Beyond Assad: The Rise of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Syria’s Uncertain Future
A Conversation with Haian Dukhan and Daniel Neep
Organized and edited by Ramyar D. Rossoukh, Associate Director for Research
December 18, 2024
On December 8, 2024, a coalition of rebel forces led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) captured Damascus, ending the Assad family’s five-decade rule and a brutal civil war that claimed 600,000 lives and displaced over half of Syria’s population. This historic moment leaves Syria at a crossroads, raising critical questions: How will it rebuild after years of devastation, and what does it mean for a region reshaped by the conflict? In this Crown Conversation, we asked Syria experts Haian Dukhan, a lecturer in politics and international relations at Teesside University and fellow at the Centre for Syrian Studies at the University of St Andrews, and Daniel Neep, who teaches Middle East politics at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and is a non-resident fellow at the Crown Center, to reflect on Assad’s legacy, the rise of HTS, and the immense challenges ahead. From urban-rural divides to sectarian tensions and regional dynamics, they explore what must be overcome to build a stable and inclusive future for Syria.
What has struck you the most about the way the fall of the Assad regime is being reported and understood?
Daniel Neep: For me, there are two significant misinterpretations of what's been going on in Syria recently, primarily circulating amongst Western analysts. The first misinterpretation is that the fall of the regime represents the fall of the last standing Arab nationalist regime. This argument, made by many leftists, frames the Assad regime as the last bastion of resistance against Zionism and American imperialism. From this perspective, the collapse of the regime is a historic moment because it marks the end of that era. But in actuality, Arab nationalism had already ended by the 1970s. By the time of Bashar al-Assad, the regime had become riddled with corruption, hollowed out by self-interest, and characterized by an intra-elite division of the spoils. Syria has been dominated by a commingling of the security and intelligence apparatus with rich businessmen. Sociologically, that is the type of coalition that's come into being since the early 2000s, even if it's been transformed by the war.
The second misinterpretation is one that I often hear in DC. This view frames the fall of the regime as marking the end of Iranian influence in the Middle East. It sees these events as emblematic of a bigger structural change, linked to Israel’s campaign in Gaza and in Lebanon, which has reversed the fortunes of Hezbollah and Iran. Here, Syria becomes the next domino in a geopolitical chess game that reduces complex regional dynamics into a simplistic narrative. This framing is offensive to the Syrian people, who have spent the last fourteen years fighting and suffering for their historic victory. It’s important to note that Iran is also far from marginalized in the region. The increasing signs of rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran over the last couple of years, for example, suggest that even in parts of the region where Iran was considered to be the most pronounced threat, such as Riyadh, there has been gradual rethinking. Relations between Iran and the Arab world are much more complex and dynamic than the idea of an Iranian “boogeyman” conveys.
Haian Dukhan: I would add that these narratives often shift blame or oversimplify the agency of Syrians themselves. For example, we’ve been hearing lots of analysis that claims that this was orchestrated by Turkey—Turkey provided HTS with weapons, and funding allegedly coming from Qatar. Over the past few years, however, Assad turned the northwestern region of Idlib into a dumping ground for rebels and those who surrendered through reconciliation agreements. Idlib became a reservoir for grievances and offered the ideal environment to sustain the rebellion. Many of the rebels who took Aleppo had last been there as children, having been displaced from the city and its countryside during their youth. They returned, saying, “We are liberating the city that we were forced to leave.” This highlights that the agency of the Syrian people has never disappeared, whatever the structural and environmental circumstances.
At the same time, Turkey did seize an opportunity to fill the power vacuum left by diminishing Iranian influence in Syria, and likely provided HTS with equipment. Structurally, the regime’s military failures also played a role. Friends in Syria have told me, “How can you expect Syrian soldiers wearing pajamas to fight al-Nusra [a precursor to HTS] and HTS fighters with night-vision binoculars?” The Syrian Army does not even have basic equipment. All they had were a few rusty fighter jets that were unable to perform effectively.
