Since the establishment of Jordan in the 1920s, it has been analyzed by observers with an inordinate measure of skepticism and regarded as a particularly artificial creation. Yet the historical record reveals that Jordan is the most stable state in the Arab East and the only country in the Fertile Crescent that has the same regime in power today as when it was established nearly ninety years ago. Both the skepticism and the record of stability, strangely enough, stem from the same key variable: Jordan’s geopolitical centrality.

Regional and external powers in varying coalitions have always been willing to lend Jordan political, military, and economic support in its hours of need lest its collapse result in a regional conflagration, with local and/or external players left scrambling for control of this critical swath of territory. The regional environment has invariably been determined by others more powerful and influential, forcing Jordan to contend, at different points in its history, with events initiated by regional leaders like Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s, or by external players like the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War; with burning regional issues like the Palestinian problem; and with ideological trends and movements such as pan-Arabism or Islamic fundamentalism—and with the constraints imposed by all of these factors.
The Jordanians have fared reasonably well thus far, thanks in large part to the grit and fortitude of its ruling elite, and to their unswerving determination to protect their political patrimony. No external support can sustain an elite that does not have the conviction and resolution to stand up for itself.

In the last decade, the intensity and diversity of the trials Jordan has had to endure have been extraordinary. Jordan has had to contend with three major challenges that appeared on the horizon more or less simultaneously: at home, the passing of King Hussein after nearly half a century at the helm; to the west, the breakdown of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the rise of Hamas; and to the east, the destabilizing fallout of the U.S. war in Iraq.

The Jordanians are laboring under a sense of strategic suffocation. But as is their wont they are managing well, with their traditional combination of tenacity and fortitude at home along with reliable external support from the United States, the European Union, and Japan—and with some occasional Saudi and other Arab largesse as well.

Abdullah II Reigns and Rules

Abdullah II is but one year shy of his first decade on the Jordanian throne. Considering the difficulties Jordan has had to contend with in this period, the king and the East Bank political elite have proved more than equal to the task and capable of keeping matters on an even keel, both politically and economically. From the outset Abdullah II has proved to be his own man, who has usually had the courage of his convictions and the capacity to make difficult decisions, when they have been required.

This is not to say that he has no shortcomings. Abdullah II, educated abroad for the most part, ascended the throne with a less than flawless command of classical Arabic. He has improved a great deal over his years in power, but he remains a little wary of public speaking. Abdullah II has thus not quite re-created the monarchical presence of his father. It is said that some tribal leaders have complained that the very westernized Abdullah II “has lost touch with tribal customs and traditional values.” Some of them have reportedly “been hopeful that Abdullah might eventually be replaced by his younger brother, Prince Hamza,” who bears a “much stronger physical resemblance” to King Hussein than does Abdullah, and seems to have a “similar personality and manner.” There is no evidence, however, that any of the above has seriously impaired Abdullah II’s capacity to reign and rule effectively. As for the East Bank elite, they are as loyal and devoted as ever to the protection of the existing political order.

Jordan’s Israel-Palestine Dilemma

With respect to regional affairs, the last decade has been fraught with disappointment for Jordan. To the west, in the Israeli-Palestinian domain, things have gone woefully wrong. Jordan’s relationship with Israel has always been and still remains very largely a function of Jordan’s interests in Palestine. Thus, Jordan’s expectations from the peace treaty it signed with Israel in October 1994 were twofold. First, Jordan banked on the implementation of the Oslo accords, signed a year before, and the achievement of a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine. This, it was calculated, would stabilize Jordan’s western front and enhance the identity of the Jordanian state as distinct from Palestine, finally putting to rest the contention that “Jordan is Palestine.”

But Israel and Palestine went to war instead of making peace. In the Jordanian analysis, this outcome was largely due to Israeli intransigence, specifically its unwillingness to withdraw fully from the West Bank and from Arab East
Jerusalem. The instability inherent in this situation was coupled in Jordanian thinking with the constant anxiety that Israeli-Palestinian armed conflict might eventually lead to massive Palestinian migration across the river into Jordan. This, the Jordanians feared, might irreparably upset the kingdom’s already precarious demographic balance between Jordanians and Palestinians. Precise figures on the composition of Jordan’s population are not available, but Palestinians are thought to constitute at least half of the total population. The East Bank Jordanian political elite is most concerned not to allow Palestinian demographics and economic power to morph into political dominance.

