Is Iraq Viable?
Prof. Kanan Makiya

Editors’ Note
Earlier this year, Prof. Kanan Makiya, Sylvia Hassenfeld Professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at Brandeis, delivered a lecture at the Crown Center on the sectarian nature of Iraq and its prospects for survival as a viable, unified state. Drawing on years of professional and personal experience, Prof. Makiya pondered the question of whether Iraq, as a political and social entity, has ever really existed—and, if it has, whether it still does exist. As editors of Middle East Briefs we believe that Prof. Makiya’s lecture is an important document that must be considered in any debate about Iraq’s future. Hence, we have decided to make an updated version of his lecture available to our readers.

On March 25, 2008, the Iraqi government launched a military operation against units of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army operating in the militia-controlled city of Basra. The prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, was forthright in affirming that the target of the operation was the Mahdi Army, even though the United States military, in an attempt to keep the ceasefire announced by al-Sadr in August of 2007, has insisted that the fighting was only against “rogue” elements of that army. Since then the fighting has expanded to Sadr City, the Mahdi Army’s stronghold, and to some southern governorates of Iraq, with Iraqi and coalition forces achieving a growing number of tactical military successes even as Muqtada al-Sadr continues to press for ceasefires and political engagement.

The fighting represents the most dramatic escalation of intra-Shi’a conflicts to date, and is at bottom a struggle for power within the political bloc that benefited the most from the 2005 Iraqi elections. In an important sense it is a
continuation of the logic of the 2005–2006 civil war between the Sunni and Shi’a Arabs of Iraq, only this time around the fighting is taking place not between the big communal sectarian blocs, but within them. The intra-Sunni struggle, culminating in strategic setbacks for al-Qaeda in Iraq, preceded that within Iraq’s Shi’a, and the various Sunni contending forces are now set to enter a more political phase of competition focused around the upcoming provincial elections scheduled for the fall of 2008. By contrast, the extremely diverse non-homogeneous Shi’a political parties that won control of the state in 2005 are at the very beginning of their internal settling of accounts with one another.

What does this bout of fighting tell us about the sectarian genie that was let out of the bottle by the American 2003 war, and by the behavior of the new Iraqi political class empowered by that war—the subject of the article below? It tells us, first, that the government of Nouri al-Maliki has essentially allied itself with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (and with its militia, the Badr Brigade), run as a fiefdom by the Hakim family, against Maliki’s former ally, Muqtada al-Sadr (and his militia, the Mahdi Army). In that sense, nothing of a strategic nature has changed in Iraqi post-2003 politics as a result of the behavior of the Maliki government. On the other hand, the fighting opens up the possibility that the Maliki government is, for the first time since it came into power, beginning to assert the “Iraqiness” of Iraq over the logic of sectarian identity politics that won it the 2005 elections. The central state, which had been so atomized and broken up after 2003, may, in other words, be coming back into the picture. But these are early days yet—too early to say which of these two tendencies present in the situation created by the recent fighting will prevail.

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The execution of the former president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, on December 30, 2006, was one of those intensely clarifying moments in politics when a psychological tipping point gets crossed—one which, in the case of Iraq, was overshadowed by the everyday death toll and the awfulness of daily life since April 2003. Following the sentencing, the execution was rushed through by the Maliki government in the face of strong American objections. A bitter standoff ensued between top American and Iraqi officials over whether or not it should take place at that particular point in time. Its timing had been accelerated to coincide with the day Sunnis everywhere celebrate as the Great Eid, marking the end of Ramadan, the most venerated and blessed month of the Islamic calendar.

Until the execution, it was easy to blame everything that had gone wrong in Iraq on the insurgency; on the lack of planning before the U.S. invasion, and the provision of troop levels inadequate to administer an occupation; on the conflicts within the U.S. government; and on all the other perfectly legitimate criticisms of the American 2003 enterprise. But Saddam’s trial—over a 1982 atrocity in the village of Dujail, where he ordered the execution of 143 people for a failed assassination attempt organized by the followers of the Dawa Party—and then his execution on orders of the leader of that party, who was also the prime minister of Iraq, taught that perhaps the real Achilles heel of the American undertaking in Iraq was their Iraqi allies—put in power by the American military, and to whom Saddam’s trial and execution had been entrusted.