Nonetheless, the rebels’ primary ambition wasn’t to take Damascus, and they were as surprised as anyone at how quickly the regime forces collapsed in eastern Syria. The regime’s support base, mainly the Alawite core, did not really put up a fight. Friends from Qardaha and other Alawite areas told me that after the Aleppo battle, many Alawites were taking refuge in their cars to avoid being mobilized. The cohesion among the Alawites, which had been crucial to Assad’s ability to fight against the opposition alongside Iranian and Russian assistance early in the uprising, had waned over time.
Sanctions, economic hardships, and over a decade of war had weakened morale. Disillusioned by the regime’s failure to alleviate their suffering, many Alawites no longer wanted to fight for the regime.
Neep: I just want to come back to what you said about the structural underpinnings of the momentous advance of HTS across the country. You mentioned the way Idlib became a dumping ground for jihadis, allowing HTS to consolidate itself within Idlib. From the regime's perspective, with the benefit of hindsight, the error was not simply creating a dumping ground for militants but also allowing the front lines of the conflict to be effectively frozen for the last four years.
Since March 2020, there has been no real movement on the front lines. This period allowed HTS to consolidate its governance power in Idlib but it also removed the impetus that allowed the regime to keep its momentum going in the armed conflict. It's one thing for a regime losing legitimacy to keep dragging people to the front lines and forcing them into military service. But when the conflict dies down and the desperate need to sustain the war machinery goes away, loss of faith and frustration erodes the little cohesion that is left among the armed forces. While long-term disaffection with the regime already existed, it spiraled over the last four years, leading to a sudden collapse in morale. This is perhaps part of the reason why the army imploded so quickly: there's a clear structural component to what we’re seeing.
Are there other factors being overlooked in discussions of Assad’s fall?
Neep: The fall of the Assad regime can be seen as the culmination of the Syrian revolution. This struggle was launched in 2011, but its roots are in the 1970s and early 1980s, in uprisings against Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad. Those uprisings are often characterized as Islamist, but actually began as secular and leftist movements that were subsequently crushed. Those leftist dissidents were imprisoned for decades before resurfacing in the 1990s and 2000s. To understand the significance of what is unfolding, it should be seen as the culmination of that broader revolutionary spirit. This is what we see in the streets of Syria today. On the first Friday without Bashar, we witnessed amazing scenes in the Umayyad Square in Damascus—people going out into the streets, protesting, and celebrating this moment of jubilation. For foreigners, it's crucial to acknowledge this as a historic moment and to give Syrians a space to breathe after years of repression.
Dukhan: I completely agree about the importance of the revolutionary spirit, and HTS probably deserves more credit for sustaining it, particularly in Idlib. HTS did not frame their struggle in Syria as part of a global Islamic jihad. Instead, the leader of HTS, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, in his speeches embraced the revolutionary spirit and spoke about the “Syrian revolution.” While this is not a secular resistance movement, HTS has incorporated elements of revolutionary discourse into its operations, a key factor in its success. Even in areas with a mixed sectarian composition, HTS was not seen merely as an Islamic rebel movement but was welcomed as a liberating force—for example, by the Ismailis in Salamiyah. Its revolutionary discourse legitimized it in the eyes of many Syrians, regardless of their religious background. In Hama and Homs, for instance, locals cheered them on as the “Free Syrian Army” (FSA), even though that term had largely fallen out of use by that time.
The label FSA initially symbolized the broader opposition movement during the early years of the Syrian revolution. It encompassed a variety of rebel groups united under a shared identity of resisting the Assad regime. Over time, as the conflict fragmented and groups like HTS emerged with distinct ideological and operational approaches, the term “Free Syrian Army” ceased to represent a cohesive entity. Despite this, the association with the FSA’s early revolutionary ideals made HTS appear to embody the liberation and revolutionary ethos that many Syrians still yearned for.
Interestingly, just before HTS operations to expand their control in Syria, a debate emerged among Syrians, particularly on social media, about whether the Syrian conflict was a revolution or a civil war. This was sparked by the publication of a book by a Syrian scholar on demographic changes in Syria, whose title referred to the “Syrian Civil War.” Many Syrians rejected the idea that this was a “civil war,” insisting that it has always been a revolution. After the recent fall of the Syrian regime, some Syrian intellectuals have publicly apologized for previously describing the conflict solely in civil war terms, emphasizing the continued strength of the revolutionary spirit. I agree with them that this spirit may have diminished among Syrians who left the country; however, for those, particularly in Idlib, who experienced the early phase of the revolution, it continues to endure.