The destabilizing wave of Palestinian migration that the Jordanians have feared for so long has not materialized, but Jordanian anxieties are, nonetheless, as real as ever. Indeed, the election victory of Hamas in January 2006 exacerbated Jordanian apprehension, as the chances of a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Palestinians receded even further. That victory, coupled with Hamas’s violent takeover of Gaza in June 2007, also raised the specter of internecine Palestinian conflict that could similarly threaten the Jordanians with potential waves of Palestinian refugees.

Not only do the Jordanians pursue peace and quiet on their western border so as to prevent further refugee migration to Jordan; they also seek a stable and viable Palestinian political order that would be able to attract and absorb refugees from Jordan and thus reduce the Palestinian population of the kingdom. As moderate as the Jordanians usually are in the conflict with Israel, they are amongst the most adamant of Arab states when it comes to securing the return of Palestinian refugees to a future state of Palestine, and possibly to Israel proper as well.²

Jordan, needless to say, has vital interests in Palestine. But ever since King Hussein’s decision to disengage from the West Bank in 1988, the Jordanians have been on the horns of a dilemma. Jordan’s quandary is how to remain involved and influential in Palestinian affairs without assuming responsibility for the destiny of the Palestinians, and without tying Jordan to Palestine too closely for the comfort of the East Bank elite, forever on guard against an erosion of their dominance by a Palestinian majority.

Jordan’s problem was illustrated in sharp relief in the run-up to the Annapolis meeting of late November 2007. The Jordanians feared the consequences of failure and stalemate and sincerely hoped for a breakthrough, though they clearly did not expect the meeting to produce such an outcome. At the same time, there were those who were seriously concerned that progress in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would sooner or later bring pressure to bear on the Jordanians to involve themselves more than they would wish in assisting the Palestinians to build a state with reasonable governance, security, and law and order.³ For the Jordanians, any outcome was problematic on an issue which was bound to have a critical impact on Jordan’s future, and over which Jordanian influence was marginal at best.

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**Jordan and the “Shia Crescent”**

On Jordan’s eastern flank, things were not much better, though the Jordanians did seem to have contained the fallout from Iraq, at least in the short term, and they also have some very concrete plans for the longer term, including the possible deployment of Jordanian forces in certain border areas of Iraq. Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Sunni-controlled Baath party in 2003, Iraq became the first Shia dominated Arab state. The Shia were also on the rise in Lebanon, and Jordan’s King Abdullah was very candid in his anxious reference, in December 2004, to an emergent “Shia Crescent” of Iranian regional influence. The Israeli-Palestinian stalemate and the Hamas victory to the west, coupled with the “Shia Crescent” to the east, was hardly a desirable combination for the Jordanians.

For the Jordanians, Saddam’s Iraq had for many years been a secure, Sunni-dominated, strategic hinterland. An Iraq in which the Sunnis had been disempowered, and in which Iran had far greater influence than at any time in the modern era, was most unsettling. As the November 2005 bombings in Jordanian hotels indicated, the terror and total chaos in Iraq could spill over into Jordan. Worse still, Iraq faced possible disintegration, which could become an insufferable menace to Jordan. Many more Iraqis might wish, or be forced, to emigrate to the kingdom, thereby bringing even greater pressure to bear on an economy and infrastructure (roads, housing, schools, water, social services, and the like) already straining under the burden of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis (figures vary, from 450,000 to as many as 1,000,000)⁴ who have already taken refuge in the kingdom.

