's international creditworthiness, dived to the lowest point in the last decade.

The First Wave

The Egyptian revolution can be broken down into four phases, based on the nature of the participants. The first wave of the revolution was primarily composed of educated youth who utilized the information technology revolution, particularly social networks such as Facebook—rightfully termed “the heartbeat of the revolution”¹²—Twitter, and blogs¹³ to mobilize and to plan for fundamental change. The statistics on social media activity relating to the revolution are astounding. Between January 10 and February 10, for example, there were 93 million revolution-related tweets within Egypt and between Egypt and the rest of the world.¹⁴ According to another account, in the same period, there were some 2,313 revolution-related pages and events on Facebook, involving a total of 34 million participants; 9,815 people accounted for 461,000 posts.¹⁵ All of this activity attracted young individuals and cultivated a shared conviction regarding the necessity of change in Egypt. The estimated 216 groups formed, all of which were virtual groups, together gave rise to a new notion of “cyber-revolutionaries.”

The nature of the groups that utilized Facebook varied. Some of the groups, such as the April 6 movement and the Egyptian Society for Change, which was inspired by Mohamed ElBaradei, had existing political infrastructure on the ground and previous experience in political action. Other movements, such as *Kifaya (Enough)*, which had done some work on the Egyptian street beginning in 2005, were quite new, with heretofore only a virtual existence and minimal operational political work in the streets. (Other such included the Khalid Said group, the Revolutionary Socialist Movement, and the Freedom and Justice Movement.) Together with other minor groups, these groups chose January 25 as a day of gathering, with the intention of starting a major protest movement. They demanded substantial changes in the Egyptian political system, including ensuring that Hosni Mubarak was not allowed to rule for another term, dissolving the Parliament and the Shura Council, changing the government of Ahmad Nazif, and putting limits on the interference of the security apparatus in the political lives of Egyptians.

The Second Wave

The revolution's second wave began on the appointed day of gathering, January 25. At first, the traditional opposition forces in the country, including the Muslim Brothers, issued statements indicating that they would not participate. Despite these official stances, however, substantial numbers of youth identifying with the organized opposition gradually joined the Facebook groups and coalitions as well as the general youth movement, which by then had spread all over the country. By the evening of January 27, the organized opposition had reversed its position and declared its support for the youth movement. By the following day, these movements had joined the protesters in the streets. While the Muslim Brothers represented the bulk of the forces in numerical terms and in terms of impact, it was the participation of other opposition parties that transformed the youth protest into a full-fledged revolution.

January 28 was marked by confrontations with police forces: Police stations in the major cities were attacked, and some were burned. Meanwhile, prisons were broken into and prisoners escaped. In the course of the fighting, the army intervened and protected major public institutions while in effect taking over responsibility for the country. Amid the deteriorating security, there was a sharp rise in acts of violence, terror, and rape. In subsequent days, citizens formed security groups that efficiently protected their neighborhoods during the course of the revolution.

The Third Wave

The first week of protests was primarily composed of the youth and the opposition movements and parties. During the subsequent third wave, millions of protesters, including government workers and public- and private-sector employees, joined the revolution, with their particular demands for higher salaries and for changing their respective administrations. Such bureaucratic discontent was not new to Egypt, as protests, strikes, and sit-ins had increased during the years leading up to the revolution. During this period, Egyptians began to develop their particular style of protest. Once the revolution was underway, the protesters gradually moved into the center of the political stage.

The Fourth Wave

The fourth wave of the revolution began as millions of Egyptians took part in mass protests throughout major urban areas. With the help of artists and the innovative Woodstock-like Tahrir Square shows, even normally conservative Egyptians took part in the historic events. At the same time, during this period, it was reported that growing groups of “ultras”—rowdy soccer fans of major sport clubs, who were used to combative encounters with the police during matches, were playing a major role in the demonstrations, especially on the deadly days of January 25, January 28, February 2, and February 11.¹⁶

In many ways, the February 2 NDP counter-revolutionaries’ attack on Tahrir Square unified the revolutionary groups, as they together called for change. Their demands included the removal of President Mubarak and Interior Minister Habib al-Adly, the holding of trials for political and financial corruption, and the dissolution of the People’s Assembly and the Shura Council.

Like other revolutions, Egypt’s revolution promoted the trinity of “Freedom, Dignity, and Justice.” Such revolutionary slogans encapsulate many things in a few words: values capable of inspiring and unifying people; urgent human needs stemming from a history filled with various forms of suffering; and, most importantly, the protesters’ desired future. Yet, however noble the slogans and however real the hardships, problems arise and disputes surface the moment a society begins the process of translating revolutionary slogans into political reality. This is not just owing to the fact that the definitions and ramifications of the words in a slogan may be open to different interpretations; it is also because, at this point, various political, economic, and social interests start to come out into the open. After the first jubilant days of the revolution, there is, always, a loss of innocence.¹⁷

THE REVOLUTION: WHY?

The Egyptian revolution was the shortest of the Arab revolutions. The Tunisian revolution took approximately a month to achieve its goal of removing the President and the main pillars of his regime. The uprisings elsewhere, such as in Yemen and Libya went on violently for much longer, while in the case of Syria, they are still going on. The Egyptian revolution, on the other hand, lasted all of eighteen days. In seeking to explain the collapse of a regime that prided itself on being a stalwart of stability, I highlight structural factors, circumstantial factors, and the governing elite's mismanagement of the revolutionary event: its inability to preserve unity in the face of the rising tide for change.

Structural Factors

By “structural factors,” I mean the socioeconomic and political pillars upon which states are built, which dictate the demographic, geographic, and institutional composition of polities. These factors usually change over the long term, and when they are not in harmony they lead to cracks in the governing system. At times, when the contradictions between these factors reach a certain level, they render fundamental change in the system necessary: They lead to revolution. In the thirty years of Hosni Mubarak's rule, Egypt had changed in many ways. By 2011, however, these changes had generated structural contradictions that brought about a revolution.

During the course of the last three decades, Egypt experienced a number of fundamental changes, many of which deeply impacted its political life. From a security and strategic perspective, Egypt underwent two major developments. The first was the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979 and the subsequent Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in April 1982. The withdrawal marked the first time in almost 2,500 years that Egypt was not occupied or ruled by a foreign power. Even without looking back to the very distant past, this was the first time in one hundred years in which Egypt was not occupied. (From 1881 until 1956, the United Kingdom occupied Egypt. Israel occupied Sinai twice: once from October 1956 to March 1957, and then from June 1967 to April 1982.) The second major security-related

development was the Egyptian success in curbing and defeating the Islamist terrorist threat, a threat that in a short period of time became a major global concern.

Economically, Egypt had changed in two major ways over the course of these three decades. First, the private sector once again began to actively participate in the national economy. In the last decade, the share of the private sector in the national economy ranged from 62 percent to 73 percent of GDP, with an average 7.8 percent rate of annual growth. Second, the participation of the private sector in the national economy became much more vital and diversified than in the past. In 2010, the Egyptian GDP reached \$215,845 billion, while per capita income reached \$2,752, in comparison with a per capita income of \$300 in 1980. If these numbers are calculated according to the purchasing power parity of the dollar, the Egyptian GDP in 2010 was \$496,609 billion, while per capita income was \$6,347.

Socially, Egypt's population increased from 40 million in 1980 to 88 million in 2010 (20 percent of whom lived below the poverty line), with an additional 8 million Egyptian citizens living abroad—or, depending on how one looks at it, 80 percent lived over the line. The literacy rate in Egypt reached 72 percent in 2010, as compared with 25 percent in 1960 and 40 percent in 1980. Life expectancy also increased, from 57 years in 1980 to 72 years in 2010. All these changes had deep impacts on the Egyptian political system, including on civil society. The impact on the latter was clearly evident, as over thirty thousand civil organizations and associations, many of which later played important roles in the revolution, opened during this period.¹⁸

The Youth Bulge

Ironically, the massive youth participation in the revolution was a result of the Mubarak regime's successful reduction in infant mortality (along with maternal mortality) during birth. As noted above, from 1980 to 2010, life expectancy in Egypt increased by fifteen years, resulting in a youth bulge in the population—greater than the growth observed in other age groups—to the extent that one can estimate that approximately one-quarter of the Egyptian population is under 30. The better educated among these youth and the ones with some degree of global awareness were the leaders of the first wave of revolutionaries.

Egyptian youth suffered major problems in the transition to adulthood: poverty and unemployment, unequal access to education, lack of housing and transportation, long periods of waiting to form a family, and lack of political participation or involvement in public service. It is important to note that 83 percent of unemployed Egyptians (who make up 8 to 10 percent of the labor force) belong to the 15–29 age group. Forty-seven percent of unemployed youth are between the ages of 20 and 24; 95 percent of them have completed high school. Moreover, 72 percent of youth who entered the employment market in 2005 worked in the informal, low-wage sector.¹⁹

The Expansion of the Middle Class

Egyptian youth were raised as part of the burgeoning middle class that developed in the aftermath of the economic growth and economic reforms of the last two decades. This new middle class was different from that of the bureaucracy, which was experiencing a decline in wealth and power. It resulted from the shift to a market economy, which gave rise to more freedom and independence from the state and brought about the state's loss of its monopoly over economic power. In the mid-1970s, Egypt started to shift toward a market economy; by 2000, the private sector controlled 73 percent of the Egyptian economy. One hundred sixty-five public sector companies, which had accounted for more than half of the public sector industry, had been privatized.

The private sector ventured into areas that were once unimaginable, such as infrastructure, airports, and communications. Additionally, this section has been contributing 70% of the Egyptian GNP. Othman M. Othman, the Minister of Economic Development has noted that the share of the private sector has gone up from 50% of the GDP in the 1950s and the 1960s to 63%, with 88% of the daily economic activities performed by the private sector. Sector by sector the breakdown is as follows: 99.9% of the agriculture is done by the private sector, 85% of manufacturing, 89% of contractors, 99% of tourism, 96% of real estate, and 92% of social services excluding education.²⁰ These developments contributed to the rise of a business class and an increase in their influence on the decision-making process.

In social terms, Egypt's population improved in quality as well as quantity. The Egyptian public became better educated and more

informed, reflected in the increasing literacy rate and the growing and expanding independent, private, and transnational media. Egyptian civil society has also grown immensely in the past few decades. In 2010, Egypt had close to 30,000 different associations, ranging from developmental organizations to political advocacy groups.

In political terms, the developments discussed above transformed the Egyptian political scene into a much more sophisticated system. Political movements, civil society organizations, an enhanced media presence, and an increasingly assertive judiciary made the political process in Egypt much more complex than the traditional authoritarian model. Everything that occurred after 2005 constituted a prelude to the more fundamental changes, reflecting demands for political participation and reform, that took place during the revolution.

The Rise of Islamic Politics

One of the important results of the 2005 elections was the establishment of the Muslim Brothers as the leading Egyptian opposition group. In fact, between 2005 and the 2010 elections, the Egyptian political system was split between the National Democratic Party and the Muslim Brothers, who, despite being unrecognized as a party, constituted a bloc of independents. The Brothers' unofficial status was a by-product of a series of attempts on their part to penetrate and eventually lead political life in Egypt. This status enabled the Brothers to play a role in the revolution and will undoubtedly continue to do so in the future.

For almost eight decades, the Society of Muslim Brothers has been an integral part of the Egyptian political system. Established by Hassan al-Bana in Ismailia in 1928 with the goal of restoring the Caliphate and implementing the Sharia, the Brothers soon spread throughout Egypt and the Islamic world. Throughout this period, the Muslim Brothers acted as a political movement that posed a challenge to the modern Egyptian state established in 1922. During both the Egyptian monarchy (1922–53) and the republic (1953–2011), the Brothers were in the opposition and were routinely suppressed and imprisoned.

In the 1970s, President Sadat not only released the Muslim Brothers from prisons but also allowed them to informally become part of the process of liberalizing Egyptian politics. The Brothers consequently

started to participate in elections and in Egyptian political life generally. In the 2005 parliamentary elections, they received 88 seats, or 19.8 percent of the elected seats, a dramatic increase from the 17 seats (3.8 percent) they had received in 2000.²¹ At the same time, the Brothers experienced a sharp improvement in their public stature that afforded them a permanent presence in both the Egyptian and pan-Arab media.²² In the elections in which they participated, the Brothers ran as independents and gradually introduced a relatively new vocabulary of politics that included concepts of democracy, civil society, human rights, equality, and citizenship.

In their early history, the Brothers opposed the idea of creating a political party; they viewed political parties as a tool that the West used to divide “the Islamic umma,” or community of believers. As they became increasingly active in public life, however, the Brothers began within their inner circles to discuss creating a political party. Eventually, in 1986, the Muslim Brotherhood announced that it proposed to form the “Shura Party.” While this attempt was unsuccessful, the Brotherhood repeated its efforts to form a party in the early 1990s and again in 1995, under the banner of “Reform.” Abdel Monem Abul-Futuh, a member of the Brotherhood’s politburo, spearheaded the 1995 attempt. A fourth attempt, this time under the name of the *Wasat* party (Center) began in the mid-1990s, after a segment of younger members partially disassociated themselves from the Brotherhood.²³ A detailed program that addressed major questions dealing with the relationship between religion and the state accompanied the fifth and most recent attempt in September 2007. This time, Brotherhood officials declared that the party would be a civil political entity with a religious “*marja’iyya*” (foundation or frame of reference). Civic groups, parties, and even some Islamists heavily criticized the Muslim Brothers’ program, and it was subsequently withdrawn for revision—but that did not end up happening until after the revolution. Nonetheless, and despite government harassment, throughout this period the Muslim Brothers continued to polarize Egyptian politics by agitating against the Mubarak regime and challenging its domestic and foreign policies in and outside of Parliament.