How should we understand the role of HTS at this moment and its vision for Syria?
Dukhan: The evolution of HTS in Syria is closely linked to the trajectory of its leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani. Born in the countryside of Damascus, al-Julani’s life took a significant turn after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, when he joined the conflict there. I remember living in Palmyra, Syria at that time, and hearing young people I knew suddenly begin talking about jihad and joining al-Qaeda. I was surprised—how could these young people speak like this under an authoritarian regime that had always repressed any form of political Islam? Only later did we come to know that the regime turned a blind eye to their departure to Iraq.
Al-Julani’s experience in Iraq was pivotal. He fought against American forces and built ties with Iraqi jihadists. These connections led Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, to send him to Syria to set up a branch there that was called Jabhat al-Nusra. The group gained local support by targeting the Assad regime’s security apparatus, through operations such as bombings in Palmyra and Damascus.
However, when al-Baghdadi sought to merge Jabhat al-Nusra with the Islamic State of Iraq to form ISIS, al-Julani refused. This decision led to a bloody war between jihadist factions in eastern Syria in 2014. Unlike ISIS’s “stick only” approach to the population, mentioned by Daniel, al-Julani adopted a more conciliatory approach, which helped Jabhat al-Nusra maintain support in areas like al-Shuhayl in Deir ez-Zor. After being targeted by ISIS, al-Julani moved to Idlib, where he established HTS. He set about eliminating rival factions, and HTS became the dominant power in Idlib. While some analysts speculate that al-Julani aims to extend his dominance across Syria, significant obstacles remain. The Gulf monarchies, like Saudi Arabia, are looking with concern at what is happening in Syria and the possibility that it might motivate Islamist movements in their countries.
The potential for factional competition or factional struggles between HTS and other rebel groups underscores the complex dynamics in post-Assad Syria. For instance, al-Julani lacks control over militias in the south and the center of Syria, which have different ideological leanings and had been supported by Jordan and Gulf states from 2012 to 2015. These countries may seek to counter HTS’s influence by using these southern militias as a buffer against a potential Islamist-dominated Syria. Of course, much depends on future developments in Syria.
Neep: HTS is always flagged in the Western media as a former al-Qaeda associate, implying ideological continuity with its origins. But in fact HTS has a very different approach. Unlike al-Qaeda in Iraq, which sought chaos through extreme violence to impose an Islamic order, HTS broke with this ideology. Its precursor, Jabhat al-Nusra, prioritized community support and pragmatic governance over brutality, marking a fundamental ideological shift that set the stage for HTS’s evolution.
HTS emerged as a coalition of grassroots militias in northwest Syria, eventually centralizing power and establishing the Salvation Government in Idlib. This governance structure reflects a technocratic and pragmatic approach, making HTS in some ways resemble an Islamic political party more than a typical jihadi movement. This shift in focus—toward governance and away from global jihad—has allowed HTS to integrate elements of revolutionary discourse into its operations, and has contributed to its acceptance among many Syrians. [1]
HTS’s pragmatism extends to its leadership. Abu Mohammed al-Julani, now referred to by his given name Ahmad al-Sharaa, comes from a middle-class, educated background, contrasting sharply with the transnational jihadist profile. This trajectory, reminiscent of movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in terms of class background and professionalism, has enabled HTS to merge Islamist goals with nationalist credentials, distinguishing it from groups like ISIS. While many Syrians disagree with HTS’s religious doctrines, they view it as integral to the revolution, unlike ISIS, which remains entirely outside the revolutionary framework. This adaptability suggests that HTS may not be wedded to its current organizational structure. Discussions about dissolving HTS indicate its leadership’s willingness to evolve, underscoring a pragmatic flexibility in Syria’s changing political landscape.
What do you see as the most urgent challenges for Syria’s new government?