Not all the consequences for Jordan of the influx of Iraqi refugees have been negative. Many of the Iraqis in Jordan are people of considerable wealth who invested heavily in real estate, banking, and local industry. These wealthy (as well as middle-class) Iraqis also tend to prop up the hotel, restaurant, and other service industries. Since the 1980s, Jordan’s economy has struggled to keep abreast of population growth, and unemployment has hovered around 25 percent. The infusion of Iraqi wealth, though contributing to inflation and to consequent hardship for the Jordanian middle class, has given a sorely needed boost to the Jordanian economy.⁵

Moreover, in terms of the Jordanian elite’s concerns about Palestinian demography, in the eyes of some the Iraqis were a welcome counterweight to the Palestinians, offsetting their apparent majority. All the same, and irrespective of whatever positive impact the Iraqis may have had, what was certain was that the Jordanians wanted no further influx of refugees from Iraq—or from anywhere else, for that matter.⁶

Jordan is presently considering putting troops inside Iraq’s western desert along their mutual border, should various extreme scenarios play out. Jordanian officials were quoted as having suggested that in the event of a full-scale Iraqi
Taming the Islamists

As opposed to the external arena, regarding which Jordan’s ability to control events is severely limited, with respect to the kingdom’s domestic politics the regime is master—and it has made every effort to ensure that external threats do not penetrate the sensitive fabric of the Jordanian body politic. The Hamas victory in the Palestinian elections spawned a flurry of speculation about the possibly ominous consequences for the Hashemite kingdom, considering the especially strong ties between the populations on both banks of the Jordan River. And the Muslim Brotherhood was widely expected to increase its power in future elections in Jordan.8

As an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas had strong ties with the Brotherhood in Jordan and with their political party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF). Indeed, the IAF related to the Hamas electoral victory almost as if it had been their own. Their spokesmen went on record with repeated statements to the effect that the Jordanian Islamist movement was “mature enough to take over government responsibilities,” while simultaneously criticizing the regime for its “continuous marginalization of the Islamists.”9 It was often noted after the Hamas victory that the radicals (usually of Palestinian origin) were gaining the upper hand in the internal institutions of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan.

After the Hamas victory at the polls, Jordanian intelligence suspected that Hamas leader Khalid Mashaal was determined to detach Hamas from the Brotherhood in Jordan and create a separate Palestinian Brotherhood that would operate with its own independent organizational infrastructure—in the Diaspora in general, and in Jordan in particular. All of this appeared to the Jordanians to be extremely subversive and dangerous—and totally at variance with the hitherto very carefully calibrated relationship of mutual tolerance between the monarchy and the Muslim Brotherhood.10

The Jordanian government, for its part, waged a relentless campaign against the IAF, seizing on what it regarded as the incendiary rhetoric of some of the Islamist leaders toward the regime in order to discredit them as reckless, dangerously subversive, and potentially destabilizing. IAF members of Parliament were occasionally arrested for suspected subversion, and Jordanian officials openly expressed their doubts about the loyalty of the IAF and the Muslim Brotherhood. In mid-2006 the government dissolved the administration of the Islamic Centre Charity Society, the Brotherhood’s main vehicle for dispensing social welfare to its supporters.11 All of the above, combined with the traumatic effect of the bombings in Jordanian hotels in November 2005, which killed scores of innocent civilians and were associated with al-Qaeda, did appear to impair the public image of the Islamists in the eyes of the Jordanian public.12

On July 31, 2007, Jordan held countrywide municipal elections—a dry run for the forthcoming parliamentary elections in November. There was a measure of apprehension that, coming so soon after the Hamas takeover in Gaza in June and the landslide victory of the Islamist Justice and Development Party in Turkey, in elections held just a week before the balloting in Jordan, the Islamists might be on a roll and do particularly well.13 But that was not to be.

On Election Day, halfway through the voting process, the IAF announced its withdrawal from the contest, leveling accusations of widespread rigging against the government. The main method employed by the government, the IAF charged, was so-called “vote transfer”: the large-scale busing of soldiers from one polling station to another so they could vote en masse—especially in Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid (known strongholds of the Islamists)—for the government’s favored candidates, instead of voting in their own home districts, as they should have done.