The Media Revolution

The IT revolution in Egypt has been unprecedented in its scope. In 2010, 22.6 million Egyptians, mostly youth, had Internet access.²⁴ To this end, Egypt has been classified as one of the emerging powers in information technology.²⁵ Egypt's rise as an IT power has been largely due to government investment intended to attract major multinational investors, such as Oracle and SAP, in the hope that they would outsource and establish call centers in the country. As of June 2009, there were 3,211 IT companies in Egypt, all of which were run by the new generation of youth who were present at the forefront of the revolution.

Twenty-one daily newspapers, 523 other print publications, and 700 Arabic-language TV channels with highly animated political talk shows²⁶ make for an extraordinarily well-developed and lively media climate in Egypt and the Arab world. In Egypt alone, there were 54 TV channels in June 2010—31, or 57 percent, of which were privately owned—and most of them had websites. In 2010, 70 percent of Egyptian families had legal access to satellite television, as compared with 48.3 percent in 2008, while around 90 percent owned their own TV.

Internet use has also been on the rise in Egypt. The Center for Information and Decision Making Support of the Egyptian Council of Ministers reported in 2010 that internet users in Egypt had gone up from 300,000 in 1999 to 14.5 million in 2009. Egypt had ranked first in Facebook use in the Arab world and 23rd worldwide.²⁷

The media's vast and rapid growth, which was not controlled by the government, meant that there was now an outlet for criticizing public authorities. Corruption, the misdistribution of wealth, responsibility for the economic plight of the country, and responsibility for the plight of Palestinians (attributed to Cairo's political relations with Jerusalem and Washington) were daily subjects for talk shows, bloggers, the electronic press, the opposition press, and the media at large. One minister of the last Mubarak government went so far as to say that the "single" reason for the revolution was the media, which succeeded in completely delegitimizing the regime.²⁸ This notion became seemingly particularly true as the issue of succession became a major theme of Egyptian politics.

Events in Egypt and the region helped fuel the delegitimization process. The appointment of eight businessmen in the 2005 Nazif Cabinet reinforced the conviction that there was a marriage of wealth and power in Egypt. At the time, Egypt, through a variety of taxation measures and institutional laws, was moving in the direction of a market economy. That shift led the media to claim, however, that there was an inherent connection between authority and money—an impression that was exacerbated by the fact that no adequate laws organizing or institutionalizing this relationship existed.

Reports that the son of the President, Gamal Mubarak, was going to succeed his father as the next Egyptian president—bolstered by the son's recurring appearances at Egyptian political events—enhanced the image of a corrupt regime that was moving away from a republic toward a monarchy. Meanwhile, the 2006 Lebanon war and 2009 Gaza war had given rise to allegations that the regime was incapable of helping other Arab countries and did not open its doors to Gazans in need. The Muslim Brothers, who had deep connections with Hamas in Gaza, exacerbated matters by not only mobilizing Gazans but also repeatedly condemning the Mubarak regime and the peace treaty with Israel—while hailing Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Khalid Mashaal, the leader of Hamas in Damascus, as Arab heroes.

The Failures of the Political System

All of the factors above helped bring about an ossified political system, in which the National Democratic Party—which ruled out any sort of progressive political agenda—held a monopoly on power. Throughout this period, both the regime and the opposition failed to acknowledge the growing youth-oriented political opposition, leading to a growing gap between the strategic political elite and the people. President Mubarak gave signals that he was likely to run for a sixth term, and senior NDP personalities averred that Mubarak would indeed still be the party candidate; but there was a growing perception that even if he did not run owing to his health, his son Gamal would take his place. Overall, trust in the political system's integrity was waning.

The story of Mubarak's son is worth mentioning again because it would have an impact on future developments in Egypt. Gamal Mubarak first appeared in Egyptian politics in 2000. In 2002, he was

appointed Secretary General of the NDP's policy committee, which endorsed a variety of national reform policies; several committee members were ministers in the Parliament, including the Prime Minister. The NDP policy committee started its work under the leadership of Gamal Mubarak. The main purpose of the committee was to act as the brain trust for the party, through suggesting laws to reform the socio-economic life of Egypt. As such, much of the reforms in the Egyptian economy originated in the committee, creating a degree of dynamism in the otherwise stagnant party.²⁹ As Secretary General, and owing to his high media profile, Gamal Mubarak was viewed as a prime presidential candidate. And the election of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the son of former President Hafez al-Assad, increased speculation within Egypt that Gamal Mubarak would likewise succeed his father.

Both the elder Mubarak and his son, however, rejected these conjectures. On three separate occasions, General Omar Suleiman, the head of General Intelligence, expressly denied to the author that Gamal Mubarak would succeed his father; while the Speaker of the Parliament, Professor Fathi Sorour, informed the author that he had never received any signal from either the President or his son that the latter would be a presidential candidate. Husam Badrawy, the last Secretary General of the NDP, also informed the author that at his last meeting with Hosni Mubarak on February 9, the President told him that he had never intended to hand power over to his son.

The speculation surrounding Gamal Mubarak was linked to the larger allegations regarding the relationship between wealth and power in the country and the perception of widespread corruption. The World Bank, Freedom House, Transparency International, and other international governmental and nongovernmental organizations ranked Egypt low in terms of fighting corruption, the integrity of public officials, and perceived corruption.³⁰ The Global Financial Integrity Organization estimated that between 2000 and 2008, the flow of illegal transfers out of Egypt amounted to \$6.4 billion annually.³¹

In 2006, the regime squandered the opportunity to initiate fundamental constitutional reform. But despite amendments to Article 76, which dealt with the election of the President; Article 77, which limited the duration of the presidency to two terms; and Article 88,

which limited the powers of the President during implementation of the emergency law, Egypt did not succeed in instituting major reforms, which were ultimately distorted or aborted as a result of discrepancies and miscommunication between the reformers on the NDP policy committee and those in the bureaucracy.³² In addition, the continuous implementation of the emergency laws over the course of thirty years had expanded the powers of the police and other security institutions in the country. During this period, political activities, including demonstrations, were constrained and violations of basic human rights, extending to torture and mistreatment of citizens, were widespread. Having wielded such extreme power, the security establishment served as a powerful opposition from within to reform.³³

The aging of the President also played a role in accelerating the contradictions between the regime and the Egyptian people. On the one hand, Mubarak was a strong president who wielded massive constitutional and political power. Yet, his presidency was weak, since he had no close advisors and no national security or economic councils on which he could rely; he had to depend instead on the heads of security and of other executive organs of the state. As Mubarak got older and suffered from a variety of illnesses, his stamina and ability to follow the affairs of state declined. As a result, a political vacuum emerged, and it was filled with others who were corrupt, as well as less popular than he. Dealing with major foreign and domestic issues was postponed because of the system's inability to make decisions. During Mubarak's last year in office, Egyptian development lost its momentum.

Circumstantial Factors

While structural factors were essential in bringing about the revolution, they were not the sole factors behind it. The youth bulge, the expansion of the middle class, and the media revolution all posed challenges to a political system that was failing to adapt to the new realities of the country. But there was still a need for an environment that was more conducive to revolution. Such an environment emerged rapidly in the last quarter of 2010 and the beginning of 2011.

The 2010 Elections

In the 2010 elections, the opposition official parties and forces decided to defy the call for boycotting the elections issued by a number of Mohamed ElBaradei–led opposition groups. In theory, the opposition’s participation created a situation in which the regime could have marginalized the groups that boycotted the elections while still allowing a formal opposition to function. In the end, however, the NDP won nearly all of the seats in the first round of the elections. The NDP and pro-NDP independents dominated the People’s Assembly, with a majority of more than 97 percent of the seats. This unprecedented occurrence triggered a wave of accusations that the elections were rigged and that the NDP had no intention of sharing power with any other political group.³⁴ Not only were the Muslim Brothers excluded from the Parliament, but other civic parties, too, won very few seats. In response, these opposition parties along with the Muslim Brothers decided not to participate in the runoff elections and instead to support the boycott movement. Subsequently, a large coalition of the opposition formed.

The Increase in Protests

In 2004 there were approximately 266 acts of protest in Egypt; by 2008, there were 630.³⁵ In 2010, according to one account, there were on average five protests a day.³⁶ Egyptian youth started many of these protests and utilized the media and the Internet to organize and publicize their activities. During the first national strike on April 6, 2010, they integrated their activities with those of political movements, such as *Kifaiya* (Enough). A similar protest occurred on May 4, 2010, Hosni Mubarak’s birthday. While neither of these events was particularly successful, both served as harbingers of the future. In subsequent months, protesting youth, in an attempt to become more familiar to the public, allied themselves with labor movements and public employees.

Before and during the fall 2010 elections, most of the protesters outwardly supported boycotting the elections while at the same time raising human rights issues. The brutal police killing of Khaled Saeed provided protesters with a rallying point against the Egyptian regime. Khaled Saeed was a twenty-eight-year-old Egyptian man who died

under disputed circumstances in the Sidi Gaber area of Alexandria on June 6, 2010, after having been arrested by Egyptian police. Photos of his disfigured corpse spread throughout online communities and sparked allegations that he was beaten to death by Egyptian security forces. A prominent Facebook group titled, “We are all Khaled Saeed,” which was moderated by Wael Ghonim, brought attention to his death and contributed to the growing discontent in the weeks leading up to the revolution.

The Return of Mohamed ElBaradei

In February 2010, Mohamed ElBaradei returned to Egypt and called for the regime’s removal through massive civil and peaceful disobedience. ElBaradei was a prominent Egyptian opposition figure—a diplomat who worked in the rank and file of the Foreign Ministry until the early 1980s, after which he worked for the United Nations and later for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 1997, he was elected to lead the IAEA, a position he held until 2009. In 2005, ElBaradei and the IAEA were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize; that same year, he was awarded the Medal of the Nile, the highest Egyptian honorary medal.

After his tenure at the IAEA, ElBaradei began to express negative views of the Egyptian political system. Upon returning to Egypt, he was quickly connected with the new youth mass movement through the various forms of social media. Thereafter, he established the Egyptian Society for Change and created a seven-point program for bringing about change in Egypt. He resisted calls to go to the streets and instead insisted that he needed five million signatures in support of his program. He received less than one million, most of which were Internet signatures; but notwithstanding that disappointment, he became a leader of the the youth opposition. Although most of the political parties did not listen to his call to boycott the 2010 elections, the results bolstered his claims of political corruption, and thereafter he gained political legitimacy. He later participated in the revolution and announced his candidacy for the presidency of Egypt.

Burning Churches

Shortly after midnight on January 1, 2011, terrorists partially burned down the Church of Two Saints in Alexandria. Twenty-three people, all of them Coptic Christians, died in the attack; an additional ninety-seven were injured. This was the deadliest act of violence against Egypt's Christian minority in a decade, since the 2000 *Kosheh* massacres, which left twenty-one Copts dead.

Copts were generally supportive of the Mubarak regime, since it was viewed as a barrier against Islamic fundamentalism. During the few years leading up to the revolution, however, there were an increasing number of attacks against Copts. During this period, the regime not only failed to protect the Copts; it also failed to address their grievances, which were related to building churches and to appointments to public offices. In many ways, the Alexandria terrorist incident destroyed the Copts' patience with the Mubarak regime and triggered Coptic youth to become more involved in opposition politics.

The Tunisian Revolution


In December 2010, a movement of demonstrations and civil disobedience broke out in Tunisia. As the Tunisian popular uprising grew, the Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali regime attempted to quiet the opposition by making a variety of concessions. These moves proved inadequate, however, and on January 14, 2011, the Tunisian regime fell and Ben Ali escaped to Saudi Arabia. Although there is historical evidence that Egyptian revolutionaries started planning their revolution before the unfolding of the revolution in Tunisia, the developments in that country undoubtedly strengthened their determination. Ultimately, the events in Tunisia provided valuable lessons as to how masses of activists could counter police forces and mobilize the public's support.

The International Economic Crisis

According to classic revolution theory, societies tend to revolt when they experience increasing prosperity followed by a sharp decline in their fortunes, which leads to disappointment and frustration as rising expectations are not fulfilled. In many ways, this theory is applicable to Egypt. In 2003, the Egyptian GDP grew approximately 3 percent, and

that growth continued steadily until it surpassed 7.2 percent. This rapid growth came to an end with the world economic and financial crisis, which began in September 2008. The resulting economic downturn contributed to a climate of doubt regarding the distribution of wealth in the country—which, along with allegations of corruption, triggered sentiments of anger and protest.³⁷ And although Egypt coped relatively well with the global economic crisis, both of these subjects were to play major roles in the revolution.

Figure 2: Real GDP Growth in Egypt, 2000-2010



Source: *International Monetary Fund*


Already prior to the outbreak of the revolution, the Egyptian economy had started showing signs of recovery from the economic downturn. Real GDP growth rate increased from 4.7 percent in 2008–9 to 5.1 percent in 2009–10. (See Figure 2)³⁸ In 2009–10, resilient domestic consumption was the main engine of growth, accounting for 85.9 percent of GDP and providing impetus to sectors linked to domestic demand. Sectors with strong ties to external transactions improved only slightly compared with the previous year, having not fully recovered from the global crisis. But the mostly export-oriented manufacturing sector grew at a 5.1 percent in 2009–10.

Tourism receipts grew at 12 percent in 2009–10 (US \$11.6 billion), thereby attaining their pre-crisis level, whereas Suez Canal receipts declined for the second year in a row, hitting a low of \$4.5

billion. Other areas vulnerable to global turbulence included workers' remittances, which showed an impressive growth rate of 25 percent, reaching \$9.8 billion in 2009–10. But FDI flows continued to decline, to \$6.8 billion—nearly 50 percent lower than in 2007–8, before the global crisis. (See Figure 3.)³⁹

The first two quarters of 2010–11 registered an average growth rate of 5.6 percent, impelled by strong performance in the tourism (15 percent growth), construction (12.6 percent), Information and Communication Technology or ICT (10 percent), and manufacturing (6 percent) sectors.