Dukhan: If we want to look at the challenges now, HTS is consolidating power in urban centers like Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama. Since Damascus was the regime’s stronghold and urban areas were critical to its control, it makes sense that HTS and other rebel groups are focusing on cities. However, this focus on cities leaves rural areas open to lawlessness.
A related challenge is the risk of large-scale revenge attacks, which could trigger cycles of sectarian violence. The situation has remained relatively stable—for instance, without major attacks on Alawite communities in Masyaf, Tartus, or Latakia. However, recent videos showing the burning of Hafez al-Assad’s grave in Qardaha and attacks on Alawite monuments and rural homes signal growing tensions. We also shouldn’t forget that some Alawites are still armed and have the ability to fight back.
Media coverage of dire prison conditions and some rebels vowing retribution have amplified calls for revenge, escalating the risk of violence. Although the comparison to post-Saddam Iraq may not be exact, preventing escalation remains a pressing challenge. The newly established Syrian government must prioritize transitional justice. Managing widespread anger and prosecuting those responsible for violence will be difficult for a fragile and emerging justice system. This raises serious concerns about whether the government can handle these issues alone, as well as the complex interplay between national and international dynamics. Syria is still under international sanctions, and HTS remains designated as a terrorist organization by many Western governments. At the same time, the newly established Syrian government needs international support on multiple fronts, including transitional justice and reconciliation—a process that must start quickly.
Syrians have been shocked by what they are seeing and hearing, particularly the realization that they may never be able to reunite with their missing loved ones. For instance, I recently saw a video of people outside a security branch in Damascus searching through thousands of identification cards scattered everywhere. They were hoping to locate their relatives who had been held at this branch between 2011 and 2023. In their desperate search to determine the fate of their loved ones, they discovered that many had been executed and buried in mass graves.
Neep: The parallel you mentioned with the fall of Saddam in Iraq might seem surprising at first, but actually, the parallels are quite apparent. Iraq underwent a failed uprising in the early 1990s and suffered a decade of sanctions. While the Iraqi regime was toppled by foreign intervention, there was the same hollowing out of state institutions and uncertainty about how to move forward. There was also no hegemonic force able to step into the power vacuum left by Saddam’s regime. We saw the rapid crumbling of the state and state institutions in the first weeks following April-May 2003. After the Iraqi civil war, we witnessed the emergence of an authoritarian elite bargain between political factions that had an interest in dividing the spoils along sectarian lines. [2] The situation in Syria, of course, is different because HTS has already moved to fill the vacuum. Though not hegemonic, HTS is responsible for bringing down the regime, and therefore benefits from some degree of credibility and political capital.
Many Syrians emphasize the need to retain the state institutions, in contrast to Iraq—where the army was disbanded, the Ba’ath party dissolved, and officials were purged from state institutions. Syria is a society where the state has played an outsized role for many years. At the same time, Syrians have a collective memory, normative sense, of what the state should be doing and the services it should be providing. Syrians are not calling for the abolition of the state or the radical introduction of a free market. They're looking for institutions that can keep society together.
I completely agree that some kind of reconciliation process will be necessary at some point—not in the pursuit of ultimate justice, which is unlikely, but to achieve a settlement that offers Syrians a sense of justice. Reconciliation processes are important for helping people process what has happened, so that they can start to rebuild their lives.
Given the importance of state institutions, how can a post-Assad Syria strike a balance between central authority and regional autonomy?
Neep: I think some of the most challenging problems facing Syria are not only borne out of the conflict but are those that Syria has faced since its creation or even before. For 150 years, since the late Ottoman Empire, Syria has grappled with the relationship between its regions and the political center. The diversity and complexity of Syrian society, its differences between town and countryside, communities and traditions, make it crucial to answer the question of how central political authority relates to the country’s regions. What level of centralization will there be, and how much power will be devolved to the provinces? Over the course of the Civil War, the regime was making noises toward devolving authority from the center. The idea of a heavily centralized state, with all the decisions being imposed top down, seems well past its time. What political vision of the state will guide the new Syria?