Judging from independent sources, the IAF complaint was well founded.14 But government spokesmen (including Prime Minister Ma’ruf Bakhit himself) along with the government-controlled press exploited the IAF’s withdrawal to seek to discredit the party as poor losers, who withdrew to avoid what they called a “crushing defeat.” They were undemocratic and unpatriotic, it was said, in their “defense of extremist terrorist takfiri (a term used by radical Islamists to condemn other Muslims as infidels) trends.” The hawks in the movement (al-suqar, in the local parlance) were gaining in influence at the expense of the doves (al-hama’im), went this attack,15 and had apparently chosen to confront the state. In so doing, the government-controlled press warned, they had chosen a fight that they were bound to lose.16

In what began to look increasingly like a very well-orchestrated campaign, the government-controlled press portrayed the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF in a highly negative light, insinuating that they were engaged in secretive and ostensibly subversive contacts with Hamas and Hezbollah in Syria and were even on their payroll. Government spokesmen urged the doves in the movement to reassert their control, lest matters get out of hand.17 The doves took heed: In the run-up to the parliamentary elections in November 2007 they assumed a much more conciliatory tone toward the government in their public pronouncements, and they subsequently chose to enter into a dialogue with the government, rather than confronting it in a hostile election campaign. They proceeded to draw up a list of candidates for the elections which systematically excluded all of the hawks
Parliamentary elections were held on November 20, 2007. The IAF ran 22 candidates, expecting to at least retain the 17 seats they had in the outgoing (110-seat) Parliament. But that is not what happened. The IAF was trounced in the Jordanian elections by the candidates who were in the good graces of the regime. The Islamists ended up with just 6 seats, the least they had ever won since the revival of parliamentary life in Jordan in 1989. The IAF cried foul again and accused the regime of massive fraud: The Islamists complained that “thousands of votes” were added to ballot boxes in favor of certain candidates, while other candidates and their representatives were prevented from overseeing the ballot counting.10

According to another source, the decisive factor that broke the back of the Islamists in the elections was yet again the phenomenon of vote transfer, which decided the results in many districts. Thousands of votes were transferred in an extensive vote-buying process, especially in the Amman districts. Buses carried voters from different areas of Amman to polling stations that were not theirs. They entered in hundreds to cast their votes, and upon exit were paid the “last installment” for their vote.20

The Islamist defeat had other explanations besides extensive rigging. The government campaign had hurt, as had the fact that the movement was deeply divided between hawks and doves. The hawks, having been excluded from the list of candidates, not only refused to campaign for their own party, but in practice actively campaigned against it.21

How to Rig Elections: A Jordanian Manual

The Hashemites, with very few exceptions, have not been in the business of brutal suppression of their domestic opponents. “Black September” was an extraordinary event in Jordanian history, pitting the regime not against domestic political opponents or conspirators, but against an external military force: The fida’i factions of the PLO had taken root amongst Jordan’s Palestinian population, creating a form of dual authority (izdiwajjyyat al-sulta), as they called it, or a state within a state. Even then, it took Hussein two years to make up his mind to use force, and he did so only when it was widely thought that the regime was on its last legs and would not survive the fida’i assault on its authority. The fida’iyun themselves were quite convinced that the king was, in the words of Fatah’s Faruq al-Qaddumi, no more than a “paper tiger,” whom they could “topple in half an hour.”22

More typically in the Jordanian experience, there was a touch of class to the Hashemite style of intimidation. Enemies of the regime were hardly ever executed (one of the more prominent exceptions were the assassins of King Abdullah I), and more often than not opponents and former conspirators were pardoned and, in some cases, even co-opted into the very inner sanctum of the ruling elite. One former conspirator, Nadhir Rashid, actually became the director of the Mukhabarat (Domestic Security Services) in the 1970s—he was serving in that position at the time of “Black September”—and then in the late 1990s he was appointed minister of the interior, responsible for overseeing domestic security.23

The Jordanian toolbox for the more benign managing of the opposition included an elaborate system of election-rigging. Necessity, so the adage goes, is the mother of all invention—and in Jordan, political necessity gave birth to an election-rigging system second to none. The most recent elections in 2007 were in many ways reminiscent of Jordan in the 1950s. In those days, when it was still common, and indeed fashionable, to talk of state-controlled economies (al-iqtisad al-muwajjah), the Jordanians had perfected a system of controlled elections (al-intihabat al-muwajjah). The patent should have been registered in the names of two very different legendary figures of Jordan’s early history: the very meticulous, accountant-like, determined stalwart of the monarchy, Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda (1894–1956), and Sir John Bagot Glubb (Glubb Pasha; 1897–1986), the illustrious British commander of the Arab Legion from 1939 to 1956.