Figure 3. Sources of Egypt's Foreign Income



Source: Central Bank of Egypt

Mismanagement of the Crisis

In the period leading up to and during the revolution, the Mubarak regime failed to manage the crisis. This mismanagement began when the regime failed to implement the 2005–7 constitutional reforms, which would have opened the political system to Egyptian youth and to the new middle class. The mismanagement continued following the 2010 elections, which were actually something of a success for the regime, as it succeeded in thwarting the opposition's boycott attempts. But having failed to read the signs of imminent upheaval, the regime also failed to properly define the situation and find ways to handle it.

Wrong Definition of the Crisis

Following the collapse of the Tunisian regime, President Mubarak held a series of meetings with his top advisors to consider the possibility of an outbreak of similar events in Egypt. His advisors collectively agreed that Egypt was not Tunisia, and that such a development was unlikely: Egypt differed from Tunisia, they believed, in terms of the size of its population and the sheer area of the country, its type of state institutions, the degree of oppression in the country, and its relative freedom of expression, particularly on the Internet. Nonetheless, Minister and Chief of General Intelligence Omar Suleiman remarked to a group of senior journalists on February 8, 2011, that the government was monitoring the Internet and Facebook and had anticipated the January 25th demonstrations. But, he advised, the general assessment of Egyptian security organs had been that it would be no more than a large protest with a maximum of one hundred thousand participants. In fact, as later revealed during the trial of Mubarak, Egyptian security forces estimated that there would be twenty thousand protesters in Cairo, and ten thousand in both Giza and Alexandria.⁴⁰ The government continued to view this latter assessment as accurate until the fourth day of the revolution, when the Minister of Interior informed Mubarak that following the January 28 “Friday of Anger” events, Egyptian security forces were no longer able to control the millions of demonstrators.

Throughout the revolution, the President was seemingly uninformed about ongoing developments. As we have seen, there were far more demonstrators than any assessment provided to the President had predicted. Husam Badrawy, the newly appointed Secretary General of the NDP, met with Mubarak several times in the second week of the crisis and found him ill-informed about the realities in the street. This was partially the result of Mubarak’s subordinates’ reluctance to provide him with seemingly negative information, on account of his age and poor health. Whatever its source, this lack of information undoubtedly contributed to the President’s inability to make critical decisions.

Multiple Decision Making

The strategic political elite, which was unprepared for the size and scope of the demonstrations, found itself unable to manage the crisis over the course of eighteen days. While its paralysis was due in part

to the unanticipated levels of participation, it was also a result of the fact that there was more than one group making decisions. According to the available information, there were multiple centers of decision making, often taking different and contradictory courses of action, that contributed to the toppling of the regime.

The first group consisted of Mubarak's close family. His two sons, Gamal and Alaa, along with Mubarak's wife, Suzanne, viewed the revolution as just another crisis, similar to others that the President had survived before. The second group consisted of state security, which was first under the control of the Ministry of Interior and later directed by General Intelligence, led by Omar Suleiman. State security failed in its assessments of the situation and did not convey a sense of urgency to the President. When General Intelligence was placed in charge of state security, Omar Suleiman was appointed Vice President. In this position, Suleiman was responsible for managing the crisis through dialogue with the opposition. Although he in fact did engage the demonstrators, other decision-making groups employed violence.

The third group consisted of a group of NDP politicians led by Safewat Asharief, the Secretary General of the NDP, who advocated handling the crisis in a tough, even violent, manner. According to unconfirmed reports, this group developed a plan to follow steps similar to those taken by the Chinese during the 1989 Tiananmen Square riots. Finally, the fourth group consisted of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces—who, on January 28, managed to take over the country after the Interior Ministry's security forces failed to do so.

These four groups all attempted to manage the crisis, but they each had different objectives. While the Mubarak family worked to save the presidency of Hosni Mubarak, the different security groups simply wanted to save the regime. The army and its leadership were worried about the country and its stability. And each political group tried not only to protect its own interests but also to defend the privileges and political system under which they had lived since 1952. As a result of these different and competing objectives, the government found itself in a state of disarray throughout the revolution.

President Mubarak made three speeches during the revolution. The first was very late at night on January 28. In this first speech, Mubarak acknowledged the grievances of the demonstrators, promised more

reforms, and dissolved the Ahmad Nazif Cabinet. The opposition was not satisfied with these promises, however. Earlier that day, demonstrators clashed with the security forces and some protesters were killed, while hundreds were wounded. Subsequently, revolutionary leaders demanded that Mubarak declare that he would not run for another term and that his son Gamal would not take his place.

The second speech came on February 1, after Mubarak assigned Ahmad Shafik, the former minister of aviation, to form a new Cabinet and appointed Omar Suleiman Vice President. This speech generated sympathy for Mubarak, since he declared that he would not be running for a sixth term in office; moreover, he declared that during his remaining months in office, he would do his best to repair the deficits of the last elections and he would not leave Egypt. But the following day's events extinguished any sympathy generated by this speech. On February 2, NDP supporters decided to mount counter-demonstrations in Mustafa Mahmoud Square in Cairo, and in tandem with these counter-demonstrations, part of the NDP leadership decided to attack the Tahrir Square demonstrators. In the ensuing clashes, demonstrators were killed and hundreds were wounded. Following this violence, the revolutionaries reiterated their demands for Mubarak to surrender his powers to Vice President Suleiman. While Mubarak did in fact hand over authority to Suleiman in his third speech on February 10, he first stated a long list of objectives he intended to achieve for Egypt before the power transfer. In this way, Mubarak did not wholeheartedly abdicate his powers but rather continued in his attempts to outmaneuver his opponents.

The President Is Always Late

Mubarak made his third and final speech on February 10. Over the course of the eight days leading up to that date, Suleiman negotiated with different political factions, including with Egyptian youth, in an attempt to reach an agreement regarding the transfer of presidential powers. According to Husam Badrawy, Suleiman and the opposition reached an agreement according to which Mubarak was slated to deliver a speech on February 9 and surrender his powers to Suleiman in the presence of the leaders of the new generation of revolutionaries. This scheduled passing of the torch seemed on track after Mubarak agreed

to the amendment of a number of constitutional articles that would limit presidential terms and empower a commission to investigate the February 2 “Battle of the Camels” when Mubarak supporters had violently clashed with protestors in Tahrir Square. After agreeing to the deal, however, Mubarak retracted his consent until February 10, when, in the last sentence of the speech, he indeed announced that he would transfer his powers to the Vice President. Mubarak’s resignation statement, however, seemed to contradict his earlier commitment to carry out reforms. This seeming contradiction led to revolutionaries feeling deceived and sparked demands for the resignation of both Mubarak and Suleiman. “The People Want the Regime to Fall Down” became the slogan of the revolution.

The Army Split

As the Interior Ministry’s security forces totally collapsed on the fourth day of the revolution, large numbers of police stations—eleven of them in Cairo alone—went up in flames, and there were systematic attacks on prisons as well as state security stations. The Minister of Interior advised the President on the afternoon of February 28, 2011, that his forces could not maintain security any longer, whereupon the President asked the Minister of Defense to let the army take over. By the evening of the same day, army tanks and armored vehicles of the Central Command, responsible for the defense of the capital, rolled in to protect public institutions. F-16 fighter planes made a run over the capital, probably hoping that a massive show of force would make the revolutionaries go home.

That did not happen. In fact, there was a show of fraternity between the demonstrators and army soldiers. As political negotiations got underway and demonstrations and sit-ins continued day and night, there were escalating pressures on the army from the political leadership to act more sternly. A consensus arose within the army leadership that it had to take a position regarding the crisis. On January 31, 2011, in an announcement broadcast on public radio and television, the army stated, in the name of the General Command of the Armed Forces and the Minister of Defense and his close associates—and without consultation with the President, who was nominally the Supreme Leader of the Armed Forces—that it supported the legitimate demands of the

Egyptian people and approved of “peaceful” demonstrations to express such demands; the army was going to protect the demonstrators and had no intention of using force against them.⁴¹ During this period, it was reported that the President offered the positions of Vice President, the Prime Minister, and the Deputy Prime Minister to Field Marshal Mohamed Husain Tantawy, the Minister of Defense, who declined these posts on the basis of being a soldier trained to defend his country and not a politician.⁴²

The army’s position interposed a new force into the crisis that would act independently of the political leadership. Although the army continued to oversee political negotiations to solve the crisis, it also took steps to consolidate its power. As the President demurred at surrendering his powers to the Vice President, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) issued what was designated Declaration Number 1, declaring that SCAF would remain in continuous session. The message was as follows:

Based on the responsibility of the Armed Forces, and its commitment to protect the people, and to oversee their interests and security, and with a view to the safety of the nation and the citizenry, and of the achievements and properties of the great people of Egypt, and in affirmation and support for the legitimate demands of the people, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces convened today, 10 February 2011, to consider developments to date, and decided to remain in continuous session to consider what procedures and measures . . . may be taken to protect the nation, and the achievements and aspirations of the great people of Egypt.⁴³

President Mubarak got the message that he had to act as he had promised in the previous negotiations or the army would take measures of its own. He did what he did late on the night of February 10. The President’s speech, however, was not acceptable to the revolutionaries, who decided to march toward the Oroba Presidential Palace in Heliopolis. On the morning of February 11, Marshal Tantawy, the Minister of Defense, informed the President that a possible bloody

confrontation might ensue between the demonstrators and the Republican Guards, and that it would be better for him and the country if he and his family departed for Sharm el-Sheikh.

The President finally took that step at noon. The last details of the last hours of the regime's fall are not known. However, one story goes that SCAF, represented by Field Marshal Tantawy, Vice President Omar Suleiman, and Prime Minister Ahmad Shafik, agreed that the resolution of the crisis would be that President Mubarak would transfer his powers to SCAF. Omar Suleiman took the responsibility of informing the President, who agreed to do so, and at 6:00 p.m. the Vice President broadcast the assumption by the army of responsibility for governing the country. The constitution, which provided for no such arrangement, would essentially be temporarily inoperative.

In the end, the resolution of the crisis was engineered by four military men, representing the Egyptian military establishment that in many ways had been in power since July 1952, and who negotiated the process of easing out the head of the regime in order to save him, the military, and above all the country. The first was President Mubarak (b. 1928), who finally realized what the demonstrators declared: that "the game is over." For sure, he had a variety of options available to him in order to stay in power; but the cost would have been high and the results uncertain. The second, Vice President Omar Suleiman, (b. 1936) was the closest to the President, and he was the one to finally deliver to him the decision taken by Prime Minister Ahmad Shafik, and Minister of Defense Field Marshal Husain Tantawy, and himself. Omar Suleiman was too close to the former President, however, and after being Vice President for a few days, he lost his power base at General Intelligence, as he realized at a critical moment that his time for leading the country had gone. The third, Ahmad Shafik (b. 1941), the Air Marshal and Prime Minister, is the youngest, and his future lies ahead of him. It is not surprising that he is the one who seeks to become a candidate for the presidency. The fourth, and now the most important, Field Marshal Tantawy (b. 1945), came to the political stage late, but he kept a tight grip over the army, which had become by default the only real power protecting the country. Tantawy's sense of historical responsibility led him to put the country at the top of his priorities, and in the meantime keep the unity of the army intact.

After Omar Suleiman announced the transfer of sovereign power from the President to the Supreme Council, SCAF issued a second declaration, thanking the President—a hero, it said, in war and peace—for wisely choosing to leave his post. Ahmad Shafik would soon leave his position as Prime Minister, though he did not leave politics altogether. Omar Suleiman left office as the powers of the presidency were transferred to SCAF, and a new chapter in the history of Egypt was to be written under the leadership of Field Marshal Tantawy. (For detailed biographical information on all four men, see Appendix 2).

POST-REVOLUTION DEVELOPMENTS

The departure of President Mubarak from Cairo for Sharm el-Sheikh began a new era for the Egyptian revolution, as well as for Egypt itself.⁴⁴ For the Egyptian revolution has surely amounted to much more than an “upheaval,” or a mass protest movement intended to pressure the political system to change its policies. Rather, the revolution sought to mobilize millions of people to first change the heads of the regime and then, over time and ultimately through negotiations among different political forces, to change its foundations by generating a totally new constitution for the country. The continuation of the revolution through the process of demonstrations, strikes, and sit-ins allowed larger numbers of Egyptians to participate in the shaping of their own future—thereby taking a whole population out of apathy, to a point where they were no longer surrendering to the status quo.

The end product of the revolution will, it is hoped, be that the possibility of a return to any form of despotism is unthinkable. An overhauling of the political system has, in any case, become feasible, if not inevitable. The impacts of such a change on Egyptian social and economic life remain to be seen, as negotiations and bargaining among different political groups, parties, and coalitions proceed. By surrendering his powers to SCAF, Mubarak in any case assured the continuity of the state, which was represented by three major institutions.⁴⁵

The State

SCAF

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) both carried out the responsibilities of the President and exercised legislative powers, particularly after its declaration dissolving both legislative councils: the Shura Council and the People’s Assembly. (According to the Egyptian constitution of 1971, the President’s responsibilities extended to some legislative powers in times of emergencies, as well as executive functions.) SCAF is composed of twenty senior military officers headed by Field Marshal Mohamed Husain Tantawy, Commander in Chief

of the Egyptian Armed Forces and Minister of Defense and Military Production, and his deputy, Lieutenant General Sami Anan, Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces. SCAF also includes all the heads of the Egyptian Armed Forces' field commands and their army branches. It is as such the operational leadership of the Egyptian armed forces.