Dukhan: Discussions about representation in the new government have increasingly invoked the concept of the “Khaldunian” cycle, which provides a lens to understand the shifting balance of power between rural and urban forces in Syria. This concept, rooted in the ideas of the Arab historian Ibn Khaldun, describes the cyclical nature of power in societies. [3] During periods of state weakness, cohesive rural or tribal groups from the periphery often rise to dominate urban elites.
In the current context, there is a sense that the rural has overrun the center. Many people in Damascus are unhappy that the Prime Minister, most ministers, and the security services are all from Idlib. This shift reflects a broader Khaldunian dynamic, but also highlights the challenge for the new government to ensure it represents all the diverse components of Syrian society. People from rural areas, who have long been marginalized in government structures—except in superficial ways—now feel like they are coming back in full force. At the same time, there is significant pressure on any future government to be inclusive and representative of all segments of Syrian society.
What will happen to the dominant Alawite presence in the army and security apparatus? Will it be reversed, or will it remain? The new government appears to have decided to disband all security services. This raises critical questions about the thousands of Alawites who served in these institutions. Drawing comparisons to Iraq, disbanding the army and security services there created a reservoir for counterinsurgency and counterrevolution. Could the same happen in Syria? Will those who feel they have lost power and influence attempt to reclaim it? This underscores the need for inclusive governance to address these challenges.
Alongside the issue of the devolution of power, particularly in eastern Syria, is the question of Kurdish representation in the new government. It is crucial to establish a representative government. Will it resemble Lebanon’s system after its Civil War—a constitutional democracy in which, for example, the Prime Minister is an Alawite? Or will the new government be imposed by those who have won the war, such as the rebels now in Damascus?
How viable is UN Security Council Resolution 2254 as a framework for establishing a more inclusive government in Syria?
Dukhan: Discussions have emerged around using UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254 as a framework for forming a new government. The resolution proposes an interim government for six months, followed by free elections. However, HTS does not appear to be addressing the resolution or its implementation. Are we beyond this framework? It is possible that Western countries lack the leverage to enforce it.
If HTS were removed from the list of terrorist organizations, as Ahmad al-Sharaa has recently called for, and reconstruction aid tied to fair elections after six months, Western countries might gain some influence in shaping Syria’s political future.
Neep: The terms of the ceasefire established by UNSCR 2254 explicitly exclude Jabhat al-Nusra, the precursor of HTS, and calls for the eradication of its ‘safe haven’ in Syria. It is unlikely that HTS will implement this resolution as the basis of a new settlement. But whatever form of political representation emerges, it cannot simply be cosmetic, as was the case under the previous regime. For example, the Assad regime pretended that all communities were represented in its ranks—the defense minister was Sunni, for example—but real power of course lay elsewhere.
There needs to be an alignment of appointments to prominent positions with real power, achieved with a degree of accountability. The idea of a consociational system that involves power-sharing arrangements among different groups, similar to those in Lebanon or Iraq, has clear shortcomings. What is surely far preferable is to have a geographically based system of representation that encourages people to work across the lines of sect and ethnicity, rather than dividing them along those lines.
The demographic changes that have taken place in Syria are challenging to deal with because the nature of society has changed significantly across the entire country. For instance, I am wary of simplifying the situation in northeast Syria. It is not simply the “Kurdish issue” there. One Kurdish party, the PYD (Democratic Union Party), has become the dominant—though not very liberal—political force in the northeast. It has excluded members of other political parties from representation within the system. Many Kurds have also fled the northeast and become refugees elsewhere. We need to be wary of taking claims at face value that these groups are truly representative of public opinion; this applies to political parties in the northeast amongst the Kurds as well as elsewhere.
Most importantly, we have to resist the temptation to see Syria simply as a mosaic of different ethnicities and sects. A mosaic, of course, is a concept rooted in French colonial terminology, which has unfortunately persisted into the present day. Instead, we should frame issues and discussions in terms of geography, economic equality, and social equality. Reliance on the language of sect and ethnicity risks perpetuating stereotypes and divisions and creates long-term problems.
The Islamic State (IS) ruled a sizable territory in Syria from 2014 until its effective destruction in 2018. How do the legacies of IS still affect Syria?