These two men, loyal servants of King Abdullah I and then of the very young King Hussein, crafted and perfected the system governing Jordan’s elections in the early 1950s, particularly those of 1954. The “triple B system,” as it might appropriately be dubbed, was founded on buying, busing, and ballot-stuffing. As presently adapted, it operates as follows:

Buying: Votes are bought from paying voters, often in two installments: a down payment ahead of time, in exchange for a commitment to vote for the right candidate, and a second payment upon exit from the polling station after having delivered the goods. As for soldiers, their votes are free of charge. They do, in entire regiments, what they are told is their patriotic duty.

Busing: Voters are bused to polling stations—and sometimes more than one—to cast their votes. Checking the rolls of who is supposed to vote where is not always easy when many people arrive at a polling station all at once, which creates much room for confusion. This also works particularly well if the authorities in charge of security at the polling station are complicit in the exercise.

Ballot-Stuffing: If these two components have not worked sufficiently well, then the crudest method—simply stuffing the ballot boxes with votes for the right candidate before the votes are counted—is resorted to. This task is carried out by loyal operatives of the candidates (or the government).
There used to be a fourth, auxiliary mechanism, employed well in advance of Election Day. It was known to have been in use in the 1950s and 1960s and could aptly be described as “the call.” The “wrong” prospective candidate receives a phone call from the Mukhabbarat politely informing him that the authorities think he might wish to reconsider his decision to run for office at this time. That was usually enough to secure the desired result, without violence or even a threat of violence. A variation of this technique was definitely used in the recent parliamentary elections. As the IAF drew up their list of candidates, they knew from their dealings with the authorities exactly whom to exclude in order not to over antagonize the government and precipitate its interference. It did not make any difference, however, on this occasion.

In 2007 the rigging system was double-tiered. In the municipal elections it was classic Glubb style, with the busing of soldiers (who do not vote in parliamentary elections) being a key mechanism. As for the parliamentary elections, as befitting the globalized economy of the post-modern early twenty-first century, the rigging was outsourced by the government to the private sector. Men of means bought the votes, hired the buses, and had the ballot boxes stuffed in time, as the government essentially turned a blind eye. In earlier election campaigns the regime had agreed with the Islamists on prearranged results, but this time the IAF had been too cocksure, and the security establishment was in a punitive mood. The attempt by the doves in the movement to come to an understanding with the government at the last minute was essentially rebuffed. The hawks had crossed a line, and the Islamists as a whole were going to be taught a lesson.

Some observers would argue that the security establishment, in its narrow-mindedness and shortsightedness, dealt a crushing blow only to the doves in the Muslim Brotherhood, who were actually seeking a compromise. The moderates, according to these analysts, would now be vulnerable to a takeover by the pro-Hamas hawks, which would only make matters worse in the long run. That, of course, may or may not prove to be so. In any event, the security establishment did not believe that the doves could contain the hawks, and therefore felt that an agreement with them would be nothing more than a tactical stopgap.  

For their part, the hawks were indeed more confrontational in their demands for political reforms that would considerably weaken the monarchy’s control and give the Islamist opposition a far greater say in affairs of state. They will still have to consider, however, the enormous imbalance of power in the regime’s favor, which was demonstrated yet again in the 2007 elections.

The hawks had drawn the wrong lessons from the Hamas victory in Palestine. Jordan is not Palestine. In the eyes of the Jordanian public, their government, in contradistinction to the Islamists, is genuinely accepted as the effective force of law and order. In this respect Jordan is very different from the Palestinian territories, where one of the major complaints of the public against the Palestinian Authority is its total ineptitude in matters pertaining to law and order. The PA therefore had little to recommend it in comparison with Hamas in the eyes of the public.

The Palestinians have always looked down on their Jordanian neighbors, whom they have tended to regard rather condescendingly as their country bumpkin cousins from the desert. But the Jordanians have been monumentally more successful than the Palestinians in the craft of state-building. Thus, the Palestinian state-in-the-making has still not come into being, and the essential machinery to contain Islamic extremists was not in place when it was really needed. In Jordan that was never so.