The Egyptian constitution of 1971 makes no mention of SCAF; it only refers to the "National Security Council," which in addition to the President and the leadership of the army includes representatives of other organs of the state that work on national security matters, such as General Intelligence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The constitution further provides for how the powers of the presidency will be transferred in the case of death or incapacitation or any condition that creates a vacancy in the post of President. In the case of incapacitation or trial, presidential powers are transferred to the Vice President or, in case there is no Vice President, the Prime Minister. In the case of death, powers are transferred to the Speaker of Parliament or to the Chief Judge of the High Supreme Court.

Mubarak's transfer of presidential powers then, signaled by SCAF's first declaration, was based on a political assessment of the capabilities of the army to lead the state, on the one hand, and the realities of the street, on the other. From the moment that the army went to the streets and squares of Cairo, and thence to the rest of Egypt, the armed forces had taken on new responsibilities that were warranted by revolutionary developments.

The good relations between the army and the revolutionaries after January 28, 2011, created a new sense of legitimacy based on mutual acceptance and a measure of trust. The army's recognition of the "legitimate demands" of the revolution, followed by statements that stressed the democratic path that would be followed in transferring power to civilian institutions, enhanced the legitimacy of SCAF actions.

SCAF's second declaration, on the day Mubarak left office, reflected the transitional nature of the SCAF mission⁴⁶:

Owing to current developments which define the destiny of the country, and in the context of [the necessity for] continuous follow-up of internal and external incidents, and of the decision to delegate responsibilities to the Vice

President of the country, and in the belief that it is our national responsibility to preserve the stability and safety of the nation, the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces has decided to secure the implementation of the following procedures:

First: End the state of emergency as soon as the current circumstances are over. Decide on the appeals [procedure in the case of disputed] elections and consequent measures. Pass needed legislative amendments and conduct free and fair presidential elections in light of the approved constitutional amendments.

Second: The Armed Forces are committed to supporting the legitimate demands of the people and achieving them by following up on the implementation of these procedures in the defined time frames with all accuracy and seriousness and until the peaceful transfer of authority is completed towards the free democratic community that the people aspire to.

Third: The Armed Forces emphasize [that there be no] pursuit on security grounds of the honest people who refused corruption and demanded reforms, and warn against imperiling the security and safety of the nation and the people; and emphasize the need for regular work in state facilities and returning life to normal to preserve the interests and possessions of our great people.

God protect the nation and the people.

This affirmation of change in the direction of reform and democracy was further strengthened by SCAF's third statement,⁴⁷ on February 12:

In light of the conditions that exist in the country, and the difficult times that have placed Egypt at a juncture that demands of us all to defend the stability of the nation and

the achievements of the people; and due to the fact that the current phase requires a reordering of the priorities of the state with the objective of meeting the legitimate demands of the people, and delivering the nation from the current situation; and as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is aware that the rule of law is not only necessary for the freedom of the individual, but . . . is the only legitimate basis for authority; and with determination, clarity, and faith in all our national, regional and international responsibilities, and with recognition of God's rights and in the name of God, and with His support, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces announces the following:

First: The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is committed to all matters included in its previous statements.

Second: The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is confident in the ability of Egypt's people and institutions to get through this critical situation, and to that end, all agencies of the state and the private sector must play their noble and patriotic role to drive the economy forward, and the people must fulfill their responsibility towards that goal.

Third: The current government and governors shall continue as a caretaker administration until a new government is formed.

Fourth: The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces aspires to guaranteeing a peaceful transition of authority within a free and democratic system that allows for the assumption of authority by a civilian and elected authority to govern the country and the building of a democratic and free state.

Fifth: The Arab Republic of Egypt is committed to all regional and international obligations and treaties.

Sixth: The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces calls on the great Egyptian people to cooperate with their siblings and children in the civilian police forces, for affection and cooperation must exist between everyone, and it calls on the civilian police forces to be committed to their slogan “The police serve the people.”

God is the source of success.

The Judiciary

The judiciary had in many ways been the harbinger of the revolution by providing a check on President Mubarak’s powers via the High Administrative Court (HAC) and the High Constitutional Court (HCC). In recent years this was demonstrated in a number of important HAC rulings concerning minimum wages and prices as well as the agreement Egypt signed with Israel regarding the sale of natural gas. In these and other cases, President Mubarak and his Cabinet considered HAC rulings to be infringements on the authority of the executive branch of government.

In parallel fashion, since its establishment in 1980, the HCC has annulled more than two hundred laws. It also declared elections to the People’s Assembly in 1984, 1987, 1990, 1995, and 2000 illegal owing to the lack of requisite judicial supervision as provided in the constitution. Indeed, during the past few years of the Mubarak regime, the Judiciary had been in a state of semi-rebellion over the issue of judicial independence, including its right to an independent budget.

In the post-revolution period, the Judiciary had a double task to perform, in the service simultaneously of the state and the revolution. On the one hand, the judiciary had the responsibility of dealing with the old regime, in terms of personnel, corruption, and the infringement of laws. The list of those to be dealt with was growing as every public institution in the country started to provide the courts with a long list of names of those in the old regime who had misused their power, or who had used their influence to increase their income. Having the President and his family added to the list did not make the process any easier.

On the other hand, the business of the revolution was, in the end, to build a new political system and create a new constitution. It was for the judiciary to translate political demands regarding election laws, referenda, and different propositions for the proposed constitutional assembly into meaningful legal terms that did not contradict either the legal traditions of the country or the constitutional foundations that had been formulated after the revolution. The country was demanding judicial supervision not only of elections, but over the entire transitional period.

The major dilemma for the judiciary, however, was to do all of the above while remaining independent from the pressures of the street, which was pushing for summary trials, and instead insisting on legitimate trials despite demonstrations, as well as accusations of collusion with the old regime. Of no less importance was that the judiciary had demands of its own—foremost among them, that the independence that it had fought for during Mubarak's era was now possible.

The Bureaucracy

In the immediate aftermath of the first mass protests, the bureaucracy was headed by a new Cabinet formed on January 29, led by Ahmad Shafik, a former Minister of Aviation and former Commander of the Egyptian Air Force. The bureaucracy, which historically constituted the backbone of the Egyptian state, supported the revolution for economic reasons, but showed its conservatism by working to restore law and order—a principle that the revolutionaries consistently violated. (Not only is the Egyptian bureaucracy the oldest in world history, it is also the largest, in relative terms, among contemporary nation-states. Counting government and public sector workers, the army, the police, other security organs, and others who are on the government payroll, it comprises over seven million employees, amounting to about 29 percent of Egypt's twenty-four-million workforce.) The bureaucracy wanted something more, however—which was to restore what it had lost in power and influence, political and economic, as a result of economic reforms during the previous two decades.

The rise of the private sector and its dominance in a number of sectors of the Egyptian economy had pointed out the inefficiency of

the public sector and its lack of managerial skills and understanding of the world. In other words, the public sector was failing in competition not only vis-à-vis the world market but also in the domestic one. The privatization process was threatening to propel the bureaucracy into a world in which it would not know how to compete. Even when privatization was not possible—as in what are called “strategic sectors,” like banking, insurance, and major industries—administrative reforms were painful for an unskilled bureaucracy that was facing a new breed of bureaucrats that a number of governmental and public sectors had to hire, giving them higher salaries than the private sector.

The Revolutionaries

The revolutionaries were divided largely along four lines: the youth, the traditional political parties, the Muslim Brotherhood, and various nongovernmental organizations and related groups, along with notable opposition personalities.

- The youth, who launched the revolution, were soon to lose their leadership as they fragmented into a large number of coalitions and unions. According to one account, the revolution was initially made up of 216 different coalitions,⁴⁸ while another account asserts that by July 2011 there were 180 such coalitions.⁴⁹ Regardless of the exact number, what this reflects is a highly fragmented phenomenon. Predictably, as a result, these groups have so far failed to unite under one or even a small number of parties. As of the end of August 2011, neither the Egyptian Economic Social Party nor the Justice Party nor the Free Egyptian Party, each of which represented different revolutionary factions, had scored high in any public opinion poll.
- The traditional political parties that functioned before the revolution as the formal and informal opposition to the Mubarak regime—such as the liberal *Wafd* and the leftist *Tagammu* parties—were devastated by the results of the 2010 elections. After experiencing initial successes in the late 1970s, they had lost their popularity on account of their perceived surrender to the Mubarak regime’s “rules of the game,” which were based on the dominance of one party: the

National Democratic Party (NDP). That was not the only reason for their decay, however. The fragmentation on both the Right and the Left into a variety of political parties, like *al-Ghad* and the Democratic Front, prevented the opposition from mounting a serious challenge to the NDP. Furthermore, these and other parties' fears of the dominance of the Muslim Brothers, who had made impressive gains in the 2005 elections, pushed opposition parties further toward the NDP's embrace. Yet the 2010 elections caused them to join anti-regime forces and to accept the leadership of the Muslim Brothers in the hope that the Brothers would in turn accept the notion of a "civic state," which the Brothers promoted.

- The Muslim Brothers themselves, who also constituted part of the traditional political opposition before the revolution, now represented a distinct voice, expressed by new, "Islamic" parties. At the liberal end of the spectrum defined by these new parties is the religiously liberal *Wasat* party, which tries to emulate the Justice and Development Party in Turkey; while at the more radical and militant end are the *Gama'at Islamia* and *Jihad* groups, whose members had been serving long prison sentences for committing acts of terror in and outside Egypt and who consider Islam to be simultaneously a religion and (the basis of) a state. They are scornful of Western political values and consider liberal and secular ideas as tantamount to blasphemy. These various movements and groups were now joined by the Salafis, who advocated strict implementation of the Sharia, the literal interpretation of the Quran, and strict imitation of the acts and behavior of the Prophet Muhammad.
- The last strand of the opposition comprised the various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations, and especially human rights groups, as well as public personalities who had opposed Mubarak and his regime. Egyptian civil society had grown massively in the previous two decades to number over thirty thousand organizations and associations, who benefited from the growing reach of the media, from globalization, and from funding from international and Western—especially

American—organizations such as the Ford Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House. Although initially these organizations were focused on development, they were soon to shift to political goals.

The public personalities involved in these organizations also were part of the process of delegitimizing the regime. Many, such as Hisham al-Bastawisi, Salim Alawa, Mahmoud al-Khudairi, Nuha Azzeni, and Hamdeen Sabbahi—as well as a long list of journalists and TV anchors, including Ibrahim Esa, Abdel Halim Kandil, Magdy al-Gallad, Amr Adib, and Mona Ashazli—have since become presidential hopefuls.

“The people and the army are one hand”

As the revolution unfolded, the organs of the state and the forces of the revolution jointly arrived at a formula represented by the slogan “The people and the army are one hand.” It is not clear who coined this slogan, which became a chant as soon as Egyptian army forces were deployed to the streets and squares where the protests had been taking place. But the slogan was indeed very suitable for the army and the revolutionaries alike: It expressed a sense of patriotism and conveyed the hoped for indivisibility of the Egyptian polity. At the time, the high regard for the army as a national force, and the professionalism of the army as the organ responsible (and which saw itself *as* responsible) for the safety and security of the country and its citizens, helped avert a possible confrontation.

A more practical factor averting such a confrontation was the balance of power between the forces of the revolution and those of the state. While the revolutionaries in Tahrir Square were aware that a violent confrontation with the army might mean a bloodbath that would abort the revolution, the army, for its part, feared the revolutionaries’ massive numbers and the possibility that a vast number of civilian casualties might result in a division within the armed forces or their facing the same fate that the police forces had experienced during the revolution. The army’s decision to refrain from supporting the regime and to protect the revolution from a violent confrontation with the regime, along with its orchestration of Mubarak’s smooth departure,

brought a number of revolutionary groups to adopt the assessment that “the people have made the revolution, but the army protected it.” In the end, both, working together, succeeded in toppling Mubarak, preventing his son’s succeeding his father, and putting Egypt on the road toward a civic state.

To view developments through this prism is to recognize the continuity of the Egyptian state while at the same time acknowledging that Egypt must go through a process of revolutionary change on a massive scale. The tension between the forces supporting the continuity of the revolution—the need for Egypt to undergo a process of revolutionary change on a massive scale—and those supporting the continuity of the state was in effect built into the revolution and became a central feature of it. Translating the slogan “the people and the army are one hand” into reality meant that while political change in Egypt had become a state matter, the institutions effecting change were operating under the watchful eyes of the revolution. In the short term, this has made possible a semi-stable situation in the country; but it has also ensured an ongoing state of tension around a growing list of subjects. Moreover, each of the two contending camps has its particular levers: The state has its armed forces, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary, while the revolutionaries have the power of numbers: the ability to mobilize mass protests in Cairo’s Tahrir Square and in the country’s other main cities.

Soon enough, however, the divergent pulls of the state and the revolution were also to generate tensions *within* each side of the equation. SCAF was to face the demands of the judiciary, and the ever-escalating demands for higher salaries from the different sectors of the bureaucracy. Problems were further compounded by local forces, in the governorates and at sub-administrative units levels, beginning to take public matters into their own hands—as in the governorate of Qina, where the population demonstrated its opposition to the appointment of a new governor by blocking the railway between Qina and Aswan for nine days, until the appointment was suspended. Meanwhile, minorities such as Copts, Nubians, Shia, and the Bedouins of Sinai sought to assert their rights through the media and by means of continuing protests and strikes in addition to some violent acts. All these social forces, and the related actions in the streets, brought the

Egyptian economy to a complete halt. The state was to face the paradox of ever-shrinking resources and ever-increasing demands.