Dukhan: The enduring influence of IS in eastern Syria, particularly among the youth, has fostered a generation exposed to its ideology. Some individuals continue to operate covertly as sleeper cells. Thousands of suspected IS fighters and their families remain in detention centers and refugee camps in northern Syria, as many countries have chosen not to repatriate them.
This raises significant concerns: amidst ongoing instability in the country and continued conflict among various factions, including Kurdish forces, these detainees could rejoin militant groups or resume extremist activities if released. While not all detainees are IS supporters, some fighters have been held in Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) prisons for as long as four years. If the SDF were to collapse, what would happen to all the foreign citizens held in camps like Al-Hol in northeastern Syria?
Neep: I find it astonishing that more attention is not paid to Al-Hol, the prison camp where there are 30-40,000 people imprisoned—the families of IS members, primarily women and children—who are locked in a camp guarded by the SDF. The camp community essentially runs its own affairs, imprisoned in a small city. You have the most radicalized or unrepentant family members, sometimes known patronizingly as “ISIS wives.” You have children who have been raised there. You have boys who have grown to maturity there and are now fathering the next generation of IS. The level of indoctrination happening socially within that camp is truly terrifying.
When these people eventually are released, what possibilities will there be for reintegration into society? What we are seeing in Al-Hol is the generational compounding of misery. It is astounding that no one is talking about what we are going to do, how we are going to repatriate people. European countries don't want them; Iraq doesn't want them; Syria doesn't want them. Nobody wants to take responsibility for these people.
At the same time, some European politicians are already talking about sending Syrians back to Syria right now, despite the ongoing instability. Yet they refuse to accept responsibility for dealing with their own citizens who have contributed to radicalization and violence in Syria over the years.
What will shape Syrians' decisions to return home or stay abroad?
Neep: Syrians have had to make lives outside of Syria for a long time, and the question is open as to how many will want to return and how many will want to continue the life they built abroad. The situations among Syrian refugees vary widely. For instance, many businessmen and industrialists from Aleppo relocated their activities to the Turkish city of Gaziantep, near the Syrian border. Are these people going to want to move back to Aleppo? For them, it will be relatively accessible and easy to do so compared to refugees in Europe, but by now they are well established. Are we going to see more transnational comings and goings, with people building bi-national lives? There's no simple answer to the question of return.
Dukhan: The refugee situation is indeed complex. Many Syrian refugees, especially those in camps, are willing to go back and may have already actually started returning because their living conditions have been miserable for the past decade. Fear of Assad and his intelligence apparatus has held many back, but we will probably see large-scale returns from Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan, depending on how things unfold in the coming weeks.
However, this comes with challenges, such as the economic strain it places on the country. Many of those in the camps have been living off international aid. If they return to their homes and villages in rural areas, where the majority of the infrastructure is ruined, what will they do? I was talking to a friend a couple of days ago, and he told me, “I want to go back but I don't have the money to rebuild my house. Where am I going to live? I have a decent income here in Jordan and can probably survive. But if I go back to Syria now, how am I going to survive?”
Going back is on the minds of many but survival remains a big question. Most of the battles in Syria took place in rural areas, so those going back might move to cities like Aleppo and Damascus, placing a huge strain on already fragile and limited facilities. This is something we will have to watch closely, but I do see a large-scale return happening.
For more Crown Center publications on topics covered in this Crown Conversation, see: "After 10 Years of War, Who Rules Syria," "Why Hasn’t the Asad Regime Collapsed? Lessons Learned from Syria’s History of Tyranny," and "After ISIS: Development and Demography in the Jazira."
Endnotes
[1] Jillian Schwedler has famously written about the way involvement in the pragmatic, day-to-day business of government brings about ideological moderation. See for example: Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
[2] Toby Dodge, Iraq from War to a New Authoritarianism. Vol. 434-435. (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012).
[3] Ibn Khaldun. The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. Translated by Franz Rosenthal. Abridged and edited by N.J. Dawood (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
The opinions and findings expressed in this Conversation belong to the authors exclusively and do not reflect those of the Crown Center or Brandeis University.