Everything that the Iraqi dictator represented in politics ought to have been put under a microscope during the trial and on the day of his execution. But it
wasn’t. No one put the whole system of government that had for so long terrorized the people of Iraq on trial. No one acknowledged in public and before the eyes of the world the terrible injustices that had been perpetrated on millions of innocent and undeserving victims of that system. No one made even the slightest reference to the fact that Sunnis, too, had died under Saddam, along with Kurds and Christians and Turkomans and Yezidis. Doing so would have given all Iraqis some investment in the new order—a small measure of affirmation that the new state belonged to them as well. It might have been the first step toward putting forth the notion of a different Iraq from the one that Saddam Hussein had so dominated during his thirty-five years in power.

Why choose to minimize the criminality of the outgoing regime when it had gone to such lengths to victimize everyone? Surely the point of trying and executing Saddam was to magnify his regime’s criminality—to treat that regime as a prime offender against the very condition of being a human being. Saddam’s crimes should have been compared to those of Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, and all the other monsters of the twentieth century. But such comparisons were not made.

But if Saddam’s trial was flawed, the execution was a disaster. A grainy clip of film shot secretly in the execution chamber with a mobile phone showed the great dictator standing erect and defiant before a jeering rabble chanting, “Muqtada, Muqtada.” Why were they there? Whom did they represent? Was the prime minister of Iraq so beholden to Muqtada al Sadr, a thirty-year-old cleric who had had the son of a grand Ayatollah, Majid al-Khoei, murdered in the shrine of Imam Ali, the holiest site of Shiism, on the day of Iraq’s liberation? Muqtada had never criticized Saddam before 2003. But modern Shi’a supporters returning from exile, former friends of Majid, had begun to court and flatter Muqtada, telling him that he was leading a popular revolution when he rose up against the American presence in Iraq in April 2004. Now his thugs were picking up Sunnis at night and torturing them before slitting their throats. Had the Iraqi government become so beholden to this man that it would cede control of its executions to his thugs? The fact of the matter was that the state, which had pushed for the hanging in the first place, was no longer present in the execution chamber, just as its authority was not present in the country as a whole.

In power, the politics of victimhood, of blaming others for one’s own inadequacies, is a measure of failure—in the Iraqi case, failure to rise to the historic occasion that the 2003 overthrow of the Ba’th represented. No one talks more about ta’ifiyya, the sectarianism of others, than the new Shi’ite rulers of Iraq and their spokesmen, both inside and outside the government. Over and over again they repeat how victimized the Shi’a of Iraq were under Sunni rule, which they equate with that of the Ba’th. But in a contest between them and Saddam Hussein over who is more profoundly sectarian, the objective observer would have a hard time coming to a conclusion.

When the political leadership at such a historic moment of opportunity so consistently fails to see what is in the national interest, howsoever defined, and acts instead in accordance with the narrowest and most sectarian frame of reference imaginable, more fundamental questions are raised. This was, after all, a genuinely elected leadership. On the most fundamental level, therefore, one must wonder if the world is asking too much of it, and of the people who voted it into office.

Hazem Saghie, a Lebanese writer and senior editor at the Arabic daily Al-Hayat, has provided a historical and sociological analysis of Iraq that suggests just that. Saghie has examined what made the Baathist system work—and, by implication, why one cannot expect fundamentally different behavior from those who replaced Saddam Hussein. His argument, if correct, has a bearing on whether or not it makes sense to even talk about a country called Iraq—much less bring democracy to it, as so many Iraqi democrats hoped to do in the months preceding the 2003 war.²