Developing Tensions

In the revolution's aftermath, it seemed that everything in Egypt had become subject to debate. Of particular importance were debates about how to run the country during the transitional period and how to chart the country's future course.

The first area of controversy was what the country should do with respect to crimes the former regime was alleged to have committed during the revolution, and particularly what to do regarding former President Mubarak and his family. Ahmad Shafik's Cabinet, which was formed while Mubarak was still in power, was now asked to cleanse itself of members of the old regime; but after doing so it resigned on March 3. The revolutionaries were then asked to appoint a new head of government, and they chose the former Minister of Transportation, Esam Sharaf. Despite his previous membership in the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), Sharaf had taken part in the revolution by staying in Tahrir Square. More than half of his Cabinet, however, was composed of former members of the NDP. Criticized for being slow in implementing the demands of the revolution, Sharaf was pressured to change the composition of his Cabinet. His new government, formed on July 21, now included a much smaller contingent of NDP members.

A second issue for debate concerned the road to be taken in the transition to civilian rule. It became conventional wisdom among various political forces that the country should adopt a civilian system of government. Accordingly, members of SCAF asserted publicly and repeatedly that SCAF saw itself as a conduit for the transformation of the Egyptian political system to civilian rule, and that the Army was eager to return to its original mission of safeguarding the country. Tensions soon grew, however—both between the different factions of the revolution and between some of these factions and SCAF—over the proper means of achieving this goal. Some of the revolutionaries, particularly liberals and those on the Left of the Egyptian political spectrum, pushed for creating a kind of steering committee or presidential council of civilians and military personnel who would run the country's affairs. Others,

however, including all Islamic organizations as well as nationalists on the Right, favored keeping SCAF in charge.

Reflecting this division, the first group opted for electing a constitutional assembly that would deliberate and then suggest a new constitution for the country; it also advocated postponing new legislative and presidential elections, which would be based on this new constitution. The second group suggested the reverse: a process that would begin with electing new chambers of the legislative branch, which would in turn be empowered to nominate a constitutional council that would formulate a new constitution for the country.

Meanwhile, SCAF took the initiative and formed a committee, which suggested amending eight articles of the 1971 constitution. These amendments were then approved by 77.8 percent of the public in a referendum that took place on March 19; they reduced the powers of the presidency and limited any occupant of the office to two terms of four years each. The 1971 constitution, which had been put on hold after SCAF had assumed the sovereign powers of the presidency, was then replaced on March 30 by a “Constitutional Declaration,” consisting of sixty-three articles, based mainly on the 1971 constitution but reflecting the new amendments approved in the referendum, establishing the legality of the transition period. (See Appendix 3) The referendum also resolved the “Which should come first?” debate by stipulating that elections to the two legislative bodies—the Shura Council and the People’s Assembly—would be held first, beginning in September 2011.

This in turn led to a third area of disagreement, focusing on how to deal with SCAF. One school of thought views SCAF as the country’s new political leadership and, as such, as accountable to the public and deserving of criticism. A second insists that the army should continue to be honored for having protected the country and the revolution, and that criticism of it constitutes a “red line” for revolutionaries that should not be crossed. Islamic groups constitute the core of the second school, even as liberals and leftists of the first school have accused SCAF of favoring them. The second school prevailed, meaning that elections to the legislative bodies would be held first; but the actual elections for the People’s Assembly were postponed from September to November and December, with those for the Shura Council to follow in March

2012. These changes were intended to give new parties more time to organize and formulate coherent platforms. But as these changes in the timetable were put in place, the Muslim Brothers started to worry that the drawing out of the elections was intended to leave the military in power. The relationship between SCAF and the Muslim Brothers soured.

What Lies Ahead? Choosing a Course of Action

The tensions discussed above, while regrettable, are likely to persist. One reason is that the revolutionaries are still spending too much time thinking about how to punish the members of the old regime, or about whether to have a new constitution or hold elections first. Other revolutions come with a ready-made leadership and a vision of the future; the Egyptian revolution had neither. Apart from wanting to oust the old regime and demanding a minimum wage, the revolution asked for little that was concrete. As a result, people with leadership skills stepped forward to fill the vacuum, and various visions—some copied from the experiences of other countries—were brought to the table.

In many ways these tensions will put the Egyptian polity to the test: They will have to choose between the preservation of the state and the continuation of the revolution. It is possible that there is no contradiction between the revolution and the state in the minds of the revolutionaries. The realities on the ground, however, tell us that the democratic inroads that have been made so far are unprecedented—but also that these successes have established two possible courses forward, each of which could lead to a democratic state that Egyptians would then have the duty to nurture to robustness and prosperity.

Preservation of the State

The first course, preservation of the state, follows Egyptian traditions that have been brought to bear whenever the evolution of the state takes a new turn. When former President Mubarak transferred powers to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, he nearly plunged Egypt into a major constitutional dilemma. Fortunately, Egypt had people who could perform a precise surgical intervention to respond to this new shift in Egyptian history, which entailed suspending the

constitution rather than jettisoning it entirely. In the midst of revolution, constitutional and legal considerations are often overlooked or even scoffed at. This has not occurred in the case of Egypt, which has always tried to ensure that transfers of power take place according to the book, whether the text in question was an Ottoman decree or a constitution, permanent or otherwise. What has always mattered in Egypt is that Egyptians not leap into a void, leaving it for people further down the line to squabble over questions of legitimacy and charges that the new authority came to power by the gun or through some other means of force and intimidation.

This is precisely why the work of the constitutional amendment committee was so important. The amendments it drafted promised to take Egypt a long way forward on the road to democracy, even if these amendments plus the SCAF's temporary constitutional declaration were subsequently a subject of debate, or sometimes struggle, among different political forces. Specially, the revolutionaries preferred to begin by first creating a new constitution and then proceed to the elections. However, with the November 28, 2011 elections for the People's Assembly, it became clear that it was from the womb of the state and not the revolutionaries that change was coming to Egypt.

Continuation of the Revolution

The second course, continuation of the revolution, seeks an immediate and total rupture with the past. It is fired by an overwhelming rage at an era that is perceived as having been purely evil. This phenomenon has prevailed at times in Egyptian history as well, sometimes taking decades if not entire generations for facts to emerge to temper that view. There was a time when Egyptians discovered that King Farouk was not really as bad as they had imagined after a TV series about his life aired in 2008. The same applied to Gamal Abdel Nasser and his era, and Anwar Sadat and his. Both these figures, along with their times, were tainted with charges of despotism, corruption, and negligence, but there was no end to the exaggeration of such ills in a country whose pharaohs customarily defaced the statues of their predecessors. The crux of the problem is: Does the current generation of revolutionaries have the right to amend this legacy? Or do they want to create an entirely new legacy, in which case there will be a parting of the ways between the state and the revolution.⁵⁰

TRENDS AND DIRECTIONS

As in the case of most countries that have undergone revolutions, Egypt has become pregnant with ideas, trends, and paradigms—some old, some new—about how to run the country. Presumably, support or lack of support for each of these ideas will be tested through the new electoral process. Four of these ideas, trends, and paradigms are particularly noteworthy.

Four Paradigms

- We have witnessed the birth of a dynamic liberal trend in Egyptian politics that is youthful and capable of organization in the form of political parties, coalitions, and street politics. The “Facebook” Egyptian revolutionaries are the children of the electronic revolution, the globalization process, and the growing Egyptian middle-class private sector who could not accept the backwardness of the old regime and its failure to catch up with modern life and advanced countries.

Whether this paradigm prevails will be highly dependent on the improvement of liberal education in quantity and quality; an increase in connectivity with the outside world; and the growth of the middle class, which in turn depends on an expanding private sector in a modern market economy. The spread of globalization and the revolution in communications are going to enhance the horizons of this trend, not only in Egypt but in the rest of the region as well. A deeper trade, industrial, and technological relationship with the West—and with the United States and the European Union in particular—will enhance the continuity and sustainability of this trend. At the same time, in many ways, the furtherance of this trend will be dependent on developments in the rest of the region: especially, whether this paradigm of governance spreads to the rest of the region, and whether a spirit of peace prevails, particularly between Arabs and Israelis.

- The Islamic trend in the country has been consolidated. The Muslim Brothers have been legalized and have established a new

political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). Other Islamic parties have also been formed: the *Wasat* party on the Left and the *Gama'at Islamia*, *Jihad*, and *Salafis* on the Right. To avoid being outpaced in the politicization of Islam, the many *Sufi* orders began to organize and position themselves in the new and expanded political arena. Despite the major differences between these orders, they acted as one during the post-revolution period, with minimum friction as well between the *Sufis* and the *Salafis*. A year after the Egyptian revolution of 2011, the Islamic trend has shown prowess in its ability to mobilize masses, cooperate with and confront SCAF when necessary, and win votes in the Parliamentary elections. In the latter case, the Freedom and Justice party of the Muslim Brothers gained 45% of the seats, while the Salafi party of *Nour* gained 25%. If the votes for the moderate *Wasat* party and Islamic independents are counted in the Islamic vote share, the total would amount to nearly 77% of the seats in the People's Assembly.

In many ways this trend represents the antithesis of the liberal paradigm and, as post-revolution developments bear witness, its mortal enemy. Although it is possible that a liberal Islamic trend might develop, as in the Turkish case, there is no indication that Islamic forces in Egypt have gotten to that point, with perhaps the only exception being the small and stillborn *Wasat* party. In fact, when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Prime Minister of Turkey and head of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), visited Egypt in September 2011, he was received by members of the Muslim Brothers carrying banners calling him the *Caliph* of the Islamic *umma*. But when he spoke at Cairo University and on a variety of talk shows about the necessity of a secular state in order to enable the spirit of Islam, and the Islamic principles of freedom and justice, to flourish, Muslim Brothers propaganda organs attacked him ferociously and asked him not to interfere in Egyptian internal politics.

In the arena of post-revolution Egyptian politics, not only are the Muslim Brothers better positioned than the liberals in terms

of organization and financing, but they can also mobilize other Islamic factions, with the likely exception of the *Sufis*. Initially, at least, their status will be enhanced by increased government intervention in the economy, greater disconnectedness from the outside world, and general animosity vis-à-vis Western countries. The Palestinian question will continue to be, as it has been in the past, a main asset so far as Islamic politics are concerned. Regional tensions are always helpful in advancing populist-style politics.

- On the socioeconomic front, while it does not represent a dramatic departure from the policies of previous NDP governments, there has been a noticeable tilt to the Left with increased government intervention in the economy. Although none of the post-revolution governments has presented to the public a clear program, when a free-market economy is being equated with corruption, the general direction is clear.

While the new government has committed itself to avoid additional privatization of public companies or institutions, this constitutes less of a change than might at first appear, because no significant public institution has been privatized in Egypt since 2008. In fact, more than half of the 314 industrial companies designated for privatization by the Mubarak regime have remained in public hands. More recently, also, there has been some return to the slogans of the 1960s Nasserite era, with its emphasis on grand, state-run projects like the Aswan High Dam. The new discourse accordingly includes such ideas as the “Development Pass” and the “Reconstruction of Sinai”—intended to relocate and settle five million Egyptians there—and a Science and Technology Conglomerate. While many of these projects were on the table of the old regime, they are now flaunted as part of a revolutionary approach to Egypt’s renaissance.

- Finally, although foreign policy issues have not taken center stage in Egyptian politics, some changes in this realm are noteworthy. Egypt’s first post-revolution foreign minister, Nabil al-Araby, published in the *al-Shrouk* daily an article entitled “It Is Time to Review Our Foreign Policy.” *In it, he argued that the previous Egyptian foreign policy was “incompatible with Egypt’s status*

and its history.” “Egypt’s stance toward the siege imposed on the Gaza Strip in the time of Mubarak,” he argued, “was in breach of international humanitarian law prohibiting blockades of civilians even in wartime.”⁵¹ El-Araby did not remain long in his position, because he went on to become Secretary General of the Arab League. Nevertheless, it is evident, albeit not in a dramatic fashion, that Egypt’s foreign policy since Mubarak stepped down has aimed to establish more balanced relations within and outside the region. Greater attention has been given to ensuring that the country’s strategic and geostrategic position is more in line with public opinion and Egypt’s internal politics, and better reflects the unprecedented changes sweeping the country.

A significant portion of the Egyptian public believes that Mubarak and his regime had revealed an inclination toward maintaining good relations with Israel and the United States at the expense of the Palestinians and other Arab causes. Establishing new relations with the African states—in particular the Nile Basin states, an important source of water—is seen as another challenge facing Egyptian foreign policy after the revolution; the previous regime ignored relations with Africa in general, and with the Nile Basin states in particular, for more than two decades. Last year, some Nile Basin states signed a pact that guarantees a fairer distribution of Nile water among them, from their point of view. In an effort to avoid a conflict over water, a forty-member Egyptian delegation managed to postpone the ratification of the new agreement after meeting both with Ugandan officials and with Ethiopian officials in the period following the toppling of the Mubarak regime.

These trends reflect sharp divisions among revolutionaries: for example, between the more civic and even secular groups and individuals, on one side, and those with Islamist tendencies—who are adamant, to different degrees, with respect to shaping Egypt’s new constitution so that it will more closely correspond to the Sharia. Although the Muslim Brothers have shown pragmatism by emphasizing the civic nature of the state and by issuing or signing a variety of documents to that effect, they refused to have such

an approach codified by the general public's approving something like a Bill of Rights. And other Islamic parties have been far less pragmatic, and have insisted on creating an Islamic constitution. This division regarding the basic concept upon which the state should be based has overshadowed all other serious debates about Egypt's domestic and foreign policies.