Conclusion

Despite Jordan’s turbulent geostrategic environment, Jordanian resilience should never be underestimated. Jordan is a minor regional power constantly constrained or unsettled by regional developments set in motion by others. But at home the regime is master. The staying power of the monarchy rests on three main pillars: 1) the cohesion and determination of the political elite; 2) the strength and effectiveness of the country’s armed forces and security establishment; and 3) the importance of the kingdom’s geopolitical centrality.

Many skeptics in the past, on numerous occasions, were certain that the days of the monarchy were numbered. Jordan, they surmised, was an anachronism or an artificial colonial creation and was bound to be swept away by its more powerful neighbors, or by pan-Arabism or Palestinian nationalism—or it would collapse economically or as a result of the assassination of the monarch. The predictions of doom and gloom were many in number and varied in their reasoning.

But Jordan is not a one-man show that survives by a fluke. The pundits have tended to underestimate the resilience and determination of the East Bank political elite that has coalesced over the years since the establishment of the Emirate in the 1920s. That elite remains the backbone of the political order as it aspires to ensure Jordanian self-determination, and to defend its own political patrimony. It has no alternative political patrimony, nor does it harbor any desire to fall under the aegis of the Syrians, the Iraqis, the Palestinians, or the Israelis.

Moreover, many powers, both in the region and outside it, continue to support Hashemite Jordan politically, strategically, and economically as an essential link in the chain of broader regional security. Jordan has thus weathered countless storms, and though there can be no certainty that the future will always resemble the past, it is wise to bear the lessons of the historical record in mind. Had the Islamists in Jordan done the same, they probably would have fared better in the 2007 elections.
Endnotes

1 W. Andrew Terrill, *Jordanian National Security and the Future of Middle East Stability* (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January 2008), p. 10. I wish to thank Assaf David, of the Economic Cooperation Foundation in Tel Aviv and the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, for drawing my attention to this source.

2 See, for example, two of Jordan’s most well-known and widely read columnists: Jordanian nationalist Fahd al-Fanik (a senior columnist in *al-Ra’y*) in *al-Ra’y*, February 2, 2006, and Palestinian Urayb al-Rintawi (a senior columnist in *al-Dustur*) in *alqudscenter.org*, quoted in *Mideast Mirror*, January 14, 2008.

3 Assaf David, *Jordan, Israel and the Annapolis Meeting: An Update* (Tel Aviv: Economic Cooperation Foundation, November 7, 2007) [In Hebrew].

4 According to a study conducted by the Norwegian Research Institute FAFO, in collaboration with the Jordanian government’s Department of Statistics and the UN Population Fund, the number of Iraqis in Jordan is between 450,000 and 500,000, of whom 68 percent are Sunnis, 17 percent are Shias, and 12 percent are Christians. See *Iraqis in Jordan 2007: Their Number and Characteristics*. These figures are considerably lower than the 750,000 to 1,000,000 (of whom 200,000 are Shias) cited by Terrill in *Jordanian National Security*, p. 51.


7 Ibid., pp. 33–34.


10 Assaf David, *Jordan: The Results of the Elections to the 15th Parliament: Implications of the Muslim Brethren Defeat* (Tel Aviv: Economic Cooperation Foundation, December 25, 2007) [In Hebrew]. In King Hussein’s time, the Hamas external leadership was allowed to operate in Amman, much to Israeli and PLO displeasure. Hussein, forever on the lookout for opportunities to undermine the PLO and Arafat, retained the Hamas card in order to facilitate his meddling in Palestinian politics. King Abdullah II, on the other hand, was much more focused on Jordan and hence more concerned about Hamas’s rising influence and its subversive potential in Jordan. He expelled the Hamas leadership in the summer of 1999, shortly after his ascension to the throne. This was also Abdullah II’s way of saying from the outset that he was his own man, and not just a carbon copy of his father.


21 Ibid.


23 One such co-opted opponent of the regime once told the author how truly grateful he was to the monarchy for magnanimously saving him from wasting his life in exile because of his youthful folly. The least one could do in return was serve king and country loyally—which he did. By the time he reached the age of 70, he was addressed by all and sundry with the utmost deference and respect as “ya Pasha.” Bygones were bygones—not quite forgotten, but certainly forgiven.

24 David, *Jordan: The Results of the Elections*.

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