Saghie rightly begins with the nature of the outgoing regime. His point is that Baathism is not in the end comparable to European totalitarianism—a comparison I made in my Republic of Fear—because all the modern trappings of the Baath Party “were a mere pretext for the primordial community’s [i.e., the Sunnis'] assumption of power, and consequently of control [over the] society.”¹ He opens his argument with this telling question: “When speaking of Saddam Hussein’s terror in Iraq, the names of his sons, brothers and cousins come to mind… Yet does any ordinary person know whether Hitler had a brother, or whether Stalin had any cousins, and if he did what their names were?” Saghie is not denying the many similarities in the techniques of social control between European totalitarianism and Iraqi Baathism; he is making the more interesting point that behind this communal power grab in 1968 lay the “artificial” nature of the 1920s Iraqi state, and its historical inability or unwillingness to truly represent the nation as a whole—especially the Kurds and the Arab Shi’a.

Saghie admits that before the Baath assumed power its membership included young Sunnis as well as Shiites. And he takes note of moments in the modern history of Iraq, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when a trans-sectarian and
trans-ethnic Iraqi middle class emerged, with a public life centered in Baghdad. Unfortunately he makes no mention of the large amount of scholarship that suggests that it was under the monarchy, not in the Qassem period, that a dynamic of integration was achieved according to which elites from all the different regions of Iraq were drawn upon for public service. “The selection processes,” utilized by the monarchical state “involved...ethnic and communal balance in terms of Kurds, Arabs, Shiites, Sunnis and Christians,” writes Faleh Abd al-Jabar.4

Whatever the actual experience of integration before 1968, however, Saghie argues that the actual experience of holding power from 1968 to 2003 gradually pushed the Baath party to establish the army as a Sunni instrument of social control—and the regime as a whole from the 1980s onwards, he asserts, became the “most important guarantor of [Sunni] security.” He concludes, therefore, that “the totalitarianism of Saddam Hussein was both a product of the historic failure to build an Iraqi nation-state, and itself a barbaric scheme [of] nation-building.”5

But it was a scheme that ultimately failed, according to Saghie—who proposes understanding why the Iraqi government executed Saddam Hussein in the sectarian way that it did by looking at the social constructs invoked in Ibn Khaldun’s analysis of ‘asabiyya, or blood solidarity.6

Paramount among these is the concept of honor, which requires that a man like the Iraqi prime minister and his colleagues stand by their own community through thick and thin.

Saghie’s study is an insightful formulation by a secular and nonaligned close observer of Arab politics with experience of the Lebanese civil war and of the Lebanese communal system of government. It lays out the logic behind a position that is increasingly prevalent in academic circles and is today making its way into policy in the U.S. Congress in the form of the Biden plan for the “soft partition” of Iraq—and it explains the behavior of the new Shiite political class that was brought into power by the elections of 2005, and that sought to settle accounts with the arch-representative of Sunnism in Iraq, Saddam Hussein. The ‘asabiyya of the new Shiite political elite takes the form of a deep-seated and thoroughgoing reluctance to treat Sunni Arabs as equal partners in the building of the new Iraq because of historical injustices that the Sunni community as a whole is held responsible for—injustices that Shiite politicians seek compensation for through the new Oil Law, for example, and by making it difficult for Sunnis to enter the police force or join the army.

Speaking for that new political elite is Ali Allawi, in his recently published magisterial insider account of post-2003 Iraq.7 Allawi served for two and a half years beginning in 2004 as Minister of Defense and was the Minister of Commerce in the new Iraq. The most striking thing about this book of over 300 pages is the curious fact that it never once mentions an occasion when Iraqis as Iraqis—not as Shi’a or Sunni Iraqis—acted in concert with one another over anything. Completely excluded from Allawi’s account, for example, is any assessment of the main truly national force in modern Iraqi politics, the Iraqi Communist Party, which dominated opposition politics from the 1940s through the early 1970s, and whose membership included all sects and nationalities but was predominantly Shiite. Hanna Batatu’s twenty-year study of that party, a massive scholarly undertaking of some 1,300 pages, is dismissed in one sentence for having “ignored the evolution of the Islamic movement.”8