Debates on Domestic Politics

Although the civic-religious dichotomy remains the major schism in Egyptian politics, there are other major ones worth monitoring. There is, first of all, the divide over the nature of the political system that should be established in the coming constitution. In what has been termed the "Second Republic," the future political system is taking three directions. The parliamentary system had been tried in Egypt for three decades, from 1922 to 1952, in what was known as the liberal era in the country. The Egyptian constitution of 1923, which was based on the Belgian constitution, deferred to the decisions of the majority party—that is, the party that garnered the majority of seats in Parliament. In many ways it was similar to the Indian, British, and Israeli political systems.

A considerable part of the Egyptian political elite, liberals and Islamists alike, have been calling for reinstituting such a regime, as one familiar to Egyptians. Even before the revolution, however, in light of the instability inherent in the parliamentary system, and the possible tension between the head of state and the Prime Minister—and with an eye toward more efficiency and transparency in the political system—a presidential political system has been considered more suitable for a country used to a strong head of state, yet at the same time seeking a democratic foundation. The experiences of the newly democratized states in Eastern and Central Europe, South America, and Asia were seen as evidence of the effectiveness of a presidential system of government.

There were also those in Egypt who wanted to mix the two systems together, citing the French system of governance as the example to follow. And with respect to a legislative body, there were those who wanted a unicameral legislature—namely, the People's Assembly, with the Shura Council being abolished—and others who wanted a

bicameral legislature, with the Shura Council serving like the Senate in a presidential system.

The debates over the proper system of governance for the country were tied to another debate, about the best possible election system that could ensure a *representative* government. The division was between those who preferred the districts system of elections, with each district representing the same number of constituents, and those who advocated a proportional system of elections—one that is dependent on party lists. This debate was resolved on September 27, 2011, when SCAF declared a new “Constitutional Declaration,” which set forth a road map for elections according to which candidates would register their candidacy by October 12; three rounds of elections for the People’s Assembly, each taking up two weeks, would begin on November 28; and Shura Council elections, conducted in the same fashion as those for the People’s Assembly, would begin on January 29, 2012. The elections would be supervised entirely by the judiciary, with two-thirds of the seats chosen according to party lists and one-third being individual district seats.

None of the above, however, should be taken as defining the final organization of the state—and the same should be assumed with regard to the debates concerning the relationship between the state and the economy, and between the central government and local administrations. It seems that the road to the final configuration of the state will be longer than was assumed in the first announcements of the SCAF, or even in the early demands of the revolutionaries. The current timetable might take the rest of 2012 in order to finalize the constitution and thereafter hold presidential elections—whereupon another election of the legislative bodies might be called for according to the new constitution. And over all that time, the list of issues to be debated will surely keep growing.

Foreign Policy and Regional Politics

One can certainly see the Egyptian revolution as having erupted as a result of complex socioeconomic and political factors that created contradictions that the Mubarak regime could neither handle nor absorb. At the same time, however, it seems that the Egyptian revolution is part of a much larger trend that is sweeping the region—

and there is no indication that that situation will stabilize any time soon. Some revolutions in the area have toppled regimes but are still in the process of defining what sort of state, and government, they seek to create, while others are still in the process of struggle, amidst bloody confrontations with the regime in power. It is still highly uncertain whether the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, where the first mission of overthrowing the regime has been accomplished, are done; what the status is (and what the future will be) of revolutions that are underway, as in Yemen or Syria, or seemingly still budding, as in Algeria, Morocco, or Bahrain; and whether revolutions are still to come in Oman, Kuwait, UAE, and Saudi Arabia—and if so, when. The only thing that *is* certain is that the Arab Middle East will never be the same, and accordingly the regional environment has changed once and for all—with implications for regional balance and state behavior.

The future course of governments in the Middle East will depend largely on the direction that any given revolution takes: Islamic or democratic. There are some possible options between these two poles, however: Islamic political parties and movements will have a considerable voice in a democratic country, and democratic practices may not be entirely shunned in a country governed according to the Sharia. But whatever directions are taken, the politics of the Middle East will be much more complicated. Both the number and possible orientations of regional actors will increase; media will be even more differentiated and pervasive; and even the terms of major issues—war and peace, development, intra-Arab relations, relations with neighboring countries like Turkey and Iran, and above all Arab-Israeli relations—will likely change. Relationships with the rest of the world—especially with the West in general and the United States in particular—are bound to be different from what now prevails..

In almost all cases, however, the biggest loser will be Israel. In many ways, Israel lost its greatest opportunity for peace over the last few years; now that possibility must be relegated to a distant future if it is to come at all. Existing peace treaties will be respected: After all, the countries that signed them understand the price of war, and democracies are usually busy with internal affairs. But such peace as has been achieved will be colder than ever before.⁵²

Arab-Israeli conflict may assume many different forms. Democracies, Islamic or not, are capable of innovating and improvising with respect to a goal like making the Israeli occupation costly. The recent attempts at reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah gives a clue as to the future to come. Revolutionary Egypt was able to conclude a deal that had been initiated under the toppled Mubarak regime: The agreement could not have happened without the revolution in Egypt, which made the deal happen, and Syria, which could not prevent it. The deal and the entire episode were intended to prepare the stage for the Union Nations General Assembly meeting in September 2011, when Arab delegations sought international recognition for a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, thereby rendering all Israeli settlements within those borders illegitimate.

None of this, of course, will be accepted by Israel. The new democratic Arab regimes will seek to deprive Israel of its status as the only democracy in the region. Although this was already put in doubt by the Turkish presence in Middle East politics, it will now be even more open to question if there are a number of Arab countries that are democratic, or look like they are. On the ground, the Palestinian struggle for statehood may take on a different appearance than it has had over the last six decades. Although Intifada has been practiced before as a form of resistance, both peaceful and violent, this time it will likely ignite new forms of pressure on the Israeli government, and probably on Israeli politics in general.

While all the changes in Arab countries will be welcomed in Turkey, where a model of something like Islamic democracy already exists, Iran will face the dilemma of needing to attach itself to the region's revolutions while at the same time fearing their democratic possibilities. For all actors involved, there will be both risks and opportunities. The United States, the European Union, and the rest of the Western countries will be continuously evaluating the authenticity of democracy in the various Arab countries; they will also have to reconsider how to respond if one democracy—Israel—is seen as occupying the land of another democratic country. For the first time in the Arab-Israeli saga, the conflict will be judged on the basis of democratic principles.

Egypt's transition to a more democratic system in the months ahead will have major implications for United States foreign policy in

the Middle East, and U.S. policy makers are grappling with complex questions regarding what those implications might be. United States policy toward Egypt has long been framed as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running military cooperation and on sustaining the March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Successive U.S. administrations have viewed Egypt's government as a moderating influence in the Middle East, and the U.S. has provided Egypt with an annual average of \$2 billion in economic and military foreign assistance since 1979. (For FY2012, the Obama administration has requested \$1.55 billion in total aid to Egypt.) Egypt received promises after the revolution of greater moral and material support from the EU, Japan, and many other countries from the East and West; all of these are waiting, though, to see what direction Egypt is going to take.

That direction is too early to measure, however. The coming constitution will surely be more democratic than the previous one; the already enacted constitutional amendments have already curtailed the powers of the presidency, and the new constitution can only curtail them further. Whether more democratization at the center of power leads to more good governance or not, more tolerance or not, or more decentralization or not remains to be seen. What we can confidently say now is that whatever style of governance is eventually in place in Egypt, there will be a greater voice for the people than there was under the previous regime. No government, Islamic or secular-democratic, will be able to ignore the ability of the masses to organize and mobilize, and above all to vote.

It is noteworthy, perhaps, that, according to a poll taken by the al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in August 2011, 32 percent of respondents (despite Egyptians' lack of trust in all political parties) express a preference for the Muslim Brothers' Freedom and Justice Party, with 16.7 percent supporting the Revolutionary Youth Coalition. At the same time, the sentiments of those in Egypt's foreign policy elite are known to be moderate regarding the West and the Arab-Israeli conflict. And according to the same poll, among presidential hopefuls, Amr Musa, a former Egyptian foreign minister, a diplomat of long standing, a long-time participant in the peace process, and former Secretary General of the Arab League, ranks first, with 63.9 percent support among respondents.

All these early indicators should not lead to the prediction of a much tougher Egyptian foreign policy, with revolutionary tendencies. It is still early, after all, and in democracies internal needs are generally much more pressing. As Egypt emerges from its current revolutionary stage, it will be exhausted and in need of rebuilding and investment after putting its political house in order—especially as Egypt's population will reach 90 million in 2012.

Finally, foreign policy and regional politics are not dependent on only one actor's conditions and behavior. Any movement toward a more conciliatory mood in the regional environment will likely take Egypt in the same direction.

THE PARADOX OF THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION

Contemplating revolutions while they are still in the making is a difficult task for analysts and scholars alike. In many ways, it can be likened to a blind man trying to measure the dimensions of an ice cube while it is melting in his hands. If it is a hot day (and revolutions are usually full of heat and flare), the measurement will be highly mistaken. However, it is the function of scholarship to keep tracking developments taking place while they are still in their unresolved and uncertain stages and not leave that task to historians, who cannot take the pulse of a revolution while it is happening or observe and record the nuances that afford any given revolution its peculiar magnitude, character, and luster.

Now, after Egyptians' initial feelings of pride and fulfillment, and the awe and touch of romanticism that it inspired among outsiders, the Egyptian revolution is facing what every revolution in history has faced. The world, and certainly Egypt, was not born when young Egyptians went into Tahrir Square on January 25 to start a revolution that kick-started a process of change. Change, said Leo Strauss, is the essence of politics: The question is whether any given change takes a country forward or backward. And the direction of revolution-impelled change in Egypt will be determined by conditions that were well established to the point of being entrenched, in the country and in the region.

One may ask: Can the fall of Mubarak—his overthrow and removal from the presidential palace, and eventual conveyance to the courtroom, on August 3, 2011, to stand trial with his two sons—be seen as an end to the Pharaonic state that he ruled for three decades in Egypt; or is the reality of a Pharaonic Egyptian state a much more complicated phenomenon, such that it might outlive this particular Pharaoh? Might we now be seeing the beginning of a new era in Egyptian history that might assume a new name or form, but in the end would remain Pharaonic?

Days before the trial of Mubarak began, Tahrir Square had changed, on July 29, and become the birthplace of a new, religious Pharaoh of another shade—one not remotely related to democracy, who did appear as a harbinger of a different Egypt from what had existed before.

On that day, which was called “Kandahar Friday,” when liberals were forced to withdraw, the Egyptian flag was ornamented with verses from the Quran, Saudi flags were raised, and the black flags of al-Qaeda and photos of Osama bin Laden were raised. For the first time since the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, heavy Egyptian forces were needed to uncover jihadist groups in the Sinai whose banner is a black flag with the phrase “There is no God but God” printed in the center of a circle, and who view the Egyptian state as illegitimate and its officials as heretics, so that fighting this status quo they regard as a form of jihad; the state’s law is abrogated in favor of Islamic law; and those who work for the state are fit objects of revenge.

The chants in Cairo on “Qandahar Friday” were no longer “*Salmiya . . . Salmiya*” [Peace...Peace] and “Raise your head up, you are an Egyptian,” which were the slogans of the eighteen days of the revolution, but “*Islamiya . . . Islamiya*” and “Raise your head up, you are a Muslim.” The speeches of the day were not any more about democracy, a constitution, progress, or “Freedom, Dignity, and Justice,” but about an Islamic state that would strictly implement the Sharia. All of these were signs that the Pharaonic state was perhaps greater than the Pharaoh who had stumbled, whose rule had eroded, and whose resources had dried up. Its essence, it appeared, had remained the same; its components reincarnated and revived, even if in new forms.

This pessimistic view should not be taken as definitive, however. The Nile, after all, continues to flow; Egyptians are still on their land, with a long history behind them; and customs remain firmly embedded in Egyptian culture, mocking change and each new instance of revolution. For let us ask: Over the course of that long history, how many rulers of Egypt have come and gone? In truth, the balance sheet of this revolution has yet to be finally reckoned. The socioeconomic and political changes in the country that have occurred over the past two decades do not suggest that a new Pharaonic state in Islamic garb is a foregone conclusion. The al-Ahram Center poll referred to earlier indicates that the jury is still out on the matter of the future of the Egyptian state. With regard to the nature of that state in the coming phase, the majority of popular opinion (51.6 percent of the sample) favor a civil democratic state, while 41.4 percent of Egyptians want

Egypt to be an Islamic state; the rest of the sample (7.4 percent) favor a *strong* Egyptian state, even if it is not democratic.

In many ways, such numbers reflect the paradox of the Egyptian revolution, and the contradictions of Egyptian politics at this stage of transition—and they suggest a desire for neither a fully democratic state nor a fully theocratic one. Most likely, the next Egyptian state will be located somewhere between the Turkish and Iranian models, and will contain tensions that will need more than a decade (or two elections) to settle.

Nothing should be taken for granted, therefore. For one, the revolutions in Egypt and other Arab countries, referred to as the Arab Spring, are still in process. And what we have seen so far indicates that at least a decade will be needed for the dust to settle, with respect to both individual countries and the region as a whole. In many ways, until 2011, the Arab regional order was rooted in the changes that took place in the 1950s. The new, post-revolutionary political regimes will continue to face many of the same challenges—and opportunities—that the outgoing regimes faced, as well as the additional challenges of:

- meeting the revolutionary demand for democracy;
- harmonizing every state's need for law and order with the revolutionary demand for freedom—which might, at the hands of populists and demagogues, turn into chaos; and
- harmonizing the requirements of a civic state with demands by some for the dominance of religion—meaning, of course, Islam—in public life. This is likely to prove a daunting task, as regards everything from writing a constitution to implementing it when tensions grow between the realm of legislation and the reign of fatwa.