There is a reason, on the other hand, why Batatu ignores the Islamic movement: It did not exist during his book’s primary time frame. Allawi himself concedes that Iraqi politics were “devoid of any serious Islamist content” until the late 1950s, which is very late in the process of state formation that began in the 1920s.9 But that raises the question why that was so. Allawi dates political Shiite Islam to the founding of the Islamic Dawa Party in Karbala in the autumn of 1958, without mentioning that it was the horror of Shiite mujtahids (clerical authorities) at the loss of their authority over young Shiites to the Iraqi Communist Party that led them to take political action in the first place.10

It behooves us to remember that if Shi’as today are 55–60 percent of the population of Iraq, they became this majority only very recently. Massive conversions to Shiism occurred during the nineteenth century as the bulk of Iraq’s nominally Sunni Arab tribes settled down and took up agriculture. The British census of 1919 put the Shi’as at 53 percent of the population, but about 5 percent of these were Persians. The Arab Shi’a, in other words, were not a clear majority of the population at the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century. Moreover, the converts kept the moral and social values indigenous to their Arab tribal origins and had more in common with their Sunni counterparts—who might even be from the same tribe—than they had with anyone else. If anything, the disintegration of their former Sunni tribal confederations split the new Shi’a apart, as some became landowners while the bulk remained landless. A crisis of identity that is still going on today naturally accompanied these massive cultural and sociological transformations.

No sooner had Iraq’s Shi’a become a majority than they had to contend with the reactionary attitude of their marja’iyah, based in Najaf, with respect to the newly forming Iraqi state. In 1922, three of the most influential mujtahids issued
The Dawa Party was the original seed out of which grew all of the Islamist political parties that gained power after American military action in 2003. Two Iraqi prime ministers since the 2005 elections have come from the leadership of the Dawa Party, which oversaw the trial and hanging of Saddam Hussein. The biggest irony surrounding the role of the Dawa Party in Iraq today, however, concerns its size: This was always a small party, never exceeding, according to its own sources, more than a few hundred activists during its heyday in the late 1970s and 1980s. This sharply contrasts with the hundreds of thousands who either joined or were fellow travelers of the Iraqi Communist Party in the 1950s and 1960s.

Even today, despite being in power and running the government in Iraq, the Dawa Party is minuscule in size. When it held its party conference in the Rashid Hotel in Baghdad early in 2007, voting in Nouri al-Maliki, the current prime minister as its head, less than a hundred people attended. By contrast, some four thousand people attended the party conference of the Iranian-backed Supreme Islamic Council, held two months later—which is not so much a measure of their influence over Iraq's Shiites as it is a reflection of Iranian influence in post-Saddam Iraq. Dawa Party activists will privately admit that their numbers are so small in Iraq that the party is in real danger of disappearing from the national scene if it ever loses control of the prime ministership. The Dawa Party survives, and controls that office, solely because it serves as a balancing force between the Supreme Islamic Council, run as a fiefdom by the Hakim family, and Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army, who were in the room in which Saddam was executed and who taunted him as he stood on the scaffold.

To return to Saghie and Allawi's dismissal of Iraq: If Saghie is telling us that the idea of Iraq remained very weak at the time of the removal of the Baath, as compared with the centrifugal forces pulling the country apart, Allawi, who put his heart into making the new Iraq a success, is in effect denying that the idea has ever had currency in the culture throughout the nearly eighty years that the state has been in existence. Presiding over Iraq as the Coalition forces arrived, Allawi writes, was “a fearful, heavily armed minority”—that is, the Sunnis—whose decaying institutions and ruling ideology masked the real dangers of “divisiveness, vengefulness, deeply held grievances and bottled-up ethnic and sectarian passions” lurking underneath Iraqi Arab society.