In addition, the role of the state in the economy—especially when the demands on the system in a given state far exceed its own human and physical resources; the relationship between state and society, especially when it comes to defining morality; and other major issues all have to be revisited in light of the slogan of the Egyptian revolution: “Freedom, Dignity, and Justice.” The new addition to the lexicon of revolutions,

Dignity, will require conceptualization as well as implementation. And the need for development—a concept almost absent from the revolutionary dictionary in the Arab Spring—will haunt all of the new regimes, who will in particular have to deal with disparities between the rich and the poor and among regions and social groups.

The new generation of Arab revolutionaries has yet to come to grips with all these issues—and they approach them with two major deficiencies. First, they have no apparent leadership that can concretize and articulate their demands while avoiding factional division resulting from compromise and bargaining among themselves, as well as with more established political forces. And they have no model for change except toppling the old regime, cleaning the system of corruption, and assuming a more independent stance in relationship to the outside world. Overcoming these two realities constitutes the work of transition—and as we can see from the Egyptian and Tunisian cases, that work is no less tedious and agonizing a process than the business of revolution itself.

APPENDIX 1: CHRONOLOGY OF THE REVOLUTION

Date	Event
January 25th	Demonstrations begin in Tahrir Square in massive, unprecedented numbers and are duplicated in different Egyptian cities. The demonstrators stress the peaceful nature of their action.
January 28th	“The Friday of Fury”: The police withdraw, and the army appears on the streets; a large number of police stations are burned, communications are disrupted, and a curfew is imposed. Mubarak asks the government of Ahmad Nazif to resign after declaring that he has no intention of being a candidate for the presidency.
January 29th	General Omar Suleiman, head of Egyptian General Intelligence, is appointed Vice President, and Air Marshal Ahmad Shafik, Minister of Aviation, is asked to form a new Cabinet. Major acts of violence occur against police stations, National Democratic Party headquarters, and public institutions, including courts. Citizens form units guarding houses, museums, and neighborhoods.
January 30th	Ahmad Ez, the Head of Organization for the NDP, resigns; there is a massive escape from Egyptian prisons; banks, the stock market, and the railways shut down.
January 31st	Vice President Omar Suleiman calls for dialogue with political forces, including the Muslim Brothers; and the General Command of the army issues a statement supporting the legitimate demands of the demonstrators, asking them to continue being peaceful, and declaring that the army has no intention of using force against them. The Minister of Interior resigns his post after being accused of being responsible for the use of violence against demonstrators.

February 1st	Mubarak makes a second speech, in which he reiterates that he has no intention of seeking another term for the presidency, and declares his intention to live and die in Egypt. The speech gains him sympathy from the general public.
February 2nd	“The Battle of the Camel”: Groups of Mubarak supporters riding camels and horses attack the demonstrators in Tahrir Square.
February 3rd	Vice President Omar Suleiman declares that neither President Mubarak nor his son Gamal will seek the nomination for the presidency.
February 4th	“The Friday of Departure”: Demonstrators ask President Mubarak to leave his post and the country.
February 5th	The NDP <i>politburo</i> resigns; Husam Badrawy is appointed Secretary General of the NDP.
February 8th	Demonstrators put the Council Of Ministers, the People’s Assembly, and the Shura Council under siege.
February 10th	Mubarak makes a third speech, in which he delegates his powers to Vice President Omar Suleiman.
February 11th	“The Friday of Challenge”: President Mubarak leaves Cairo for Sharm el- Sheikh; Omar Suleiman declares that President Mubarak has left his office and transferred the powers of the presidency to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).
February 13th	SCAF freezes the 1971 constitution.

State and Revolution in Egypt:

February 15th	SCAF forms a committee to amend a number of articles in the constitution of 1971.
February 25th	“The Friday of Purification”: Demonstrators in Tahrir Square ask for the Cabinet of Ahmad Shafik to resign.
February 28th	The public prosecutor puts the assets of Mubarak and his family under state control.
March 3rd	The Cabinet of Ahmad Shafik resigns.
March 5th	State security stations are attacked all over the country.
March 7th	A new Cabinet headed by Esam Sharaf, former Minister of Transportation, is formed.
March 19th	A referendum on the amendment of eight articles of the 1971 constitution is held.
March 30th	SCAF issues a new “Constitutional Declaration” intended to replace the constitution of 1971.
April 1st	“The Friday of Salvation”: Demonstrators ask that Mubarak be put on trial.
April 10th	The public prosecutor makes a decision to call Mubarak and his two sons in for interrogation.
April 16th	The High Administrative Court makes a final ruling dissolving the NDP.

May 5th	Former Minister of Interior, Habib ElAdly is sentenced to twelve years imprisonment by the Criminal Court.
August 3rd	The trial of Mubarak and his two sons, Gamal and Alaa, and Minister of Interior begins and is broadcast on Egyptian public radio and television.
August 15th	The second session of the trial of Mubarak and his sons is held; the judge makes a ruling canceling the public broadcasting of the trial.

APPENDIX 2: FOUR MILITARY MEN

The relationship between the political system in Egypt and the military establishment is as old as time. Pharaohs in antiquity were Gods, heads of state, and warriors all at the same time. Later, those who ruled Egypt in the name of foreign powers or sovereigns established their presence by means of foreign garrisons and armies if necessary.

The first Egyptian revolution installed Muhammad Ali Pasha in 1805 to be the *wali* (governor) of Egypt despite the initial unwillingness of the Ottoman Sultan. A soldier in the Ottoman army who came to Egypt after the French and British invasions of the country, Muhammad Ali, along with his sons, re-established the Egyptian army after twenty-three centuries of its absence, thereby planting the seeds of modern Egypt. It remained for the elder son, Ibrahim Pasha, to take the army to the heart of the Ottoman Empire, where it became one of the respected professional forces in the Mediterranean. Despite the waning powers of the army later in the nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth, it was the Egyptian military that held the banner of Egyptian national pride aloft as the country went through the process of wresting independence from the Ottoman Empire and later from British colonialism.

The revolution of July 23, 1952, enhanced the army's status even further, as the leader of the revolution, Gamal Abdel Nasser, symbolized both Egyptian and Arab nationalism at the same time. For most of the next six decades, the leaders of Egypt were three military men: Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak. And over the eighteen days of the Egyptian revolution, four military men played crucial roles in determining the immediate outcome of the revolutionary struggle, and in shaping the immediate post-revolution period as well as, perhaps, the future of the Egyptian polity. The four men were Hosni Mubarak, who had served as President of the republic for almost three decades; the Vice President, General Omar Suleiman; Air Marshal and Prime Minister Ahmad Shafik; and Field Marshal Mohamed Husain Tantawy, the Minister of Defense and General Commander of the Armed Forces. Omar Suleiman, Mohamed Husain Tantawy, and Ahmad Shafik together closed a chapter in Egyptian

history as they eased Mubarak out of power while he was President of the country and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

President Hosni Mubarak⁵³

Mohamed Hosni Mubarak was born on May 4, 1928, in the small village of Kafr El-Miselha (Menofia Governorate) in the Nile Delta. Upon completion of high school, he joined the Egyptian Military Academy, where he received a bachelor's degree in military sciences in 1949; he subsequently joined the Air Force Academy, gaining his commission as a pilot officer on March 13, 1950, and eventually receiving a bachelor's degree in aviation sciences.

As an Egyptian Air Force officer, Mubarak served in various formations and units, including two years in a Spitfire fighter squadron. Some time in the 1950s he returned to the Air Force Academy, this time as an instructor. He remained there until early 1959, after which he underwent additional training in the Soviet Union, attending a pilot training school in Moscow and another at Kant Air Base, eventually joining the Frunze Military Academy in 1964. On his return to Egypt, Mubarak served in wing and then base commander appointments, taking up command of the Cairo West Air Base in October 1966 before briefly commanding the Beni Suef Air Base. In November 1967, Mubarak became commander of the Air Force Academy; two years later he became Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Air Force.

Mubarak became Commander of the Air Force and Egyptian deputy minister of defense in 1972. In the following year his military career reached its pinnacle when he was promoted to Air Chief Marshal in recognition of his service during the October war of 1973 against Israel. At the Air Force Academy, Mubarak was credited with having doubled the number of pilots and navigators in the Air Force in the years prior to October 1973; and he was credited in some publications for Egypt's initial strong performance in that war.

Mubarak was appointed Vice President of Egypt in 1975; following the assassination of President Anwar Sadat, he assumed the presidency—on October 14, 1981—and also became Chairman of the National Democratic Party (NDP). In 1989, ten years after it had been suspended from the Arab League after concluding a peace agreement

with Israel, Egypt was readmitted as a full member, and the League's headquarters were relocated to their original location in Cairo.

Egypt was a member of the allied coalition in the 1991 Gulf War, and Egyptian infantry were some of the first to land in Saudi Arabia to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Egypt's involvement in the coalition was deemed by the U.S. as crucial in garnering wider Arab support for the liberation of Kuwait. The participation of Egyptian forces, in addition to further solidifying Egypt's central role in the Arab world, brought with it financial benefits. Reports in the news media were that sums as large as \$500,000 per soldier were paid to the Egyptian government, and that there was substantial forgiveness of debt. According to *The Economist*, "[t]he programme worked like a charm: a textbook case, says the IMF. In fact, luck was on Hosni Mubarak's side; when the US was hunting for a military alliance to force Iraq out of Kuwait, Egypt's President joined without hesitation. After the war, his reward was that America, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, and Europe forgave Egypt around \$14 billion of debt."

Mubarak's stance on the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, however, was different. He spoke out against the war, arguing that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should have been resolved first. He also claimed that the war would cause "100 Bin Ladens" to emerge. Yet, as President he did not support an immediate U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, on the basis that it would probably produce chaos.

Mubarak's major passion remained reaching a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. As he had been actively involved in the Arab League, he has supported Arab efforts to achieve a lasting peace in the region. The current position of the League is that which was endorsed at the Beirut Summit on March 28, 2002. At the summit the league adopted the Arab Peace Initiative, a Saudi-inspired peace plan which offered full normalization of relations with Israel in exchange for Israel's withdrawal from all occupied territories, including the Golan Heights; its recognition of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital; and a "just solution" for the Palestinian refugees. The Peace Initiative was again endorsed in 2007 at the Riyadh Summit. In July 2007, the Arab League sent a mission to Israel, comprising the Jordanian and Egyptian foreign ministers, to promote the initiative.

On June 19, 2008, the Egypt-brokered “lull” or pause in hostilities between Israel and Hamas went into effect. The agreement required Hamas to end rocket attacks on Israel and to enforce the lull throughout Gaza. In exchange, Hamas expected the blockade of Gaza to end, commerce to resume, and truck shipments to be restored to 2005 levels (between 500 and 600 trucks per day). Israel, which had tied easing of the blockade to a reduction in rocket fire, gradually reopened supply lines, permitting around 90 truck shipments per day (up from around 70) to enter Gaza. Hamas criticized Israel for its continued blockade, while Israel accused Hamas of continued weapons smuggling via tunnels from Egypt, and pointed to continued rocket attacks as well.

The domestic politics of Mubarak were less impressive than his foreign policy. Though he followed an assassinated President and presided over a country divided over peace with Israel, Mubarak did succeed in stabilizing the country. But he lacked a clear policy with respect to reforming the Egyptian social and economic structure, and he almost wasted the decade of the 1980s, and the resources and opportunities made available to Egypt by Western countries. Mubarak did exploit the benefits of Egyptian participation in the Gulf War when he approved the implementation of the structural adjustment program that was to take Egypt from the stagnation of the 1980s to economic growth over the next two decades. In July 2004, Mubarak accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Atef Ebeid and then appointed Ahmad Nazif as his successor. The new Cabinet that came in with Nazif was generally viewed with optimism. Economic conditions improved considerably, and there was some success in putting the Egyptian economy on the road to progress. The Egyptian stock market had the greatest percentage increase of all emerging markets for the fiscal year 2004/2005, and Egypt appeared atop the list of reforming countries in the report of “Doing Business” published by the World Bank.

Mubarak’s record with regard to political reform was unimpressive. Although he had to face the pressures of various militant Islamic forces—which, having assassinated his predecessor, tried to assassinate him as well while he was in Ethiopia for a conference of the Organization of African Unity in 1995—Mubarak failed to overcome the centralized essence of the Egyptian political system that had been in place since 1952, and all the elections conducted under his presidency

were rigged.⁵⁴ Mubarak attempted to reform the system through constitutional reforms in 2005 and 2007, but he failed to convince the Egyptian people, not to mention the outside world, that he was serious in taking Egypt on the road to democracy. His biggest failure was his inability to persuade the Egyptian public both to extend his rule for a seventh term, and that he had no intention of handing power over to his son Gamal. Mubarak's time in office, however, did make him Egypt's longest-serving ruler since Muhammad Ali Pasha, often referred to as the founder of modern Egypt, who ruled over Egypt for most of the first half of the nineteenth century.

Hosni Mubarak was ousted after eighteen days of demonstrations during the 2011 Egyptian revolution. On February 11, Vice President Omar Suleiman announced that Mubarak had resigned as President and had transferred authority to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). On April 13, the public prosecutor, Abdel Magid Mahmoud, ordered Mubarak and both of his sons to be detained for fifteen days of questioning regarding allegations of corruption and abuse of power. Mubarak was then ordered to stand trial on charges of premeditated murder of peaceful protesters during the revolution; the trial officially began on August 3, 2011. Egypt's military prosecutors then also proclaimed that they were investigating Mubarak's role in the assassination of his predecessor, Anwar Sadat.