Does the extent of the collapse of the state, and the extraordinary fragmentation of authority that accompanied it, call into question the political viability of something called Iraq? Saghie and Allawi are saying so, and some non-Arab scholars in the West agree with them. The fact that no Iraqi politician other than Allawi will publicly follow suit is not surprising. During Lebanon's thirteen-year civil war, that country's leaders competed as vigorously over their nonexistent patriotism as they prosecuted massacres on one another. But at least the vestiges of a political community remained. In 1989 those same leaders met around a table, and the very same set of men who had murdered each other's families wholesale began in the 1990s to share the spoils of office. In Iraq, by contrast, the rupture with the past has been near-total. One cannot begin to imagine how Iraqis will pick up the pieces and reassemble a set of working political institutions.

Coming from two entirely different perspectives, these thoughtful and self-critical Arab writers, one with considerable knowledge of the wider Arab world, the other with a Shiite Islamist background and close personal ties with the men ruling Iraq today, converge in equally depressing assessments of post-2003 Iraq. Both are saying, in a nutshell: Iraq has never existed as a meaningful focus of allegiance and loyalty for large numbers of people. Both Hazem Saghie and Ali Allawi were early skeptics with respect to the idea of Iraq, long before Senator Biden and his colleagues in the American Congress came to the same conclusion on account of the turmoil of the last few years. Perhaps this skepticism explains why both opposed the 2003 war. Curiously, however, both pull back from drawing the logical political conclusion from this skepticism. Neither has advocated replacing the “artificial” state of Iraq with some other arrangement—although Saghie has recently toyed with the idea of city-states as a solution to the problem of legitimacy of the modern Arab state in the Middle East.

Allawi has moved in a different direction. In a 2007 interview, a year after his book appeared, Allawi made this assessment of the country of his birth: “Knowing
what I know about Iraq, I would probably opt for order rather than liberation.” I cannot think of a more bleak and depressing assessment. Consider it carefully. Is Allawi saying that the Iraq that he so loyally served for all practical purposes does not exist unless someone as ruthless as Saddam Hussein is in power? Is he agreeing, in other words, with Saddam Hussein that the dictator and the country were one and the same? Because given the failure at governance of the Shiite Islamist elite of which Allawi is such an exemplary chronicler, no other conclusion can be drawn from these words.

To every idea that we adopt as political actors, there is a corresponding psychological reality that explains the hold that that idea has managed to exercise over our imagination. This reality is necessarily of a piece with the political idea. Iraq is such an idea. On the eve of the 2003 war, that idea was still alive, in spite of the abuse it had suffered from being embodied by Saddam’s regime—or so many Iraqis thought. Even if Iraq were a kind of Pandora’s Box, lifting the lid of which ran the risk of releasing hordes of untamable furies, still in theory, at least, one could manage those furies artfully, so as to subdue and eventually contain their destructiveness. Politics was that art. The beginning of hope for Iraqis like myself in 2003, therefore, lay in separating a good thing—the idea—from a bad thing—the state. What actually transpired, however, say Saghie and Allawi—beginning with the massive looting on the day of liberation and culminating in the execution of Saddam Hussein—was a wholesale rejection of the idea of Iraq itself.

But who rejected it? The people who turned out to vote in record numbers in 2005? The first thing to notice about this analysis is how completely it exonerates the new Shiite-dominated ruling class of all responsibility—putting the blame, if that is the right word, on the behavior of ordinary Iraqis. History and sociology are the main tools of that exoneration; ostensibly they explain the shameful behavior of the Maliki government. But surely it is possible to be a true sectarian and still execute your outgoing president with more dignity than was the case on December 30, 2006?

The problem is that Saghie and Allawi focus on divisions that they assume have been there in one form or another for centuries. Neither is interested in that which is specific to and exceptional about Baathi rule, which did, after all, last thirty-five years—longer than any other Iraqi regime in the modern period. Was 1968 a watershed year in the history of modern Iraq—at least as important as 1932 and 1958—or not? If it was, then how does an emphasis on Shi’a victimhood or blood relations in politics even begin to explain its importance? All that interests them about Saddam’s regime is that life inside it was “nasty, brutish, and short,” and that it was the political expression of Sunni Arab minority rule.