Vice President General Omar Suleiman⁵⁵

Omar Suleiman was born on July 2, 1936, in Qena, in Upper Egypt. In 1954, at the age of 19, he moved to Cairo to enroll in Egypt's prestigious Military Academy; he received additional military training in the Soviet Union at Moscow's Frunze Military Academy. He participated in both the Six-Day (June 1967) and October (1973) wars against Israel. In the mid-1980's, Suleiman earned additional degrees, including a bachelor's degree from Ain Shams University and a master's from Cairo University, both in political science. A fluent English speaker, Suleiman was transferred to military intelligence, to work on Egypt–United States relations; he has been a leading figure in Egypt's intelligence system since 1986, and has been an army general, politician, and diplomat as well as intelligence officer. Despite his many career roles, however, his intelligence activity is what he has been

most known for. His name became known only in later years—it was released in the media around the year 2000—breaking the tradition of keeping the name of the head of intelligence a secret known only to senior government officials.

Suleiman became Deputy Head of Military Intelligence in 1986, and its director in 1991. In 1993, he became the chief of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS). In 1995, he is said to have insisted that President Mubarak ride in an armored car during a visit to Ethiopia. A would-be assassin fired on the vehicle, but Mubarak escaped without injury owing to the added precautions.

Among the many Egyptian officials, Suleiman was one of the closest to President Mubarak, both personally and politically. He was the witness for the marriage of Mubarak's son Gamal—an honor given only to a close friend. A close and trusted ally, he shared many of Mubarak's views on key issues, including Egyptian-Israeli relations and the management of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Egypt-U.S. relations, dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic forces within and outside Egypt, and Iran. Although he was a military man who by law was not a member of Mubarak's National Democratic Party, he preferred suits to military uniforms and is seen as a major link between Egypt's political and military elites.

In many ways, since 2000, Suleiman has been Egypt's principal player in the area of external affairs, particularly in connection with its most important relationships: with the U.S., Israel, Saudi Arabia, the Palestinians, and any other country of importance where crisis was developing (Syria and Ethiopia, for example). For that work he got high marks from most chief intelligence officials in many countries, especially the U.S., Israel, and important Arab countries. It was reported that he was close to the CIA, to the degree of participating in its rendition program.

Because of his role in the regional political scene and the lack of an alternative candidate acceptable to Hosni Mubarak, some speculated that Suleiman would succeed Mubarak as President, though he denied any intention of running for election to the office. In particular, he was seen as the choice of the Egyptian military establishment.

Suleiman was appointed to the vice presidency by then President Hosni Mubarak on January 29, 2011, ending a vacancy in the position

that had lasted almost thirty years; he was sworn in two days later. On February 5, a senior Egyptian security source denied reports of an assassination attempt on Omar Suleiman, insisting that there was no truth to them at all; subsequently, on February 24, Foreign Minister Abu al-Gheith confirmed that Suleiman had survived an assassination attempt on February 4, when a group of unidentified men opened fire on Suleiman's car from a stolen ambulance in Cairo⁵⁶; he confirmed the assassination attempt to the author in a phone interview in February as well.

On Tuesday, February 8, as Vice President, Suleiman held a two-hour meeting with senior Egyptian journalists, which the author attended. It was obvious at this meeting that Suleiman was losing control over events: He was not holding a press conference, but rather asking for advice and recommendations regarding how to deal with the current revolution situation. He reported that the intelligence organs of the state had knowledge of the communications on Facebook and on the Internet generally, and expected a large protest of perhaps one hundred thousand. What did occur, of course, exceeded those expectations. Suleiman reported about communications with the leaders of the opposition, but it was clear that the events were moving beyond his control. On February 11, Suleiman announced Mubarak's resignation and ceased being Vice President when governing authority was transferred to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, of which Suleiman is not a member. A new head of intelligence services was appointed by the Supreme Council.

In many ways, Suleiman came late to the political game in Egypt, and faced a different and complicated political situation. From the information available, it seems that Suleiman played the role of a broker between Mubarak and his family on the one hand and the military on the other, taking into consideration the new revolutionary environment in the country. Together with Tantawy and Shafik, Suleiman engineered the process of power transition in revolutionary Egypt. Tantawy is heading the SCAF until the transition period is completed, and Shafik is a presidential hopeful. But when Suleiman was asked if he would enter the presidential race, his answer was: It is time for the warrior to rest.

Air Marshal Prime Minister Ahmad Shafik⁵⁷

Ahmad Shafik was born in Cairo in November 1941. After graduating from the Egyptian Air Academy in 1961, he joined the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) at the age of 20; later in his career, he earned a master's degree in military sciences and a Ph.D. in the National Strategy of Outer-Space. After a career as a fighter pilot, squadron, wing and base commander, Shafik served as Commander of the Egyptian Air Force from 1996 to 2002, reaching the rank of Air Marshal, and in the government as Minister of Civil Aviation from 2002 to 2011. He was appointed Prime Minister by President Hosni Mubarak on January 29, 2011, in response to the 2011 Egyptian revolution. Amidst a rapidly changing political situation, he remained in office for only a month, resigning on March 3, 2011.

Shafik served as a fighter pilot as a young officer and was later appointed fighter air squadron commander. During the War of Attrition, between 1967 and 1970, Shafik saw active service as Multi-Task Airwing Commander, and thereafter as an air base commander. During the 1973 war, Shafik was a senior fighter pilot under Hosni Mubarak's command; he is believed to have shot down two Israeli aircraft on October 14 in that war. Shafik saw some forty years of service in the Egyptian Air Force as a fighter pilot.

Shafik was appointed a military attaché in the Egyptian embassy in Rome in 1984; he remained in this position until 1986. From 1988 to 1991, Shafik served in several senior military command positions before he was appointed Commander of the Air Operations Department. In September 1991, he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Air Force, holding this position until April 1996, when he became Commander of the Air Force. In 2002, he was appointed Minister of Civil Aviation.

As civil aviation minister, Shafik tackled some of the major problems at EgyptAir, the national airline; upgraded management and infrastructure at Egyptian airports; and improved relations with domestic and international private operators and international regulatory authorities. He undertook an ambitious restructuring plan for EgyptAir and managed to turn around the company's performance. EgyptAir became a Star Alliance member in 2008. Shafik is also considered to have effectively modernized Egyptian airports,

transforming the Cairo International Airport into a regional hub and increasing its annual capacity to 22 million passengers; Sharm el-Sheikh International Airport attained an annual capacity of 8 million passengers.

Ahmad Shafik was named Prime Minister on January 29, in the midst of the Egyptian revolution of 2011; but his time in office would be severely short-lived, as he resigned on March 3, just over a month later, owing to pressure from protesters and the opposition, who objected to someone they saw as being part of Mubarak's old guard staying on as Prime Minister. On July 10, Shafik made his first public appearance since resigning as Prime Minister, attending the graduation ceremony of the Egyptian Air Force Academy class along with the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces.⁵⁸

In many ways, Shafik is the only one among these four military men who has both domestic and military experience. By appointing him Prime Minister, Mubarak thought he might be able to draw on his experience to deflate the revolutionary crisis. But Shafik came to the office too late, and he was not free at that point, for example, to form his own Cabinet. The result was one similar to previous Mubarak cabinets, which infuriated the revolutionaries rather than placating them. After the fall of Mubarak, Shafik attempted to form a new Cabinet, but the pressure of time and SCAF in the end ensured a large number of NDP participants, which sealed his fate.

Although Shafik finally resigned, he attracted followers who pushed him into the arena of presidential hopefuls. And in a poll conducted by the al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in August of 2011, he scored second, with 46 percent support, behind only Amr Musa, who received the support of 63 percent.

Field Marshal Mohamed Husain Tantawy⁵⁹

The most enigmatic of the four military men who decided the fate of transition in Egypt in the fateful hours of February 11 was Field Marshal Mohamed Husain Tantawy. Shying away from the media and public appearances, he was the least known of the four to the general public, and remained so even after becoming the leader of Egypt as the head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).

Born on October 31, 1935 and of Nubian origin, Tantawy received his commission as a military officer on April 1, 1956. He took part in the Sinai War of 1956, the Six-Day War of 1967, and the October war of 1973; he has held various commands and served as military attaché to Pakistan, as Commander of the Presidential Guard, and as Chief of the Operations Authority of the Armed Forces. In 1990–91 he also took part in the U.S. Gulf War against Iraq.

On May 20, 1991, following the dismissal of Lieutenant General Youssef Sabri Abu Taleb, Tantawy was appointed Minister of Defense and Military Production and Commander in Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, as well as Field Marshal. It is believed that Tantawi would have succeeded Mubarak as President of Egypt had the assassination attempt of June 1995 been successful. Early in 2011, Tantawy was seen as a possible contender for the presidency.

On February 11, 2011, when President Hosni Mubarak resigned after eighteen days of revolutionary protest from the Egyptian people, he transferred authority to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, headed by Tantawi—who thereupon became *de facto* head of state. The Council, overseeing issues with the Chairman of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Farouk Sultan, has since dissolved the Egyptian parliament, overseen the referendum over temporary constitutional amendments that took place on March 19, and presided over Mubarak and many of the former regime's top figures being summoned to justice in the name of accountability.

On a personal level, Tantawy has kept a relatively low profile since the handing over of power to the Council, only making a first public appearance to speak at a graduation at the Police Academy on May 16, 2011. He has opted to leave most public speeches and press releases to other senior members of the Council while receiving a number of foreign officials, including British Prime Minister David Cameron and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. That low profile might be taken as an indication that Tantawy is not interested in pursuing public office after transferring power to civilian rule as he has promised—or that he is waiting for the public to show interest in his leadership.

APPENDIX 3

Egyptian Cabinet, *Information and Decision Support Center*. The summary of the Constitutional Declaration was as follows⁶⁰:

In a press conference on Wednesday March 30, 2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) announced a Constitutional Declaration. SCAF member Major General Mamdouh Shahin said that the Constitutional Declaration issued on February 13; the results of the referendum on the constitutional amendments carried out on March 19; and the SCAF Declaration issued on March 23 have been viewed. He added that the new Constitutional Declaration comprises 63 articles.

The first four articles all refer to matters related to the State, as they confirm that the Arab Republic of Egypt has a democratic system built on citizenship; Islam is the State's religion; the principles of Sharia are the main source of legislation; Arabic is the State's official language; the people are the source of power; and no party can be formed on a religious basis.

Major General Shahin also stated that the Constitutional Declaration points to the society's economic, social, and political fundamentals. It confirms that private ownership is safeguarded and no restrictions are imposed on it except by law and judicial rulings. In addition, all citizens are equal before the law; citizens' basic freedoms are protected; and no one will be detained or held under guard except by law.

Major General Shahin asserted that the Constitutional Declaration guarantees dwellings' privacy, and freedom of faith, opinion, and press. Furthermore, citizens have the right to hold private meetings in accordance with the law. Taxes will not be levied or amended except by law. He also noted that the Constitutional Declaration indicated that punishment is individual, and crimes and penalties are determined according to legal provision. The accused is deemed innocent until he is found guilty, and litigation and defense rights are guaranteed for everyone.

The Declaration lays down the rules for presidential candidacy, which are set forth in the constitutional amendments approved by a referendum, Shahin said, adding that presidential elections will be held under full judicial supervision; the presidential term is four years and is renewable only once; and the President should appoint a Vice President within a period of at most 60 days. The Constitutional Declaration also reinstates the allocation of 50 percent of People's Assembly (lower house of Parliament) seats for workers and farmers, with clear definitions of both. The People's Assembly term should be five years.

The powers of the Shura Council (the Upper House of Parliament) have been contracted so as to be limited, Shahin said. Elections to both houses will be held within six months after the announcement of the results of the referendum on constitutional changes regarding the President of the Republic—who will, immediately after his election, assume the powers and jurisdictions assigned to the SCAF as set forth in the Declaration.

The Declaration also refers to the judicial power, comprising the Supreme Constitutional Court, the State Council, and other judicial bodies.

Article 56 specifies SCAF's mandates, which focus on enacting legislation; endorsing the State's public policy and the State's budget; nominating the appointed MPs; calling the two houses of Parliament for meetings; ending ordinary or extraordinary sessions; enacting or rejecting laws; representing the State internally and externally; signing international treaties and agreements; appointing the Prime Minister, his deputy, the minister, and civilian and military staff; and granting amnesty for convicted persons, in addition to other powers specified in the Declaration. Major General Shahin also noted that the Cabinet participated with SCAF in drawing up policies and preparing projects, laws, and other measures.

The Declaration also refers to Article 148 of the former Constitution on states of emergency, limiting their enforcement to six months, renewable for another six months conditional on approval of the People's Assembly and after a referendum. The current state of emergency will be lifted before conducting parliamentary elections, Shahin added. The Constitutional Declaration has put in place the measures to be taken to draft a new Constitution

Following the parliamentary elections, the lower and upper houses will elect a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution, Shahin said, adding that a referendum on the constitution will be held afterward.

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces will continue to undertake its mandates as stipulated in this Declaration until parliamentary elections are held. Powers related to legislation and overseeing the State budget will be transferred automatically to the two houses of Parliament once they are elected, Shahin said. The President of the Republic, after his election, will assume the remaining powers of the SCAF.

ENDNOTES

- 1 These articles of the constitution dealt with the qualifications of the presidential candidate (article 76), term limits for the president (article 77), and judicial supervision of elections in Egypt (article 88).
- 2 In January of 2006, in a Crown Center Brief, I assessed the Egyptian political system and the 2005 elections, in which the strategic elite of the country were subject to almost no notable changes. I noted that while the elections showed that it is difficult to replace old habits of authoritarian despotism, they also pointed to the need for changes that must not be ignored. I argued that small changes, which occurred both by default and by design, were likely to bring about more fundamental changes. See [Abdel Monem Said Aly, "Prelude to Change: Egyptian Democratization, 2005," *Middle East Brief*, no. 2 \(Brandeis University: Crown Center for Middle East Studies, January 2006\).](#)*
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