Until the uprising of 1991, however, the evidence is overwhelming that the majority of Iraq’s Shi’a population accepted the legitimacy of the Baathi regime, even though most of the personnel in its upper echelons were Sunni Arabs. I am not thinking about the activities of a minority of Shiite Islamists in the Dawa Party inside Iraq or in the Supreme Islamic Council, headquartered in Tehran until 2003. Nor am I referring to how many Shiites were left in the upper echelons of the army and the Baath party (the main criterion used by both Saghie and Allawi). I am referring, rather, to the hundreds of thousands of ordinary, nonpolitical Shiite Iraqis who served for eight long and terrible years in the Iraqi army, fighting their fellow Shiites in Iran. To be sure, they never wanted to fight in the first place. But you cannot explain their staying with the Saddam regime, and their acting against their natural feeling of asabiyya (social cohesion), only on the basis of their fear of his firing squads. Something else was at work here. Nor do we need to resort to patriotism or love of Iraq to understand what it was.

Baathi criminality implicated everyone, as I have gone to great lengths to show in all my work: In Cruelty and Silence, for example, the story of Umar is that of an innocent young Sunni Arab engineer, who is informed upon by a Kurd and tortured by a Shiite. That is the story of Iraq; it teaches that complicity creates real political ties that cut across sect and ethnicity. Victims and victimizers effortlessly changed roles both before and after 2003; that was possible only because Saddam broke down the sectarian and tribal affiliations his regime inherited in 1968, just as he broke down the authority structure within families when he got sons to inform on, or beat, their own fathers. This key political tie, which links virtually every Iraqi to the outgoing regime of the Baath, is entirely missing in Saghie and Allawi’s analysis. Introducing it into the equation changes everything.

At the core of understanding Baathi Iraq, I submit, is not sociology; it is the form of government that was able to command such allegiance. Politics is an autonomous and separate sphere, distinct from sociology or history. Both Allawi and Saghie end up relying on a form of sociological determinism that is closer to Marx than it is to liberal theory, in either its classical or its more communitarian form. There are important divisions in Iraq, to be sure, as there are in every society. But do they shape the political system the way, for instance, they do in Lebanon? Did the Baath before 1991 ever try to legitimize their rule on the basis of Sunniism? There is nothing in their literature to
that effect. In fact, when Saddam Hussein chose to publish his family tree, he traced his origins to ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, the patron saint of Shiism. Why would he do that? What was the criterion of membership in the Arab polity that he was absolute ruler of?

This is how the Iraqi Legal Reform Law, promulgated in 1977, answers the question: “the people are the source of the legitimacy of authority... But in exercising democracy... it is inevitable to exclude all persons who take a political, economical or intellectual attitude hostile to the Revolution.” Clearly it was loyalty to the party, to the principles of the Revolution, and ultimately to the person of Saddam Hussein that was the decisive criterion of citizenship in Baathi Iraq, not sectarian allegiance.

The point is that Iraqis, like everyone else, have changing, overlapping, and plural identities, and it is a gross simplification to reconstruct the whole of modern Iraqi political history as a sectarian partitioning between rulers and ruled. The very term Shi’a is a loose cultural designation and not a reference to a closely knit body of people. Most of the time these people did not think of themselves as Shi’a, in fact, until their mujtahids, along with urban intellectuals, began to push them in that direction in the 1980s and 1990s.

Politics, in the form of the choices we make, decides which among overlapping identities we give priority to at any given point in time. Thus, in the late 1950s the mass of Iraq’s Shi’a joined the Iraqi Communist Party, but in 2005 those very same masses voted for the Shiite Islamist parties that today control the Iraqi government. Why they shifted from the one to the other is a political question, not a reflection of some backward-looking romantic or communal dynamic. The same “masses” who were Communist became Islamist—and they were as genuinely Communist back then as they were genuinely Islamist after 2003. Neither sociology nor religiosity has anything to do with it. The fact is that the quality of being an Iraqi is today still up for grabs.
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